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Designing Federalism in Burma

FOREWORDS
I have become one of the editors of this book series as a
result of the sad death of a former editor, Chao-Tzang
Yawnghwe, known to many as Uncle Eugene. I now assume
his duties with the heavy awareness that I will never be able to
fulfill them as he did. Uncle Eugene was one of the great
leaders of the Burmese democratic movement in all its stages,
from the very beginning to the most recent times. When we
heard that his health had taken a turn for the worse, one of
my friends e-mailed me: “He was a shining star of the
movement, and now it seems, that star is falling down.” Life
required of him extraordinary courage, resilience, and
adaptability – as it does for all Burmese who keep alive the
hope of a better future. When he thought it time to resist the
military government by force of arms, he was ready, despite
great personal peril. And then there came a time when he
thought that he should turn away from guns and towards
words, so that he could help his country prepare for a world
after the SPDC. In the spirit of the Panglong Agreement, he
was convinced that Burma could best be governed in a truly
federal system, in which each state wrote its own constitution
and then together created the federal union, with its
constitution. In this book series, Lian H. Sakhong and I try to
carry forward the work that he began.
Part of Uncle Eugene’s legacy is the work of the Support
Committee for State Constitutions. The purpose of the
committee is to assist the groups who are drafting proposed
constitutions for their various states. Uncle Eugene always
understood that the most important part of the SCSC’s work
was not so much to write constitutions as to start a process of
education and consultation. No-one can tell exactly what the
future holds for Burma. We can, however, safely predict one
thing: when Burma’s next chance at democracy comes, it will
need a group of leaders who know how to take up the burdens
of constitutional democracy. And if Burma is to survive as a
5

Designing Federalism in Burma

free country, it will need leaders who are committed to each
other, so that they can steer their people through danger,
hardship, anger, and fear.
Burma has before it a difficult balancing act: it must find
enough unity to stay together as one country, and it must also
find the strength and confidence to allow its various states
and cultures to govern themselves in their own way. When
times become hard, this balance can be especially difficult to
maintain. Some will be tempted to break away from Burma
altogether; and others will be tempted to suppress the selfgovernment of the states. Under those circumstances, Burma
will need leaders of strength, courage, and integrity. And three
things might particularly help to sustain those leaders through
dark times:
1. KNOWLEDGE that other countries have faced
similar problems and survived, and knowledge of how
they have achieved this success through constitutional
design;
2. MUTUAL COMMITMENT to each other and to the
common project, even people from very different
backgrounds, growing from long exposure to each
other in the process of developing a constitutional
system;
3. TESTED IDEAS about how best to arrange a
constitutional system that both allows the union
government to keep the country together and also
allows the constituent states to govern themselves.
In its supporting role, the SCSC tries to help the future
leaders of Burma acquire these three things. Even after Burma
is blessed with a democratic federal government, it will still
face troubles. When those troubles come, Burma’s leaders
may be able to work out their differences if they have these
three things. They will remember that other countries have
come through the same sort of trouble, that constitutional
ideas will help get them through, and above all, that they had
6
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formed deep bonds and friendships in the process of creating
a constitutional system for Burma, rooted in ideas and hopes,
not anger and fear.
This volume is designed to serve as a concise introduction
to certain constitutional ideas that may be relevant to Burma.
It contains three documents: one essay by Lian Sakhong, and
two lectures that I delivered to the SCSC, over several days in
November 2003 and August 2004. All three contain common
themes. First, sometimes ideas can show us a way through
problems that we had thought were impenetrable. Second,
Burma’s problems have grown in part from some
misunderstandings of certain ideas. In particular, many in
Burma have imagined that governance can really occur only at
the center: people look to the central government for ideas,
initiative, direction, guidance, money, and even permission.
They have feared that decentralization (when people look to
state and local governments or even just to themselves as
citizens) will lead to the breakdown of the social order. In
fact, we know that the opposite is generally true: when the
center tries to rule without the support and participation of
the people, then the people invariably become angry and
restless. Even democratic governments–perhaps especially
democratic governments–need the people to be actively
involved in their own governance, and the only feasible way
for most people to govern themselves is at the local level. When
the central government seeks to suppress local government,
the people may rise up in arms, but when the central
government seeks to support local government, the people
may feel gratitude and devotion to the union. In other words,
democracy and federalism are not in tension. In fact, it is
hard to have democracy without also having some kind of
federalism. Every well-functioning democratic government
tries to empower the people, on a local basis, to take a hand in
building their own future.
I feel it appropriate to close this foreword on a personal
note. Some time ago, Uncle Eugene and others invited me to
7
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speak to the SCSC. At the time, I did not know that the
invitation would substantially change my professional life. But
exposure to the Burmese democratic movement and all its
wonderful members is a blessing to everyone and everything
that it touches. Even amidst its sometimes heated
disagreements, the movement holds fast (and must continue
to hold fast) to the things that matter most in human life. The
movement realizes that humans make their world, so they can
remake their world into a better place. Sometimes the path
forward is not always clear, and then we are called on to speak
from our hopes and our dedication to each other, to carry us
through to a better time. By force of circumstance, the
movement must therefore cling to its hopes and mutual
dedication. Years from now, when people sit down to write
the history books, they will remember the people who knew
that Burma could be brought out of sorrow and into joy. And
that memory will be a blessing to every future generation.

David C. Williams
Bloomington, Indiana, USA
October 2004

8

FEDERALISM, CONSTITUTION MAKING
AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA

Designing Federalism in Burma

FEDERALISM, CONSTITUTION MAKING
AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA
Finding Equilibrium between Nation-building for
Self-rule and State-building for Shared-rule in
Federalism
By
Lian H. Sakhong
Introduction
On 12 February 1947, the Union of Burma was founded at
Panglong by four former British colonies, namely the Chin,
Kachin, Federated Shan States and Burma Proper, all of which
already had their own constitutions. The British occupied these
four colonies separately as independent countries in different
periods of time, and applied different administrative systems
in accordance with the different constitutions that the colonial
power had promulgated for them. The British officially
promulgated the Chinland/Chinram Constitution, called the
“Chin Hills Regulation,” in 1896, the “Kachin Hills Regulation”
in 1895, the “1919 Act of Federated Shan States” in 1920, and
the “1935 Burma Act” in 1937. The Chin Hills Regulation of
1896 covered present Chin State in Burma, present Mizoram
State, Nagaland State, and part of Manipur and Meghalaya
States in India. The 1935 Burma Act was applied to the area
of the pre-colonial Myanmar/Burman Kingdom, which
included the former Arakan and Mon Kingdoms as well as
delta areas of Karen country.
Since independence, the twelfth of February has been
celebrated as the Union Day of Burma. The observation of
Union Day as an official holiday in Burma implies the
recognition of the distinctive national identities of those who
signed the Panglong Agreement and ratified the treaty through
the constitutional arrangement of 1947. It also implicitly
11
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recognizes their political rights—the right to gain their own
independence and to establish their own nation-state. The
essence of the Panglong Agreement was, and is, mutual
recognition and respect, based on the principles of political
equality, self-determination and voluntary association.
However, Aung San, who had persuaded the Chin, Kachin,
Shan and other ethnic nationalities to join the Union, was
assassinated before Burma gained her independence. After his
assassination, the 1947 Union Constitution was rushed through
to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. As a
result, the country was plunged into fifty years of civil war.
Burma’s political crisis today is therefore not merely an
ideological confrontation between military dictatorship and
democracy, but also a constitutional problem. The ethnic
nationalities joined the Union as equal partners, preserving
their rights of self-determination, on the basis of the Panglong
Agreement, but Burma’s constitutions have failed to adhere
to the spirit of that agreement.
In this paper, I shall argue that federalism is the only viable
solution to Burma’s current political crisis, including five long
decades of civil war. Federalism, therefore, is essential to the
ultimate success of the democracy movement, to guarantee
political equality for all nationalities, the right of selfdetermination for all member states of the Union, and
democratic rights for all citizens of the Union. I will also argue
not only that federalism is an essential goal of the struggle
but also that federalism may and should be achieved by the
drafting of federal and state constitutions. Under the National
Reconciliation Programme (NRP), the SCSC has undertaken
this drafting process, as a means to end fifty years of conflicts
and to reach a negotiated settlement in Burma.
Federalism: Theoretical Analysis
The term Federal is derived from the Latin words foedus and
fides. According to S. R. Davis, the Latin word foedus is translated
12
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as “covenant”, while its cognate fides means “faith” and “trust.”
When we find in these terms the idea of a “covenant, and
synonymous ideas of promise, commitment, undertaking, or
obligation, vowing, plighting one’s word to a course of conduct
in relations to others,” we come upon a vital bonding device
of civilization. The idea of covenant involves “the idea of
co-operation, reciprocity, mutuality, and it implies the
recognition of entities — whether it be persons, a people, or
a divine being.”1
According to Daniel J. Elazar, the first example of a federal
state with the essential characteristic of the “idea of a contract,
treaty, or alliance” was the ancient Hebrew state, whose
principles are mentioned in the Bible.2 In modern times, the
rise of federal political thought went hand in hand with the
emergence of a political-theological philosophy of federalism
in 16th and early 17th century Renaissance Europe, when the
sovereignty of the modern nation-state appeared as a
conceptual instrument for the organization of power within
the state.
Since the emergence of the modern nation-state,
federalism has generally been defined as an approach to
government that divides public powers not only horizontally,
i.e. separation of powers between legislative, administrative
and judiciary; but vertically, i.e. division of powers between
two or more levels of government. In other words, federalism
is “a constitutional device which provides for a secure, i.e.
constitutional, division of powers between central and
‘segmental’ authorities in such a way that each is acknowledged
to be the supreme authority in specific areas of responsibility.”3
The basic essence of federalism, therefore, is “the notion of
two or more orders of government combining elements of
‘shared rule’ for some purposes and regional ‘self-rule’ for the
other.”4 As such, federalism is seen as a constitutionally
established balance between shared rule and self-rule: shared
rule through common institutions, and regional self-rule
through the governments of the constituent units or states.
13
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The federal principles of self-rule and shared rule, in turn, are
based on “the objective of combining unity and diversity: i.e.
of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct
identities within a larger political union.”5
In a genuine federal system, neither the federal nor state
governments (or, the constituent units) are constitutionally
subordinate to the other, i.e. each has sovereign powers derived
from the constitution rather than from one another level of
government, each is empowered to deal with the citizens in
the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing powers, and
each is directly elected by its citizens. The structural
characteristics of a genuine federal system, at its full
development, can thus be generally defined as follows:
1. Two or more orders of government each acting directly
on its citizens, rather than indirectly through the other
order;
2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and
executive authority, and allocation of revenue resources
between the orders of government ensuring some areas
of genuine autonomy for each other;
3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct
regional or ethnic views within the federal policy-making
institutions, provided not only by a federal second chamber
(i.e., what used to be known in Burma as the Chamber of
Nationalities or the Upper House) composed of
representatives of the state and regional electorates, but
also by state legislatures or governments;
4. A supreme written federal constitution, not unilaterally
amendable by one order of government, and therefore
requiring the consent not only of the federal legislature
but also of a significant portion of the constituent units
or states, through assent by their legislatures or by
referendum of majorities;
5. Written constitutions for all member states of the union,
or constituent units, which are to be promulgated, exercised
14
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and amended independently and unilaterally by each
constituent state for its own state, so long as such
procedures are conducted in accordance with the federal
constitution;
6. An umpire (in the form of a supreme court, or as in
Switzerland provision for referendums) to rule on the
interpretation and valid application of the federal
constitution;
7. Process and institutions to facilitate inter-governmental
collaboration in those areas where governmental
responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap.6
What basically distinguishes federations from decentralized
unitary systems, on the one hand, and from confederations,
on the other, according to Blindenbacher and Watts, is that
“in unitary systems the governments of the constituent units
ultimately derive their authority from the central government,
and in confederations the central institutions ultimately derive
their authority from the constituent units and consist of
delegates of constituent units.”7 In a federation, however, “each
order of government derives its authority, not from each order
of government, but from the constitution.”8
Federalism in the Burmese Context: Lessons Learned
from the 1947 Union Constitution
At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Chin, Kachin, Shan
and other non-Burman nationalities were promised, as
Silverstein observes, the right to exercise political authority
(in the form of administrative, judicial and legislative powers
in their own autonomous national states) and to preserve and
protect their language, culture and religion, in exchange for
voluntarily joining the Burmans in forming a political union
and giving their loyalty to a new state.9
On the basis of the Panglong Agreement, the Union
Constitution was framed. Aung San himself drafted the Union
15
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Constitution and submitted it to the AFPFL convention held
in May 1947, at the Jubilee Hall in Rangoon. Aung San delivered
a long speech at the convention and explained the essence of
the Panglong Agreement, which had the aim of establishing a
Federal Union. He also argued:
When we build our new Burma, shall we build it as a
Union or as a Unitary State? In my opinion it will not
be feasible to set up a Unitary State. We must set up a
Union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard
the rights of the national minorities.10
Aung San also insisted on the right of self-determination
for ethnic nationalities who signed the Panglong Agreement
to found a new Federal Union with so-called Burma Proper.
He referred to his co-signatories, the Chin, Kachin and Shan,
as nations, or pyidaung in Burmese. He said:
The right of self-determination means that a nation can
arrange its life according to its will. It has the right to
arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right
to enter into federal relation with other nations. It has
the right to complete secession.11
Moreover, Aung San clarified the nature of ethnic and
cultural minority rights and their implications, an issue which
many of his contemporaries regarded as problematic:
What is it that particularly agitates a national minority?
A minority is discontented because it does not enjoy the
right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native
language and this discontentment will pass of itself. A
minority is discontented because it does not enjoy liberty
of conscience etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease
to be discontented. Thus, national equality in all forms
(language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the
solution of the national problem [or, ethnic conflict?].
A state law based on complete democracy in the country
is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception

16
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and all kinds of disabilities and restrictions on the rights of
national minorities.12
On the basis of the principles of equality, the right of
self-determination, and constitutional protection of ethnic and
cultural minority groups, Aung San drafted a new constitution
for a new Union of Burma, which was duly approved by the
AFPFL convention. According to Aung San’s version of the
constitution, the Union would be composed of National States,
or what he called “Union States,” such as the Chin, Kachin,
Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Myanmar (Burman), Rakhine
(Arakan) and Shan States. The “original idea,” as Dr Maung
Maung points out, “was that the Union States should have
their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state,
viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary.”13
However, U Chan Htun reversed all these principles of
the Federal Union after Aung San was assassinated. According
to U Chan Htun’s version of the Union Constitution, Burma
Proper or the ethnic Burman/Myanmar did not form their
own separate National State; instead they combined the power
of the Burman/Myanmar National State with the whole
sovereign authority of the Union of Burma. Thus, while one
ethnic group, the Burman/Myanmar, controlled the sovereign
power of the Union, that is, the legislative, judicial and
administrative powers of the Union of Burma, the other ethnic
nationalities who formed their own respective National States
became almost like “vassal states” of the ethnic Burman/
Myanmar bloc. This constitutional arrangement was totally
unacceptable to the Chin, Kachin and Shan who signed the
Panglong Agreement on the basis of the principle of national
equality, and also to other nationalities.
Another serious flaw in the 1947 Constitution was the
absence of state constitutions for all the member states of
the Union. In contrast to the original agreement, according to
which Aung San and Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders intended
to establish a separate state constitution for each and every
state, U Chan Htun’s version of the Union Constitution
17
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incorporated clauses covering all the affairs of the states. In
this way, state affairs became part and parcel of the Union
Constitution, with no separate constitutions for the Chin,
Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities. Such a
constitutional arrangement indicated that whatever powers the
governments of states enjoyed and exercised under the 1947
Constitution were given to them by the central government,
characteristic of a unitary state system. In a unitary system,
power lies in the hands of the central government, and the
powers of local governing or administrative units derive from
or are devolved to them by the central government.
What the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities
envisioned in Panglong was a federal system, in which the
member or constituent states were the basic and founding units
of the federation, and whatever powers they exercised or
possessed were not given to them by the centre. The powers
of the constituent states of a federation are, in principle,
derived from the peoples of the respective states, as is stated
in most state constitutions in countries that are federal in form.
In theory, as Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe observes,
A federation is formed when a number of states agree
for some reason to live and work together under one
flag. And because there is an agreement among founding
states to band together as equal partners, there arises a
need for another level of government to handle matters
of common interest. Accordingly, this government¾the
federal or central government¾is given or vested with
certain powers by the member states. In a federation,
therefore, it is the power of the federal or central
government that is derived from, or given to it, by the
member states. Thus, in federalism, the federal
government is not a superior government that holds all
powers. Various and significant powers are held by the
member states, and these are clearly spelt out in the state
constitutions. In addition, some powers which are shared
by all are given to the federal government, and these
18
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too are spelt out, this time in the federal constitution.
In a federation, therefore, there are two levels of powers
as well as two levels of governments, which are
intertwined, yet separate. Hence, in a federal system there
are two constitutions: one is the federal constitution,
and concurrently with it there exists another set of
constitutions, those of member states of the Union.14
U Chan Htun’s version of the 1947 Union Constitution
of Burma did not allow for the existence of separate
constitutions for the founding member states of the Union,
namely, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other nationalities —
including the Burman.
The third point which betrayed the Panglong Agreement
and Aung San’s policy of federalism was the structure of the
Chamber of Nationalities at the Union Assembly. The original
idea of the creation of the Chamber of Nationalities was to
safeguard not only the rights of non-Burman ethnic
nationalities, but also the symbolic and real equality envisaged
at the Panglong Conference. Thus, the intention was that each
ethnic national state should have the right to send equal
numbers of representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities,
no matter how big or small their national state might be. But
what happened under U Chan Htun’s version of the Union
Constitution was that, while all the non-Burman nationalities
had to send their tribal or local chiefs and princes to the
Chamber of Nationalities, it allowed Burma Proper to elect
representatives to the Chamber on the basis of its population.
Thus, the Burman or Myanmar from Burma Proper, who
composed the majority in terms of population, was given
dominance in the Union Assembly.
In this way, the Union Assembly, according to U Chan
Htun’s version of the Union Constitution, was completely
under the control of the Burman or Myanmar ethnic
nationality. Not only did the powerful Chamber of Deputies
(the lower house of the legislature) have the power to thwart
the aspirations and interests of the non-Burman nationalities,
19
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the Burmans even dominated the Chamber of Nationalities
itself. For that reason, the combined votes of the non-Burman
nationalities (even in the Chamber of Nationalities) were unable
to halt the passage of the “state religion bill” in which U Nu
promulgated Buddhism as a state religion in 1961. Thus, all
the non-Burman nationalities viewed the Union Constitution
itself as an instrument for imposing a tyranny of the majority
and not as their protector, and it was this perception that led
Burma into fifty years of civil war.
The Panglong Agreement was the most solemn agreement
that the Chin, Kachin and Shan had ever signed in their history,
and therefore it had to be protected as the covenant on which
they built the Union together with the Burman and other ethnic
nationalities. However, since the agreement was betrayed or
even broken by Burmese politicians after Aung San was
assassinated, the Chin and other non-Burman ethnic
nationalities in the Union of Burma have had to redefine the
covenant, or Union Constitution, through which they have
sought to build a peaceful Union of Burma.
Nation-building and the Problem of Forced
Assimilation
When the Chin, Kachin and Shan signed the Panglong
Agreement in 1947, what they aimed to achieve was to “speed
up” their own search for freedom, together with the Burman
and other nationalities, based on the principles of equality,
mutual trust and recognition; but not to integrate their societies
and their lands into Myanmar Buddhist society and the Burman
Kingdom. Thus, for them, the basic concept of independence
was independence without integration, that is, what political
scientists used to term “coming together”, or “together in
difference.” These phrases refer to a process by which nations
come together in order to form a modern nation-state in the
form of a Federal Union, or Pyi-daung-suh in Burmese, while
20
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maintaining the right of national self-determination and the
autonomous status of their nations.
Within this concept of “coming together,” it is important
to differentiate between “nation” and “state,” or what Hannah
Arendt refers to as a “secret conflict between state and nation.”
According to Arendt,
[The nation] presents the “milieu” into which man is
born, a closed society to which one belongs by the right
of birth; and a people becomes a nation when it arrives
at a historical consciousness of itself; as such it is attached
to the soil which is the product of past labour and where
history has left its traces. The state on the other hand is
an open society, ruling over territory where its power
protects and makes law. As a legal institution, the state
knows only citizens no matter of what nationality; its
legal order is open to all who happen to live on its
territory.15
The state, far from being identical with the nation, is “the
supreme protector of a law which guarantees man his rights
as man, his rights as citizen and his rights as a national.”16 By
signing the Panglong Agreement, the Chin, Kachin and Shan
had co-founded a Federal Union of a multi-national state,
which is an administrative and legal unit, but they still wanted
to keep their own respective nations, a concept which according
to Weber belongs to the sphere of values: culture, language,
religion, ethnicity, homeland, shared memories and history, a
specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups or
people. Thus, what Aung San and the Chin, Kachin, and Shan
leaders wanted to achieve at Panglong was to build a Union
through a state-building process, not to create a nation through
nation-building.
As mentioned above, the Burmese word for “Union” is
“Pyi-daung-shu,” which means “the coming together of different
‘nations’ and ‘national states.’”17 As the term indicates, the Pyidaung-shu allows the peaceful co-existing of different ethnic
21
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groups with different cultural and religious backgrounds, i.e.
different nations, within an administrative and legal unit of
political union. It is, therefore, clear that state-building is very
different from nation-building, because in the building of a
multi-national state, there can be many nation-building
processes taking place at the same time for the different
member nations.
In contrast to state-building, nation-building excludes from
its process other ethnic groups, cultures, religions and
everything related to multiculturalism and diversity. Thus, by
accepting only one homogeneous set of cultural and religious
values as its political values, the very notion of nation-building
can produce only a nation-state made by a homogeneous
people or nation that claims “pre-state unity based on culture,
history or religion.”18 As a result, a nation-state made by a
nation through the nation-building process cannot
accommodate other cultures, religions and ethnic groups. At
best, as Saunders argues, “it can tolerate non-integrated
minorities as guests, but not as equal citizens. The status of
fully recognized citizen can be attained only by integration.
Those who want to become citizens must change their cultural
identity.” Moreover, as Saunders explains:
If a cultural minority demands political recognition and
identity, the state must reject the claim. Because it is
unable to accommodate a fragmented political identity,
it will ultimately come into conflict with its minorities.
Either the minorities must be integrated within the
majority culture, destroying their original cultural roots,
or they must be denied the opportunity to enhance their
cultural identity through political means. A fragmented
political identity is rejected as a solution, because of is
threat to the unity, homogeneity, and the roots of state’s
existence.19
Aung San seemed to have a clear policy of state-building
based on the principles of equality and unity in diversity. He
maintained that nation-building in the form of “one race, one
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religion, and one language ha[s] gone obsolete.”20 By inviting
the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities to form
a new Union, Aung San’s policy of unity in diversity
transcended all different cultures and religions, rejecting them
as structural and functional factors to unite the country. By
rejecting culture and religion as uniting factors of the country,
he opted for a secular state whose political values would be
based not on cultural and religious roots but on the equality
of individual citizens and the right of self-determination for
member states of the Union. Aung San particularly rejected
religiously oriented ethno-nationalism, which mixed religion
with politics. He thus declared:
Religion is a matter of individual conscience, while
politics is social science. We must see to it that the
individual enjoys his rights, including the right to
freedom of religious belief and worship. We must draw
clear lines between politics and religion because the two
are not the same thing. If we mix religion with politics,
then we offend the spirit of religion itself.21
However, after Aung San was assassinated, U Nu
reintroduced cultural and religious values into political debate
and abandoned Aung San’s policy of unity in diversity together
with the union-building process. For U Nu, the only means to
build a new nation was to revive the pre-colonial cultural unity
of Buda-bata Maynmar Lu-myo, which had nothing to do with
the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities who
joined the Union in order to speed up their own freedom.
Although Buddhism had been a powerful integrative force
in traditional Myanmar society, a modern multi-national state
of the Union of Burma with its multi-religious, multi-cultural,
multi-ethnic plural society was a very different country from
that of the pre-colonial Myanmar Kingdom. However, leaders
like U Nu still believed that Buddhism could make a significant
contribution to some aspects of national integration. When
he became the Prime Minister of the newly independent
Burma, U Nu contradicted Aung San’s version of the Union
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Constitution, particularly the clause that separated religion from
politics, by declaring: “In the marrow of my bones there is a
belief that government should enter into the sphere of
religion.”22 In this way, U Nu’s government officially adopted
Buddhism as its state religion, as a means of national
integration. By this means, an attempt was made to achieve
homogeneity by imposing religious and cultural assimilation
into the predominant group of Myanmar Buddhists. In 1953,
the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs was created to
promote the process of assimilation, and eventually it
promulgated Buddhism as the state religion of the Union of
Burma in 1961.23
While U Nu opted for cultural and religious assimilation
into Buddhism, or Buda-bata Myanmar-lumyo, as a means of
integration, General Ne Win, who came to power through
military coup in 1962, removed the rights of the country’s
religious and cultural minorities, including all civil and basic
human rights, as a means of creating a homogeneous unitary
state. Moreover, General Ne Win imposed his national language
policy by declaring Myanmar-sa as the only official language in
the entire Union of Burma, which therefore was required to
be used at all levels of government and public functions, and
also to be the only medium of instruction at all levels of schools
in the country—from primary to university levels. He not only
imposed the Myanmar-sa as the official language, but also
suppressed the right to learn the other ethnic national languages
of the Union.
Nation-building, for both U Nu and Ne Win, was simply
based on the notion of “one race, one language and one
religion”—that is to say, the ethnicity of Myanmar-lumyo, the
language of Myanmar-sa and the state religion of Buddhism.
Thus, what they wanted to achieve through nation-building
was to create a homogeneous nation of Myanmar Naing-ngan,
by drawing its political values from the cultural and religious
values of Maynmar-sa and Buddhism. Although their
approaches to national integration were different, U Nu and
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Ne Win shared the goal of creating a homogeneous people in
the country. While U Nu opted for cultural and religious
assimilation into Buddhism as a means of integration, Ne Win
used the national language policy of Myanmar-sa and denied
the rights of the country’s religious and cultural minorities as
a means of creating a homogeneous unitary state. U Nu and
Ne Win thus complemented each other, although their
approaches in oppressing the cultural and religious minorities
were different in nature.
Supplementing U Nu’s policy of state religion and Ne Win’s
national language policy, the current military regime is opting
for ethnicity as a means of national integration, by imposing
ethnic assimilation into Myanmar-lumyo. The changing of the
country name from Burma to Myanmar, the name only of the
ethnic Myanmar, in 1989 is a case in point. When it implemented
its policy of ethnic assimilation by force, the present military
junta applied various methods: killing people and destroying
the livelihood of ethnic minorities in fifty years of civil war,
using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities, and
religious persecution as a means of destroying ethnic identity,
especially of the Chin, Kachin and Karen Christians. In this
way, the successive governments of the Union of Burma —
from U Nu to Ne Win to Saw Maung and Than Shwe — have
carried out the nation-building process in terms of “one race,
one language, one religion,” that is — Myanmar-lunyo, Myanmarsa, and Buddhism.
In the name of nation-building, the successive
governments of the Union of Burma have violated not only
basic human rights and civic rights but also all kind of collective
rights. In the name of national sovereignty the rights of selfdetermination for ethnic nationalities are rejected; in the name
of national integration the right to follow different religions,
to practice different cultures, and to speak different languages
are deprived; and in the name of national assimilation the rights
to up-hold different identities and traditions are denied. In
short, the successive government of the union of Burma,
25

Designing Federalism in Burma

particularly current military government have been practicing
ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide for forty years.
State-building and Unity in Diversity: An Option for
the Future
As mentioned above, nation-building belongs to what social
scientists call “subjective values,” that is, culture, language,
religion, ethnicity, homeland, shared memories and history,
etc., which differentiate one group of people from another—
values that cannot be shared objectively. Thus, the nationbuilding process is impossible to implement in a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural, multi-religious plural society like the Union of
Burma. The only way to implement the nation-building process
in a plural society is to use coercive force for assimilation, but
that approach will definitely result in confrontation and
conflict, because the very notion of nation-building is “hostile
to multiculturalism and diversity.”24 Unfortunately, this conflict
is exactly what has occurred in Burma during the past fifty
years.
In a plural society like the Union of Burma, the only good
option is federalism with a strong emphasis on decentralization
and local autonomy, in which the parallel processes of nationbuilding for all the national states, i.e. member states of the
union, and state-building for the union as a multi-national state,
can go hand in hand. Federalism by definition is the division
of power between the federal government and state
governments, which have their own separate constitutions.
When member states of the federal union are composed in
terms of ethnicity and historical homeland, each national state
can implement its own nation-building process within the
territory of its homeland based on its own culture, language,
religion, ethnicity, shared memories, etc., by making its own
state constitution. Thus, while the purpose of writing a state
constitution is self-rule through a nation-building process
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allowing for the preservation and promotion of distinct
identities, the purpose of making a federal constitution is
shared rule through a state-building process aimed at the
establishment of common institutions for multiculturalism and
diversity. In a nutshell, while the state constitutions drafting
process aims to implement a nation-building process for
national states within the Union, the federal constitution aims
to complete the state-building process for the Union of Burma.
In this way, federalism can combine nation-building and statebuilding with the objective of unity in diversity, that is,
“accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities
within a larger political union.”25
Although the state constitution making process through
nation-building can be a value-based subjective approach, the
federal constitution making process through state-building is
purely a matter of objective value; for the federal constitution
is “a legal institution, [which] knows only citizens no matter
of what nationality, and [whose] legal order is open to all who
happen to live on its territory.”26 As a legal institution, federal
constitution rules “over territory where its power protects and
makes law”, which guarantees “man his rights as man, his rights
as citizen and his rights as a national.”27 Thus, in a genuine
federal system, the federal constitution will never adopt cultural
values as political values, and it shall never promulgate a law
that aims at the creation of a homogeneous culture, which
excludes other cultures.
Conclusion: Finding Equilibrium between Nationbuilding and State-making
The question of constitution making is usually focused on
the structure and function of the state and government; how
the state should be formed, how government should be
organized, and how people should be governed. In a
multicultural plural society like Burma, such simple questions
27

Designing Federalism in Burma

concerned only with good governance are simply not enough.
We need to raise more controversial issues such as: Who should
govern whom? What majority or majorities should rule over
what minorities? Who should control the political power of
the state, and with regards to whom? Who should decide the
procedure by which it is settled who should govern whom?
As mentioned above, federalism is an approach to
government that divides public powers not only horizontally,
but also vertically. Federalism, therefore, has been viewed as a
useful way of limiting governmental power in order to secure
good governance. In addition to balancing self-rule and shared
rule through constitutionally established mechanisms, the
recognition and participation of cultural and ethnic minorities
can also be achieved through:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Emphasis on the political rather than the cultural base of
the nation-state;
Separation of the state and religious or other socio-cultural
powers;
Emphasis on human rights as protection of minority
rights;
Emphasis on separation of powers, formally and
informally;
Executive power sharing;
Multiparty system and proportional rule in elections of
the parliament;
Decentralization and local autonomy, including bicameralism, as a means of vertical power sharing.

In today’s Burmese political context, the processes of
federal constitution and state constitutions drafting can be
defined as finding a political compromise between statebuilding and nation-building, which will hopefully result in an
institutional equilibrium. A political compromise has to be
found between a cultural majority having enough power to
define a majority regime on the one hand, and cultural
minorities seeking recognition in the constitutional framework
and participation in political decision making on the other.
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The institutional equilibrium is always a compromise between
a majority regime and institutional forms of minority
protection and power sharing.
In the context of the legal system, an institutional
equilibrium between state-making and nation-building implies
the concept of equality. Thus, a multi-national state or a union
that implements this fundamental principle must translate the
concept of equality into effective collective rights. Although
democracy is based on the principle of majority rule, the
majority should not abuse its democratic power by tyrannising
its minorities. Federalism can effectively control the tyranny
of the majority through not only constitutionally mandated
decentralization, but also the equalisation of majority and
minority before the law, which recognizes the rights of a
minority to be treated equally both as individuals and as
communities.
The concept of equality implies both collective rights and
individual rights. The protection of the human rights of
individuals prevents the authorities of the state from
discriminating against individuals who belongs to minorities,
on the grounds of their language, religion, ethnicity or race.
The guarantee of human rights as individual rights according
to the law is different from that of tolerance. Tolerance also
allows everyone to live within his or her community as a
respected individual, free from discrimination on the ground
of ethnicity, religion or language. However, those who are
tolerated are not part of the governing people, the “We” who
form the state; for members of tolerated minorities, the state
is “their” state and “their” union, not “our” state or union.
Diversity might be respected, but not as a political value.
Minorities are respected because that is required by the
universal values enshrined in the constitution, as in the 1947
Constitution of the Union of Burma. But in such a situation,
diversity is neither a policy nor a goal of the state.
Fifty years of negative experiences of constitution making
and practice teaches that federalism is the only good option
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for the future of Burma. In order that unity in diversity
becomes a political value of the Union, state constitution
drafting must engage in nation-building; federal constitution
drafting must engage in state-building; and the constitutional
structure as a whole must seek equality between these two
processes. Thus, the ultimate goal of the democracy movement
in Burma is to establish a genuine Federal Union of Burma,
which will guarantee democratic rights for all citizens, political
equality for all ethnic nationalities, and the rights of selfdetermination for all member state of the Union.
**********
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Lian H. Sakhong
Preamble
The Union of Burma was founded in 1947 at Panglong
Conference by pre-colonial independent nations, namely, the
Chin, Kachin, Federated Shan State and Burma Proper or
Ministerial Burma; and the peoples of Karen, Karenni, Mon
and Rakhine (Arakan) who later ratified the “Panglong
Agreement” through the constitutional arrangement of
independent Burma. The essence of “Panglong Agreement”
was not only to “speed up” their own search for freedom but
also to establish a new multi-national-state of the Union of
Burma for those who struggled together to free themselves
from colonial power. Based on the “Panglong Agreement”,
the Constituent Assembly of the Interim Government of the
Union of Burma promulgated a new constitution on
September 24, 1947, thereby paving the way for securing
“independence” from the Great Britain on January 4, 1948.
Ever since the independence, however, the Union of
Burma has been suffering more than five long decades of civil
war, in which thousands of lives were sacrificed. In the name
of civil war the successive governments of the Union of
Burma have violated not only basic human rights and civic
rights but also all kinds of collective rights. In the name of
national sovereignty the right of self-determination for the
ethnic nationalities who joined the Union as equal partners
are rejected; in the name of national integration the right to
follow different religions, to practice different cultures, and to
speak different languages are deprived; and in the name of
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national assimilation the rights to up-hold different identities
and traditions are denied. As a result, the entire population in
Burma has miserably underwent for forty years of human
rights abuses, the demise of democratic principles, the
plummeting of nation’s economics and its attendant poverty
and hardship under the authoritarian rule of BSPP and present
military dictatorship.
Therefore it is so urgent to rebuild the “Union of Burma”
based on the spirit of Panglong, which General Aung San and
ethnic nationalities leaders had anticipated in 1947. The
Panglong Spirit is for “democracy, equality and selfdetermination”. Thus, the future “Federal Union of Burma”,
which shall be built upon the spirit of Panglong, will guarantee
the fundamental rights for all citizens including the principles
contained in the United Nation’s declaration of universal
human rights, political and ethnic equality for all nationalities
and the rights of self-determination for all member states of
the Union.
We, the representatives of the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
Karenni, Mon, Myanmar (Burman), Rakhine (Arakan) and
Shan, therefore, in the spirit of Panglong, adopted the
following “Basic Principles” for the future Federal Union of
Burma. These principles, in fact, are the same Basic Principles
as when the Union was founded in the first place in 1947. In
essence, therefore, what we are putting forward as our vision
for the future Union of Burma is the revival of the “Pang
long Spirit”, which, we hope, everyone in the Union of Burma
can agree upon.
The Basic Principles of Federalism at the time of Union
Formation
There are ten basic principles that were borne in mind by
General Aung San and the Founding Fathers of the Union
when they signed the Panglong Agreement for setting up a
Federal Union. They are:
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1. Sovereign State
The Union of Burma shall be a sovereign multi-national-state,
and the sovereign authority shall be rested with the people.
General Aung San and the Founding Fathers of the Union
particularly emphasized “popular sovereignty”, which opposed
the concepts of both “the sovereignty belongs to the nation”
(French Revolution’s tradition) and “sovereignty is vested in
nation’s parliament” (British system). It was, therefore, assumed
that the people of the entire Union of Burma, not merely a
people from any particular ethnic group or state, are vested
with sovereignty, it shall be exercised on their behalf on the
basis of a functional division of powers between the central
Federal Government and the member states of the Union.
2. Voluntary Association
The founding members of the Union, who signed the Panglong
Agreement in 1947, were leaders from pre-colonial
independent “nations”. In principle, therefore, they all had
the rights to regain their own independence directly from Great
Britain, and to form their own respective independent nationstates. However, they all opted to establish a new multinational-state of the Union of Burma together. The principle
for joining the Union, or becoming a member state of the
Union, was “Voluntary Association” which was strongly
emphasized by General Aung San and the leaders of ethnic
nationalities at the Panglong Conference and also at the
Constituent Assembly of 1947, at which the Union
Constitution was framed.
3. Equality
In political domain, the term “equality” implies individual rights
for all citizens, collective rights for all ethnic nationalities in
the Union, and political rights for all member states of the
Union. At individual level, every citizen of the country shall
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enjoy equal rights and equal opportunities before the law; at
collective level of ethnicity and nationality, every nationality
has equal right to preserve, protect and promote their culture,
language, religion and national identity. At political level, all
member states of the Union shall enjoy equal political rights
and political powers; which mean all political powers of
legislative, administrative and judiciary shall be equally bestowed
upon all member state of the Union. In order to exercise
political powers freely and fairly, all member states of the Union
shall be entitled to establish a State Legislative Assembly, State
Government, and a State Supreme Court. Moreover, each of
all member states of the Union shall elect and send an equal
number of representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities
(Upper House) of Union Assembly.
4. Self-determination
For the Founding Fathers of the Union, the principle of the
right to self-determination was meant to have two aspects;
“external aspect” and “internal aspect”. External aspect of
self-determination implies colonial situation of being subjected
to foreign domination, thereby emphasized as the right of the
peoples of the Union of Burma to determine collectively to
establish a sovereign multi-national-state and freely determine
their international status as an independent country. An internal
aspect of self-determination implies the right of all ethnic
nationalities and member states of the Union to choose their
own system of government and the right to participate in the
political process that govern them. An internal aspect of selfdetermination also implies that all ethnic nationalities in the
Union, by virtue of the right to self-determination, have the
right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural developments. Moreover,
all ethnic nationalities of indigenous peoples in the Union of
Burma have the rights to possess their natural wealth and
natural resources in their own respective homelands.
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Politically speaking, the internal aspect of “selfdetermination” implies the rights of member states of the
Union to exercise political powers of legislation, administration
and jurisdiction; and the rights to set up political institutions,
namely, State Legislative Assembly, State Government and State
Supreme Court, in order to ensure the free practice of political
powers in accordance with laws.
Ethnic nationalities leaders who signed the Panglong
Agreement with General Aung San took this issue of selfdetermination very seriously and accordingly made an ardent
request for it. They retained the idea of “internal selfdetermination” in the administration and planning of their
own internal affairs of respective states, even though they
agreed that the Sovereign Power must be vested in the entire
population of the Union in order to be able to set up a Federal
Union. In that way they vested the sovereignty power in the
Union while retaining in their hands the self-determination
of legislative, administrative and judiciary powers; that will
ensure them to legislate freely in each of all member states of
the Union.
5. Federal Principles
One of the most important principles that helps the realization
of the above three principles (Principles 2 to 4) at the time of
the formation of a Union is the “Federal Principle”. In other
words, “Voluntary Association”, “Equality” and “Selfdetermination” cannot be materialized in any other
constitutional form except for the Federalism. That means
the principles of “Voluntary Association”, “Equality” and
“Self-determination” cannot be realized in a system of a
Unitary State. They can be implemented only through the
political system of Federalism.
At the time of Union formation, this fifth principle, i.e.,
“Federal Principle”, was indeed a fundamental principle
because it had to do directly with the constitution of the newly
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independent multi-national-state of the Union of Burma.
Questions like: Shall we set up the new Union in the form of
Unitary State? Or shall we set it up in the form of a federal
system? etc., were the crucial questions for both General Aung
San and the ethnic nationalities leaders at the Panglong
Conference. It was General Aung San who first raised and
also answered the question. And he said:
When we build our new Burma, shall we build it as a
Union or as a Unitary State? In my opinion it will not
be feasible to set up a Unitary State. We must set up a
Union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard
the rights of the national minorities.1
The “Federal Principle” was the corner stone of Aung
San’s version of a (draft) Constitution of the Union of Burma,
which was ratified by the ASPFL convention in May 1947.2
Moreover, based on the federal principle, Aung San submitted
his “Seven Basic Principles”, which would form the main
components and guidelines in drawing the Constitution of
the Union of Burma, at the Constituent Assembly of Interim
Burmese Government, and the Assembly duly ratified before
he was assassinated.
In his now classic work: Burma’s Constitution, Dr. Maung
Maung mentioned that the intention of General Aung San
and the Founding Fathers of the Union at Panglong, was as
follow:
The original idea was that the Union States [member
states of the Union, i.e., Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni,
Mon, Rakhine and Shan States] should have their own
constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament,
Government and Judiciary.3
The “Federal Principle”, therefore, implies the notion of
two or more orders of government with combining elements
of ‘shared rule’ and ‘self-rule’: shared rule through common
institutions, and regional self-rule through the governments
of the constituent states. The federal principles of self-rule
40

Designing Federalism in Burma

and shared rule, in turn, are based on the fact that all member
states of the Union are entitled to exercise legislative,
administrative and judiciary powers within their respective
states, on the one hand, and, on the other to make sure that at
the Union Assembly there must be a bicameral legislature
consisting of Chamber of Nationalities (Upper House) and
Chamber of Deputies (Lower House), and each member state
of the Union should send an equal number of representatives
to the Upper House regardless of its population or size.
This is the main principle of the federal system envisioned
by General Aung San and leaders of Chin, Kachin and Shan
when they signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947.
6. Minority Rights
As mentioned, the Union of Burma was founded at Panglong
by four former British colonies, namely the Chin, Kachin,
Federated Shan State and Burma Proper, all of which already
had their own constitution. All of these former colonies were
territorial states; none of them were ethnically homogeneous.
For example, there lived Karen, Mon and Rakhine peoples
besides Burmans in the Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma,
which was formed according to the 1935 Burma Act. The
Chin Hills Regulation, which was promulgated in 1896,
represented not only the Chins but also the Naga people living
in present India and Burma, the indigenous peoples in present
Manipur State in India, and also the peoples in the whole of
Magalia State (excluding the Silong municipality). The same
can be said about the Federated Shan State where many ethnic
nationalities, such as Lahu, Pa-laung, Pa-o and Wa are living
side by side with the Shan.
Therefore, for General Aung and the Founding Fathers
of the Union, an important issue to be considered seriously
was the rights of minority nationalities living in each of the
member states of Union when it came to the issue of forming
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a Union. The rights of the minority nationalities should be
protected legally in accordance with laws in many ways.
To well protect legally the minority nationalities in the
member states of the Union, General Aung San proposed in
his draft of the Union Constitution that those areas where
minority groups are living must be designated as Autonomous
Regions and National Areas. He proposed that those minorities
shall be granted not only the rights to preserve and develop
their own culture, religion, language and national identity, but
also personal autonomy, which would enable them to ensure
their rights by acting themselves within the framework of their
own institutions.
7. Fundamental Rights
The 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma enshrined
the fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and
expression, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
freedom of movement, and also freedom of voting and
contesting in general elections, freedom of holding public
office, freedom of pursuing education and professional life,
and freedom of pursuing happiness in life. This also included
gender equality, equal rights and equal opportunity for every
citizen regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, language, religion
and age.
8. Multi-party Democracy System
Though this “Multi-party Democracy System” had been
an important principle at the time of the Union Formation,
this particular principle caused the most heated debate. At that
time many Burmese political leaders were more or less under
the influence of Marxist-left-wing ideology. Accordingly the
extremist left wings and those who were members of the
Communist party and the Socialist party did not support the
multi-party democracy system. On the other hand, there were
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some extremist right-wing politicians that admired Fascism in
Japan and Nazism in Germany, who wanted to set up an
absolute authoritarian system.
Moreover, the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Shan and
most of other ethnic groups were still practicing feudal systems
with its attendant titles, such as Ram-uk, Duwa, Sawke, Saophya
and Saobwa, respectively, and thus did not understand much
about the multi-party democracy system.
It was due to General Aung San and the Founding Fathers
of the Union’s far-sighted vision, however, that democratic
rights were definitely enshrined in the 1947 Constitution of
the Union of Burma. The multi-party democracy system lasted
only 12 years, and General Ne Win, with the support of leftand right-wing politicians, militarists and chauvinists, seized
power and established a one-party socialist-military
dictatorship. As a consequence the country has witnessed
repeated abuse of human rights, the demise of democracy,
and bitterly suffered from various sorts of political, economic
and social crises including civil war for more than 50 years.
The essence of this basic principle is that there should
not be a lasting monopolization of power and bullying
hegemony by one ethnic group or one ideology or one
organization or one party, but a political ideology which
envisions peaceful multi-ethnic, multi-ideology and multi-party
coexistence; also envisions peaceful administration of the
nation in accordance with the laws for the benefits of all people,
and alternative participation in the administration during one’s
elected term through a free, fair and just process of multiparty election contests.
9. Secular State
Like “Multi-party Democracy System”, the principle of
“Secular State” also received a heated debate among the
Burmese politicians. Leaders like Dedot U Ba Chu argued that,
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“if we cannot proclaim Buddhism as a state religion,
independence would be a hallow freedom”. General Aung
San, however, rejected such argument, and said:
Religion is a matter of individual conscience, while
politics is social science. We must see to it that the
individual enjoys his rights, including the right to
freedom of religious belief and worship. We must draw
clear lines between politics and religion because the two
are not the same thing. If we mix religion with politics,
then we offend the spirit of religion itself.4
In his draft constitution, General Aung San clearly stated
his policy on religion as follows:
14(1). The abuse of the church or of religion for political
purposes is forbidden.
14(2). The state shall observe neutrality in religious
matters.
14(3). Religious communities whose teaching is not
contrary to the Constitution are free in practice and
exercise of their religion and religious ceremonies
and are also free to have schools for the education
of priests: but schools shall, however, be under the
general supervision of the State.
However, after General Aung San was assassinated, U
Chan Htun, under the supervision of U Nu, reversed the Union
Constitution as follows:
14(1). The State recognizes the special position of
Buddhism as the faith professed by the great
majority of the citizens of the Union.
14(2). The State shall not impose any disabilities or make
any discrimination on the ground of religious
profession, belief, or status.
14(3). The State may extend material or other assistance
to any religious institution.
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U Chan Htun’s version of the Constitution, which was
promulgated in September 1947 as the Constitution of the
Union of Burma, officially proclaimed a “confessional policy
of religion”. The reversion of “secular state” to “confessional
policy of religion”, and the promulgation of Buddhism as state
religion of the Union of Burma in 1961, were the beginning
of religious-oriented ethnic conflict in Burma.
10. Rights of Secession
When the basic principles were laid down at the time of the
Union formation, the “Right of Secession” was included as
the principle that safeguards and underlines all the rest of the
principles.
The essence of the “Right of Secession” is that the newly
formed Union shall be multi-national-state and be founded
on the principle of Federalism, and all member states of the
Union shall decide for themselves to become a member state
and accordingly join the Union in accordance with their own
consent. All the member states of the Union shall enjoy equal
rights politically and socially when they decide to join the Union
as a member State. The member states of the Union shall also
enjoy the right to self-determination in the areas of politics,
economics, social and cultural affairs. What is meant by this is
that all member states of the Union shall be entrusted with
legislative, administrative and judiciary powers; and also that
all member states of the Union shall send an equal number of
representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities (Upper House)
of the Union Assembly. In this way, the essence of a Federal
Union formed by member states of the Union that are equally
entrusted with the right of self-determination will be brought
to light.
Moreover, the right of minority nationalities in each of
all member states of the Union shall be protected legally and
constitutionally. The democracy and fundamental rights shall
be guaranteed for all citizens, and the Union shall observe
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neutrality in religious matter. To prevent the emergence of
chauvinism and narrow-minded nationalism, a clear guideline
for the Form of State and Form of Government must be
provided legally and constitutionally in accordance with above
principles.
If it is found that the Form of State and Form of
Government do not conform to the principles agreed upon
or go astray from the intention of those principles, all member
states of the Union have the right to secede from the Union.
Thus, it was clearly enshrined in chapter 10, article 201 and
202 of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, adopted in
1947, that:
Chapter (X): The Right of Secession
201. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Constitution or in any Act of Parliament made under
section 199, every state shall have the right to secede
from the Union in accordance with the condition
hereinafter prescribed.
202. The right of secession shall not be exercised within
ten years from the date on which this Constitution
comes into operation.
The above principles are the lifeblood of the Union at
the time of its formation. The Union would never be set up
unless there were these principles. Therefore it is hoped that
more or less these basic principles would be of help for the
restoration of the Union.
Proposal for the Future:
Basic Principles for the Future Federal Constitution of
the Union of Burma
All ethnic nationalities in the Union of Burma have lived
together, sharing the fates of each other for more than 50
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years. In this period they have faced together five long decades
of civil war, and also passed through together the bitter
experiences of dictatorship and associated persecution of
various kinds. Together they have also suffered bitter severities
of all sorts under military dictatorship. Likewise, they are
waiting together for a new light of hope for the future.
Therefore we are now fighting in the hope of creating a
situation in which all ethnic nationalities can live together
peacefully and fraternally. All ethnic nationalities are still
fighting the resistant war against the military regime in
Rangoon, in the hope of creating the opportunity for all the
peoples of Burma to fully enjoy their human right, to establish
a democratic system, to create open society, and to materialize
the right to self-determination for all member states of the
Union. To build up a peaceful Union the following principles
are outlined.
These principles are based upon those principles
envisioned by General Aung San and the Founding Fathers
of the Union at Panglong. In other words, it can be seen as a
refurbished policy of national leader General Aung San.
However, due to the experience of 50 years two important
principles at that time are omitted. These two principles are
“Voluntary Association” and “Right of Secession”. For after
50 years of living together the “Voluntary Association” seems
no longer necessary. Though this principle was important at
the formation of the Union in the past, it is considered not to
be important in the present Union, which has already attained
50 years chronologically.
Moreover, another important principle at the time of
Union formation, that is, the “Right of Secession” is also
omitted. The sole reason for the insertion of “Right of
Secession” in the 1947 Constitution was for the protection of
the right of non-Burman ethnic nationalities who joined the
Union as equal partners in 1947 at Panglong. The “Right of
Secession”, however, failed to protect the rights of ethnic
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nationalities on one hand, and it rather encouraged, on the
other hand, the emergence of one-party dictatorship (BSPP)
and military dictatorship (Revolutionary Council in 1962 to
present military junta), to bully the rights of the peoples at
their whim. For taking his cue from this “Right of Secession”
General Ne Win seized the political power on March 2, 1962.
Using the “Right of Secession” as a pretext the civil war was
created and fought, thereby causing huge casualties of both
human lives and natural resources of the indigenous population
of ethnic nationalities for more than 50 years. The military
dictatorship is established on the conviction that “The Union
will disintegrate without a strong army” on the backdrop of
the “Right of Secession”.
Therefore it is believed that instead of emphasizing the
“Right of Secession”, making a new constitution that will
protect the rights of “democracy, equality and selfdetermination”, which are the very essence of “Right of
Secession”, will bring more benefits to the Union and the
people, and will also guarantee the survival and prosperity of
the future generation.
Therefore for attainment of peace and progress for the
future Union, the following principles are presented:
1. Popular Sovereignty
The people of the Union of Burma, not a particular ethnic
group or state, shall be vested with the sovereign power
of the Union.
2. Equality
All citizens of the country shall enjoy equal rights and
equal opportunity before the law; all ethnic nationality shall
be granted equal rights to preserve, protect and promote
their culture, language, religion and national identity; and
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all member states of the Union shall be entitled to exercise
equal political powers and rights.
3. Self-determination
All ethnic nationalities and member states of the Union
shall enjoy the rights to self-determination in the areas of
politics, economics, religious, culture and other social
affairs.
4. Federal Principle
All member states of the Union shall have their separate
constitutions, their own organs of state, that is, State
Legislative Assembly, State Government and State
Supreme Court. Moreover, the Union Assembly must be
a bicameral legislature consisting of a Chamber of
Nationalities (Upper House) and a Chamber of Deputies
(Lower House), and each member state of the Union shall
send an equal number of representatives to the Upper
House regardless of its population or size.
5. Minority Rights
The new Federal Constitution of Burma shall protect
legally the minority nationalities in the member states of
the Union, they shall be granted not only the rights to
preserve and develop their own culture, religion, language
and national identity, but also personal autonomy, which
will enable them to ensure their rights by acting themselves
within the framework of their own institutions.
6. Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality
Gender quality, democratic rights and human rights shall
be enshrined in the new Federal Constitution of the Union
of Burma; including, freedom of speech and expression,
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freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of
movement, freedom of voting and contesting in general
election, freedom of holding public office, freedom of
pursuing education and professional life, and freedom of
pursuing happiness in life. This includes gender equality,
equal rights and equal opportunity for every citizen
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, language, religion and
age.
7. Multi-party Democracy System
A Multi-party democracy system shall be applied for the
country governing system.
8. Secular State
The Union Assembly shall make no law that proclaims a
state-religion; and the abuse of religion for political
purposes shall also be forbidden. Moreover, the Union
shall strictly observe neutrality in religious matters.
[This is a Concept Paper for Seminar on the Basic Principles for Future Federal
Union of Burma, held on February 9-12, 2005. The Seminar was attended
by more than 106 representatives from 42 organizations, including elected MPs,
senior leaders of ethnic nationalities and political parties, representatives of
women and youth organizations; and adopted above 8 principles as the “Basic
Principles for Future Federal Constitution of the Union of Burma”. Written
by Dr. Lian H. Sakhong, General Secretary of UNLD-LA, for the seminar
and presented on behalf of the Joint Action Committee of NUGUB, NCUB,
NDF, UNLD-LA and WLB.]
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CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR BURMA
[The first Lecture in 2003]
by
Prof. David C. Williams
Bloomington, Indiana, USA
It is a privilege and pleasure to be here with you today. I am
here today because I have had a number of Burmese students,
and I have always admired them because they do not just think
deeply but also feel deeply. In my view, both are necessary for
great scholarship. And I now see that they are part of a
democratic movement that encourages them to do both, so I
thank you for the gift of these students that have come into
my life. Please let me say that I deeply admire your courage,
hope, idealism, and determination. I know that you carry
forward the dreams of your parents and grandparents for a
free Burma, and I pray that their dream will come to reality in
our generation. And I am very happy to be here to talk with
you about how a new set of constitutions might help bring
that result.
What I will do over the next several days is to talk about
the main subjects that one needs to address when designing a
constitution. I cannot tell you what sort of constitution would
be best for you; that is ultimately your work. But I hope that
I can help you to think about that work, by highlighting the
decisions that you have to make, the concerns that you will
want to weigh, and the various possibilities that different
constitutions open up. There is no perfect constitution, but it
is possible to choose intelligently among the types of
constitution, so that you end up with a frame of government
that suits your experience and hopes. Given the time
constraints, I will be talking primarily in general terms. The
real work will occur in tailoring these remarks to your particular
circumstances.
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A. THE PURPOSE OF A CONSTITUTION
So let me begin with the purpose of a constitution. A
constitution is a law that is more fundamental than any other
law; it is the basic law of a state. It organizes the state up and
places limits on its operation. A law that is in conflict with the
constitution is not valid. A government that seeks power
beyond that given by the constitution has over-reached itself.
Most states these days have constitutions, and more are being
written every day. So most people think that it is a good thing
to have a constitution. But why?
There are three basic answers to that question. First, a
constitution can express a popular identity or culture. Members
of a culture think about who they are and who they have been
and who they want to be. Then, they think about the way that
they want their basic law to reflect that identity, and they write
that down into a constitution, so that they will have a legal
picture of themselves. And when they are uncertain or
confused or divided, they can look to that picture to remind
themselves of who they are most fundamentally. So a
constitution can give guidance, unity, and purpose to a culture,
if the members of that culture embrace it as their own. It can
be a great help in troubled times.
But for a constitution to work this way, it must come from
you, and you must see yourselves in it. You must ponder your
past, present, and future, and you must decide who you are at
root. When you write your constitution, therefore, you must
also try to ensure that when the people read it, they will rally
to it, because they think that it embodies their identity. So the
constitution comes from you, and the most important thing is
that it contains what is most important to you, regardless of
what any other nation may think or want.
Sometimes that means that you want to put in something
that no-one else necessarily understands. For example, the
Chin Forum was especially keen that we should put in residency
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requirements for their state officials, because in the past, some
of the officers of Chin State refused to reside at the seat of
government. Now, coming from the outside, this is not the
sort of thing that I would normally think belongs in a
constitution, because it is very specific. But for the Chins in
particular, with their special history, it mattered a great dealBand
when the Chins look in this constitution, therefore, they can
see their concerns mirrored there.
The U.S. Constitution has some similar provisions. For
example, it bans the granting of titles of nobility. Few
constitutions contain such a ban, and to many it seems a little
strange. But you must remember that when the Americans
were making their constitution, they had just fought a war of
independence against a country with kings and nobles. They
rejected the idea that you can inherit power from your father,
as nobles did; instead, you had to earn it through the process
of democracy. So when they wrote their constitution, they
painted a picture of themselves: we are democratic, they said,
we are not like the British with their dukes and earls and barons.
And we must always remember that this is the kind of people
that we are, so we put that picture in our constitution.
So while it is possible to learn from the experience of
other nations, ultimately this is your constitution. It doesn’t
matter what the Americans or the Germans or the Australians
or the Chinese have done, and it doesn’t matter what I think is
best for you. What ultimately matters is what you want to do.
When you look into your state constitution, you must see the
people of your state mirrored there, so that they will hold
their constitution dear. So I have a suggestion. As you think
about drafting your constitution, you might begin by thinking
about your respective state cultures: what does it mean to be a
citizen of each of your states? And how can you reflect that
identity in a constitution?
The other purpose in a constitution is to create a
government, and, even more important, to limit that
government, so that it may not commit mischief or worse. In
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general, we hope that our governments will be just and good,
but we also know that it’s not always true. So when we write a
constitution, we try to anticipate when we can trust the
government and when not. Ideally, we develop a list of subjects
over which we can trust the government and a list of subjects
over which we cannot trust them. As for the former, the areas
where we can trust them, we give them discretion to do as
they will. But as for the latter, where we cannot trust themBwe
seek to use the constitution to protect against governmental
misbehavior. We entrench certain rights or procedures to
ensure that the legislature will not be tempted to misbehave.
Now to make a constitution work this way, we need to do
two things. First, we need to sort out those subjects that should
belong to the government and those that should not. For
example, it is probably safe to allow the legislature to set speed
limits on public highways, because the legislators have no
particular incentive to act badly on this subject. But when it
comes to voting rights, we might be especially suspicious of
the legislature: our elected representatives may want to
manipulate the electoral system to ensure that they get reelected again and again, even if it not really what the people
want. And I know that there is some worry that the military
regime is trying to do that right now in the constitutional
process going on in Rangoon.
So we need two piles of things, the government guards
one pile, but it must keep its hands off the other pile. But
then, to make these constitutional protections effective, you
need to appoint a guard to protect that pile from the
government. You have to be able to trust that guard with this
task, and it must have the strength and independence to be a
good guardian. So who shall it be? Different constitutional
systems appoint different guardians. Some think that the
citizens are the best guard: if they think that the legislature is
violating the constitution, then they will vote them out the
next time around. Others think that local legislative bodies
should do some of the policing. But the most common device
58

Designing Federalism in Burma

used today is called judicial review, because the courts are
appointed to ensure that the government stays within its
constitutional bounds.
Again, I don’t think that there is a right answer for all
people at all times and places: it depends on your history and
nature. If you strongly believe in the legal system, and if you
believe that courts are likely to be brave, independent, and
objective, then they are probably the right course. If you think
that the people will be zealous and careful in protecting the
constitution, then they might be best. And so forth. The one
thing that is clear, however, is that for your constitution to be
effective, you need a system in which some group assumes the
duty to be faithful to the constitution, rather than merely to
their immediate political gain. And who that should be cannot
be answered in the abstract; to know whom you can trust, you
must consult your own knowledge of your own society.
Another way that constitutions limit governments is to
divide power so as to preserve freedom. As Burmese have
reason to know, if you concentrate power into a small group
of men, those men may feel free to act in arbitrary ways, ways
that serve their own interests and power, rather than the
interests of the whole. Now in any system, there is always a
risk that powerful men will take more power to themselves,
until they rule all without restraint. And there is nothing that
one can do to guarantee that it will never happen again. But
constitutions typically try to set the system up so that power is
divided between different groups or government branches.
That way, no-one can dominate completely. And because each
of these groups will act to protect its own constitutional power
against the others, we can hope that power will stay divided.
We therefore hope that these different groups will be
watching and limiting each other, to make sure that the
government acts only for the common good. If many people
agree that the government should do something, it is likely
that the government should do it. If only nine people in a
military government think that the government should do
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something, you have no reason to trust that the action will be
good.
The main subjects in a constitution are the different ways
that we can divide power between different groups, so that
they can check and limit each other so as to preserve freedom.
I will now give a general summary of those different ways of
dividing power, and in subsequent days, we will examine some
of these ways in greater detail.
(i). Electoral Systems
First, constitutions typically specify an electoral system, they
tell us how the government shall be elected. In many ways,
this is the most basic division of power on a democracy: the
government makes the rules, but the people choose the
government, keep an eye on them, and can vote them out if
they should prove corrupt. Now there are many different
ways to structure an electoral system, and they produce
different political systems. For example, you can deliberately
design an electoral system to produce a legislature that includes
people from all different political beliefs. In this case, your
politics may well be contentious and divisive, because all sorts
of people are participating, but everyone will feel that they
have a voice, even the smallest minorities. On the other hand,
you can design an electoral system that will produce a very
moderate legislature, which consistently keeps to the middle
of the road. In this system, minorities will feel that they have
less power, but the system as a whole may be more stable.
So you have to decide which sort of system is right and
desirable for you, right now in your history, with your particular
culture and needs and hopes. And again, although friends can
offer advice, no-one can tell you what is best for you. Because
this subject is so important, we will be devoting all of tomorrow
afternoon to it.
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So the basic limit on government is that the people elect
their leaders. Sometimes, however, this division is not enough
because the government tries to deceive the people, or it tries
to hijack control, even against the will of the people. So it is
frequently useful to have other divisions built into the
systemBother government actors that will limit one another.
(ii). Separation of Powers
To that end, the next division is called the separation of powers,
the division of power within the government between three
different sorts of actors. First, there is the legislature, the
body charged with making the law because it is the most
democratic. Then there is a body that is usually charged with
proposing law, enforcing law, and leading the country in war
and foreign relations. In some systems, this part of
government is called the executive branch; in others, it is called
simply the government or the administration. And finally,
there are the courts, charged with deciding cases and
interpreting the meaning of the law. In many countries, the
courts are also given the final say over the meaning of the
constitution, so that they are the ultimate check on the other
two branches.
The reason that we divide power in this way is that if it is
done right, the branches will keep an eye on each other and
ensure that no one of them achieves complete dominance.
One branch may become corrupt and pursue only its own
interests, but we hope that the others will stay true and so will
keep the corrupt branch in line. For example, the legislature
can pass laws, but it must still rely on the executive and the
judiciary to enforce the law in particular cases. So the legislature
will be reluctant to pass truly awful laws, because it is worried
about what the executive and the courts may do. The executive
may refuse to enforce the law or enforce it only laxly, or he
may go to the citizens and alert them to what their legislature
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is doing, or he may refuse to give those who backed the law
any place in his cabinet. The courts may also refuse to apply
the law, or they may interpret it in such a way as to eliminate
its worst parts, or they may declare it unconstitutional. Similarly,
if the executive behaves in irresponsible ways, the legislature
may pass laws to restrain him, or it may publicize his bad
behavior, or the courts may declare his conduct
unconstitutional. In all these ways, if power is divided, it is
less likely that any one person or group can seize control of
the government to its own advantage.
But in order for this system to work, the branches must
all be vigilant to protect their own space and to keep the division
of powers in place. The system will not just work by itself; it
depends on the people involved. And it is common that despite
a constitutional division of powers, one branch, almost always
the executive, ends up taking more and more power, on the
claim that young countries need strong leadership. So it is
important when one designs a constitution, that you give the
other branches the resources and the incentives to block such
a centralization of power in one man or one branch.
Now as in all of constitutional design, it is important to
understand that this separation of powers is a balance: you
want to divide the powers enough, but you don’t want to divide
them too much. If you divide not enough, the president or
prime minister may make himself a king, and there will be noone to stand in his way. But if you divide too much, the
government may be so divided that it cannot act effectively. It
cannot address the country’s problems, and it may eventually
fall apart in civil war. And again, where you should strike that
balance depends mostly on your culture, your history, your
tendencies, and your hopes for the future.
When we speak of the separation of powers, some
countries add the military as a fourth and final branch of
government, as a separate component in the system, designed
to check and limit the others, on a par with the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary. And of course, in Burma, there
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are those who claim that only the military really stands for the
common good of the whole of Burma, so that it must be
given a central part to play in any future constitution.
Now I cannot say how transition to democracy will occur
in Burma. I know that it will be the product of long
negotiations. It may be that in order to agree to democracy,
the current government will insist on an important military
role. It is up to you to decide whether you want to agree, so as
to get a democratic system in place. No-one can stand in your
shoes, so no-one can tell you what you should want.
Nonetheless, constitutional democracies generally do not give
the military this sort of role, and overwhelmingly, constitutional
scholars think it a very bad idea.
The reason, of course, is that the military is not democratic.
Democracy is a bottom up system; democratic leaders listen
to the people below them, the voters. Ideally the voters control
the whole government. That way, we can ensure that the
government does not use its power tyrannically. So to have
the best democratic government, the citizens and the officials
must have certain habits of mind: they must listen to each
other patiently; they must look for ways to compromise and
work things out; they must seldom give orders; they must realize
that disagreement is normal, healthy, and good, and that the
way to deal with disagreement is by conversation, not by
suppression.
Now, as you know, professional militaries do not usually
act this way. The people on the top often do not listen to the
people on the bottom. Instead, the people on the top give
orders to the people on the bottom, who are supposed to
obey without question, on pain of being shot. Disagreement
is regarded as disobedience. For that reason, for good soldiers
to become good citizens, they must commonly transform
themselves. And if you give the military a formal role in
government, you are giving power to a non-democratic
institution at precisely the moment that you are trying to move
to democracy.
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I know that the military government claims that the
military represents the soul of Burma, the common good.
Lots of military governments make that claim about their
armies. Very occasionally, they might be true. But usually,
militaries obey orders. And that means that the soldiers carry
out the will of those on topwhich is often not congruent with
the common good.
So it would probably be a bad idea to make the military a
part of the governmentBbut that does not mean that you can
just ignore it in your constitution. For a long time, the military
has been an important part of the Burmese way of
government; to change that, you must take overt steps to
change the role of the military. Probably most important, you
must make the military subordinate to the civil government,
not part of the government but its servant, so that it will be
democratically controlled. But it’s not enough just to write
down on paper that the military should follow the orders of
the civilian government, because when given an order that
they don’t like, the military may simply seize control again. So
ideally, the constitution should restructure control of the
military to make it more subordinate. There are a lot of ways
to do this, change the makeup of the officer class and the
method of promotion, divide control over the military between
different branches, and so forth.
But one of the most important things that you can do is
to give the military a new and positive vision of itself. Since it
will no longer be running the government, it needs something
else to do, something that is noble and good, something that
consumes its energies so that it will not be dreaming about
retaking the government all the time. In other words, it is not
enough simply to tell the military what it may NOT do; you
also must tell it what it SHOULD do, so that it can be an
honored and important part of a new democratic regime.
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(iii). Federalism
The next division is called federalism, which refers to a division
of power between the central government and more local
governments. Federalism can divide power into any number
of levels. The most common form is a simple division between
the federal or central government on the one hand and the
state or provincial governments on the other. But the state
constitutions can further subdivide state power, between the
state government and local governments. And local
governments can then subdivide power into even smaller units.
Federalism serves four main purposes. First, if your
society contains a number of distinct cultures, it can guarantee
those cultures some measure of self-determination, so that
the majority culture will not always be telling them what to do.
We will talk about this function at length in a later session.
Second, federalism can give local people the power to handle
local problems, because they know and understand their
problems best, and they can act quickly and without a lot of
bureaucratic inefficiency. Third and relatedly, federalism can
encourage local people to become involved in their own
government and to solve their own problems, because they
know that they have the power and responsibility to do so. So
the citizenry becomes much more engaged and active, much
less passive and angry. And fourth, the local government can
act as a check on the central government. Often, central
governments think that they have the wisest, most talented,
most devoted public servants, so of course the central
government should run everything. Now the problem is that
even if the central government is wise and talented and devoted
in the beginning, it may not remain so if it has all the power.
When one government holds all the power, without any other
government to limit it, it may forget that it is only the servant
of the people, not their masters. So it is useful to have some
local governments, with constitutionally guaranteed powers,
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to remind the central government that is holds power only on
trust from the citizens.
Burma has learned by hard experience the utility of all
four of these benefits. At least since the beginning of military
government, the center has tended to make policy for the whole
country and to repress self-determination for local cultures.
The center has also tended to administer the whole country
from Rangoon, even when local people better understand their
own problems and can more effectively address them. The
center has encouraged local people to become disengaged from
governing themselves, so that they will always look to the center
for a solution. And finally, because there are no independent
local governments to put up an argument, the military
government has convinced itself that it alone knows what is
good for Burma and it alone will protect that good. The
creation of strong state and local governments may help change
this situation.
(iv). Individual Rights
The final division of power is individual rights. Governments
have the power to make policy in certain spheres, but
individuals retain a certain sphere of autonomy that the
government may not invade. Commonly, the constitution lists
those rights in a section that is called a Bill of Rights or a
Charter of Rights. The idea of a written, judicially enforceable
bill of rights originates with America, but more and more
countries have chosen to adopt one.
A complete bill of rights commonly includes two types
of provisionsBprivate rights and public rights. Private rights
guarantee the individual some protection for his private life,
so that he can carry out the projects most dear to him, immune
from government interference. Typically, these rights might
include the right to get married and have children, the right to
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raise your children in the way that seems best to you, the right
to form private associations such as literary clubs, and so forth.
In America these days, people talk a lot about private rights.
But the bill of rights really originated in a concern about
public rights. These are rights guaranteed to the people to
ensure that they can check the government. In a democracy,
the people are the government; they are not subordinate to
the government. They should keep an eye on the government,
and ultimately they should control government policy.
Unfortunately, governments tend to forget this fact, and they
treat the people as subjects, not citizensBand this is true
everywhere in the world, even in the most settled democracies.
So bills of rights guarantee that the people shall have
certain public or political rights, designed to ensure that they
may restrain the government. The most obvious example is
the right to vote, so obvious and important that we took it up
first, in a separate section, under the heading of electoral
systems These rights also include the right to organize political
parties, and the government may not ban these parties just
because it dislikes their views. Relatedly, individuals and party
members have the right to speak their opinion on the issues
of the day, and the government may not punish them for it.
In addition, rights to fair criminal procedures ensure that the
government cannot punish you except for good reason; it
cannot, in other words, punish you merely because it does not
like your views.
It is important that the protection for these rights be very
strong, because government is always tempted to encroach on
them. Many countries feel that it is especially important for
judges to be in charge of these protections for individual rights,
to safeguard them against the political branches. But more
broadly, in order for the protection to be strong, the political
culture must become comfortable with the idea that
disagreement is normal and good, not a sign of treason. And
again, Burma has had considerable experience with this issue.
I know that some of you have been in prison for speaking
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your mind, so you know better than anyone else the importance
of this issue.
So the people need to have strong, constitutionally
protected individual rights. But there is a risk here: if the
constitution protects these rights too much or in the wrong
way, people may come to feel that they have the freedom to
do as they please, without any obligation to the greater good.
In other words, people may feel that they have rights without
responsibilities. Frankly, I believe that in America, this is a
significant problem right now, and it may become worse. It is
good for people to be free to do as they choose, but they must
remember that they have duties to their families, to their fellow
citizens, and to their governments. And right now, too many
Americans are thinking only about themselves, about getting
money and power for themselves, even if it hurts their country.
And they think this way in part because their constitution talks
only of rights and not of duties.
So some believe that a constitution should also recognize
certain personal duties, and it should indicate that rights must
always be balanced against duties. For that reason, many
constitutions newer than America’s have included a charter of
duties along with its charter of rights.
Now there is a risk, or at least a complication, in this
balance of rights and responsibilities. I have suggested that a
constitution might remind citizens that they have obligations
to the greater good, to each other, to their families, to their
nations, and to their governments. But frequently, governments
like to imagine that citizens therefore have a duty uncritically
to obey their government, to act and believe just as the
government wants them to. And I know that you have had
some a great deal of experience with this problem.
But that is not the nature of the constitutional duty that I
am talking about. Instead, your duty to government is to ensure
that it acts the way that it is supposed to act, as outlined in the
constitution, in other words, that it promotes the public good,
respects the rights of citizens, and behaves in a democratic
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way, taking its instructions from the people. If it behaves
badly, it is not a citizen’s duty to obey; quite the contrary, it is
a citizen’s duty to push the government to return to the
constitutional path. Once you have written a constitution,
your ultimate obligation is thus not to the particular people
who hold governmental office at any given time; instead, your
ultimate obligation is to the collection of ideals entrenched in
your constitution itself. And if the government tries to
convince you to do otherwise, you may use your individual
rights to resist.
So in a well-functioning democracy, citizens have rights
to be free from government when it is misbehaving, but also
duties to the government when it is behaving well. And in the
same way, governments have powers to make policy, but they
also have duties to the public to govern well and to care for
the people. Just as do individuals, governments tend to forget
that they have duties, and they remember only their powers.
And this tendency makes for a government that is likely to
govern in its own interest, a government that has forgotten
that its whole reason for existence is the people. Many
therefore think it a good idea to include in the constitution
itself a list of governmental duties, as well as the list of
governmental powers. And again, the government’s powers
and duties are not actually in conflict, because the reason that
the government has power is to perform its duty to the people.
This balance between rights or power on the one hand
and obligations on the other is therefore extremely important
to any well-functioning constitutional democracy. But it is
often quite difficult to specify in advance exactly how to balance
them: it all depends too much on the facts of history. For
example, surely the government has a duty to educate its
citizenry. But what if the government has very little money,
how much of that should go to education? On what other
things may the government first spend money, such as police
officers to stop looting or judges’ salaries or the costs involved
in running an election?
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For that reason, although many constitutions include a
list of obligations, often that list is not judicially enforceable.
You cannot go into court and insist that the government fulfill
its obligation of educating you. Instead, it is intended a
reminder to the legislature and the citizens that duties are as
constitutionally important as rights and powers; and so we
should all bear this fact in mind when going about our
constitutional tasks.
So those are the main subjects of constitutional design.
Clearly, a good constitution must seek to accomplish a good
bit. It may express a popular identity; it must distinguish those
matters on which the government can be trusted and those
on which it cannot, and it must take the latter from the
government’s dominion and give it to some other constitutional
guardian; it must divide power, so as to check and control it,
through some arrangement involving electoral rules, separation
of powers, federalism, and individual rights and duties. Finally,
all of these parts of a constitution must somehow come
together to form a unified whole, in which all the parts work
together. For example, if you want strong individual rights,
you may also want an independent judiciary to protect those
rights. If you want a strong legislature, you may want to create
an electoral system that will give the legislature great legitimacy.
And so forth. Not surprisingly, nobody writes a perfect
constitution on the first draft. It usually takes many attempts
even to get something approximating a good system.
Our remaining time together will really be only an
amplification of matters that we have introduced this morning.
In future sessions, we will discuss how constitution-framers
ensure that their constitution grows out of popular feelings,
especially when the people are not themselves directly involved
in the writing process. In another session, we will talk at length
about federalism; in another, we will discuss electoral systems;
and in still another, we will consider judicial review. Finally, if
time permits, we will start to discuss the possible design of a
union government that grows out of your state constitutions.
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B. SECURING THE BASIS OF CONSENT
As I mentioned earlier, it is critical important that your
constitution come from you: when you look at it, you must
seem yourselves. And for that reason, after the transition to
democracy, your people will see themselves as well, and they
will embrace the constitution as their own. If you try to push
something on them that does not seem like them, they will
ultimately reject it, and the constitution will not work. I am
sure that you keenly feel an obligation to your people, people
who are not at this table, to make a constitution that reflects
their history, ideals, traditions, and hopes.
But while their constitution must reflect them, it is not
possible for them directly to write it. For logistical reasons, it
is not possible for a whole people to write a constitution;
instead, a committee must do it in their name. In some ways,
the process of writing a constitution is therefore a little odd.
A small group of people writes the constitution, but the
document that they write claims to speak for the whole
citizenry. To outsiders, it sometimes looks as though the
committee has tried to take over the process, and it illegitimately
claims to speak for the people. And when this is accusation is
made, often the constitution-writers become very
uncomfortable. They worry that people will think badly of
them. And if you have lived under a system in which the
military government has seized power for itself, everyone is
especially sensitive to the charge that the constitution-writing
committee is seizing power for itself.
Now on this subject, when we look over the history of
constitution-writing, we should learn two lessons. First, it is
always the case that committees write constitutions, because
as a practical matter, there is no other way. It would be nice
for the whole people to meet in some enormous room and
write their constitution, but it just cannot happen that way.
And for that reason, someone has to take a leadership role
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and initiate the process. To be a leader in this way takes courage
and energy, and even well-meaning people might suddenly start
to suspect you. But someone has to do it, even if it is a
thankless task, and really people should be grateful that you
had the courage to risk their disapproval. So although people
may accuse you of seizing power merely because you are taking
a leadership role, constitution-makers have always faced that
charge and always will, and they cannot let it stop them.
But here is the second lesson: although the process must
start with the committee, it must not end with the committee.
As you know, it is very important that you write a constitution
that you think will find favor with your people; it is important
that you consult with them as much as possible during the
writing; it is important that you give them a reasonable chance
to approve or disapprove it before it goes into operation; and
even after operation, it is important that your political leaders
implement it in such a way that the people willingly give it
their support. Indeed, most new democracies first adopt
provisional constitutions, so as to allow the government to
function, but then during the first several years, they actively
explore popular opinion on the outlines of a final constitution.
In Burma, this process will probably be especially important
because of course, right now, your ability to communicate with
your people is limited. After the transition to democracy,
however, you will be much better able to secure the basis of
consent.
Now as you know, the Chins have been writing a
constitution for several years. It is still unfinished and tentative,
and it will change many times. Today, they bring it before you
only by way of illustration: this is what a constitution might
look like; it covers the main subjects that a constitution might
cover; but you will have to make your own decisions about the
precise content of your constitution. And as you think about
how to write a constitution that will win popular support in
your respective states, you might be interested in the experience
of the Chins. We therefore have with us Pu Lian Uk and Mr.
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Andrew Lian to talk about their experience in this process. I
now turn the microphone over to them for that discussion.
C. FEDERALISM
In this session, we will speak about federalism. Presently,
Burma is governed by a military regime that is not democratic;
the people do not elect their leaders in free and fair elections.
It is important that Burma becomes democratic. But it is also
important to understand that even a democratic government
can be oppressive unless you have other protections in place.
For many countries, federalism is one of those protections.
Federalism means that the constitution divides power
between the central and local governments: the former receives
one set of powers, and the latter a different set. There are a
great many way to divide these powers, and different countries
take different paths. As a result, there are many different kinds
of federalism. All that they really have in common is that they
involve some constitutional division of power between the
center and the states. Accordingly, there are federalisms in
which the center holds almost all the power, and there are
federalisms in which the center holds almost no power.
Worldwide, the most common rationale for federalism is
the self-determination of local cultures. Sometimes a country
contains regions that have different characteristic cultures. The
people in those different regions hold different ways of life or
customary laws or styles of government, or they even dream
different dreams for their future. In a simple, unitary
democracy, without federalism, there is only one government,
the center, and that government is governed by majority vote.
In this situation, the minority cultures will never control the
center, because they are by definition the minority. But if the
center is the only government and the minorities will never
control the center, then they will have very little opportunity
to control their own destiny. So unitary democracy does not
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promise real freedom for these groups; instead, they vote and
they vote and they vote but they never win, because they are
the minority. Federalism helps to solve this problem by giving
some self-determination to minority cultures, with some power
that the central government cannot invade.
If you want to protect these local cultures, it is probably a
good idea to do so in the constitution itself, rather than leaving
the matter up to the discretion of the central government.
The reason is that if you do not put it in the constitution, the
center may fail to understand the importance of local selfdfetermination. For example, in the United States, Native
Americans very much desire to govern their own affairs, and
federal law gives them some measure of self-determination.
If the USA were a unitary government, these Indians would
be in trouble, because they would have almost no political
powers: they would vote but always lose. The major drawback
in this system is that the US constitution does not protect
tribal self-government; the tribes have power only because the
central government allows them to do so. From time to time,
the federal government has eliminated self-government for
certain tribes, and at times, it has threatened to eliminate selfgovernment for all tribes. So Native Americans live under
threat of extinction. This is a deficiency in the American
system, and it may be that you will want to protect your
federalism in your constitutions.
Now right at the outset, I should speak a little about the
relationship between local self-government and ethnicity. I
have suggested to you that federalism can help regional cultures
have some control over their futures. Frequently, the people
in these regions believe that their different life ways come from
their different ethnic identity: the Corsicans, for example, might
claim that they are different from the French because they are
ethnically a different people. I believe, however, that this is a
risky direction, and it often leads to great ethnic anger in new
democracies. I will talk about the reasons at greater length at
a later time, but here let me introduce the topic.
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When people have a different culture, then they need some
degree of self-determination to express that culture. Often,
those cultures will grow out of the old lifeways of a particular
ethnic group, so that a particular regional culture will draw
heavily on the traditions of that ethnic group. I believe that in
order for that culture to govern itself, it must be free to cling
to those traditions if it wants. As an example, Chin state may
want to protect Chin customary law, and if they want that,
they should be allowed to so, and their constitution gives their
government that power.
But it is one thing to say that local governments may
protect local cultures that have their roots in an ethnic tradition.
It is quite another thing to say that only those who are members
of that ethnic group may fully belong to that state. It is always
dangerous to treat people differently merely because of their
ethnicity, because that approach tends to stir great anger
between people. So while Chin state may protect its own
regional culture, the current draft of the Chin constitution
also prohibits the government from discriminating against
people who are not ethnically Chin. Non-Chins are entitled
to full individual rights under the Chin constitution, the same
as Chins. In the long run, the experience of other countries
suggests that this arrangement will be better for Chins and for
non-Chins. Local governments will have the power to govern
according to local culture, but no-one will be treated badly
merely because of his ethnicity. And that means that Burma
will celebrate all of its traditions and cultures, and that all
Burmese may be able to live together happily.
To elaborate this point in the context of Burma, let me
draw from a series of e-mails that I have received from Uncle
Eugene. First, he wrote, We have had cries and demands for
federalism or a federal union based on the equality of ethnic
groups, with ethnic identity rather than territories, i.e., the states
becoming the focal point. Actually, the problem is not so
much conflict between ethnic groups, nor is it between the
majority ethnic group and the minority ethnic groups. It in
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reality involves the centralizing, monopolizing impetus of
Rangoon and its encroachment of what are states’ jurisdictions
and spheres, so that the constituent states in Burma exist only
in name. The problem and the confusion is compounded
further by the distortion of the military regimes and successive
juntas of federalism misrepresenting federalism, equating it
with secession and the break up of the union.”
At a later point, Uncle Eugene explained that local
government can allow local cultures, rooted in ethnic traditions
to express themselves. But he added that it is very important
that local ethnic groups should not oppress others around
them because of their ethnicity: As I see it, if there is emplaced
in Burma a system of local governments with real power and
real responsibility (as in Western countries, or real democracies,
federal or otherwise), local governments will as a matter of
course become ‘ethnic’. That is to say, in a certain local
government (LG) area (in, say, the Shan State), where the
majority population there is, say, the Pa-O ethnic group, the
local government and the said area will become Pa-O (or Lahu,
Palaung, Danu, etc.) without a need for a superior body (the
state or provincial, or the central/federal government) having
to designate it as such. I think that too much focus on ethnicity
is like going nowhere and everywhere. At the bottom, what
ethnicity and ethnic based politics and demands are all about
is recognizing their place as equal to any other ethnic group
within, say, a country, or a nation state formation. I believe
real LG will meet this need. Of course, there will always be
minorities like for eg., a Tai, or Danu minorities in a LG area
that is Pa-O. There are many ways to deal with this, but the
advantage of real de centralization in a democratic way is that
LGs will be small, very local, not powerful enough to be used
as a vehicle to dominate and repress other minority groups in
the area. The majority group will have to accommodate,
compromise, communicate, etc., in order to keep the LG
running, and to win elections. In such a small government,
small politics context, cross cutting cleavage (and loyalty) will
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become more significant than ethnic ones. It is only when
ethnicity, ethnic identity is repressed and people are not allowed
to live and grow in their own ‘skin’ or tongue that we sow the
seed of ethnic conflict and ethnic politics.”
So the principal argument worldwide for federalism is that
it can allow local cultures to govern themselves in their own
way, and as long as these local cultures do not become rigidly
or oppressively ethnic, federalism can therefore create greater
freedom for everyone. In addition, there are several other
reasons for federalism. First, local people may know more
about local problems and be able to handle them more
efficiently. Second, if local people know that local government
makes many of the most important decisions that govern their
lives, then they will be more likely to get involved in the
democratic process. In the long run, democracy cannot survive
unless the people participate, so as to express their views and
keep control of government. Democracy cannot long survive
unless the people set the terms of their lives. If they are always
looking to the center for a decision or money or guidance or
initiative, then democracy will never really come alive. The
final reason for federalism is that state and local governments
may be able to check the central government, so that it will
never concentrate absolute power into its hands.
Federalism can occur at many levels. I know that you
want to protect state power against the federal government.
But you may also want to protect local power against the states.
In other words, you may want to put federalism in the union
constitution, so as to divide the states and the union
government, but you may also want to put federalism into
your state constitutions, so as to divide power between the
states and more local units. You may particularly want to do
this if you feel that empowering those local units will serve
the values of federalism. Those local people may stand in the
same relation to the states that the states stand in relation to
the central government. Local people may understand local
problems better; they may be more efficient at handling
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problems; they may have a distinct local culture so they do not
want to be governed at the state level; and giving power to
local governments may inspire their citizens to become
involved and proactive in their own governance.
So there is much that is good about giving power to state
or local governments. But as in everything else in constitutionmaking, there is a balance here, because although there is much
good about local government, there is also much good about
central governments as well. If there weren’t, then there would
be no point in forming a union in the first place. Here are
some of the advantages to being part of a larger country. Most
people feel that a large country can better defend its territory
from outside aggression. It can better negotiate with other
governments, because it has more diplomatic power. And most
people think that a larger market system makes for greater
prosperity for the people in that system, so you will need a
larger government to regulate the larger market in a unified
way. So at least for defense, foreign relations, and the market
economy, it can be a great advantage to build larger union
structures, rather than just staying with local governments. And
even very large nations are now trying to develop unions with
other nations to handle some of these matters.
So we need to create a constitutional structure that will
balance the advantages of local government with the
advantages of central governments. How do we do this? We
need to address at least three basic subjects. First, we need to
figure out the basic structural relationship between the states
and the union government: do the states come from the union,
or does the union come from the states? Second, we need to
decide which governments will have jurisdictions over which
subjects. And finally, we need to make federalism real and
significant by creating a local administrative apparatus that can
make a difference in the lives of its citizens.
So let me begin with the first question: who comes first,
the states or the central government, and why does it matter?
We might imagine two basic answers to this question. First,
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we might imagine that the nation begins as a unit, a single
being, and the central government possesses all the power.
This government then delegates, of its own will, some powers
to state governments. If the government does this by statute,
it may revoke the power at any time, and this system is therefore
not technically federal, because the constitution does not
guarantee a division of power. The states possess no
independent power; they are merely instruments of the federal
government to perform its will.
We might imagine, however, that the federal government
goes further: it delegates power to the states, and it then gives
those powers constitutional protection. If the powers
delegated are broad enough, we might call this system
federalBeven though the powers come from the center, they
now constitutionally reside with the states.
In some countries, this sort of system works to produce
real federalism. But there are risks associated with it. First, if
the central government comes first, then it decides how much
power it wants to delegate, and that is seldom as much as local
people want it to delegate. Second, everyone concerned, the
states, the central government, and the citizens, tend to perceive
the central government as the real government, more
permanent, more important, more powerful than the states,
because it came first and because it created the states. The
states, in this version, are mere creatures. Because everyone
perceives the central government as more fundamental, it is
likely to end up with dominant power. The central government
is more likely to assume more power to itself; courts and
citizens are likely to accept the central government’s assumption
of power; and states are unlikely to fight back very hard. Now
when the country does not have a strong tradition of central
power, none of this might matter. But if you have a history
of authoritarian governance from a central point, all these
dangers are real.
As a result, many prefer a different model: we imagine
that the states came first, and then they joined together to
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form a partnership, a union, giving certain powers to the central
government to promote their aims. In this model, the union
government is an agent of the states: it has only those powers
that the states give it, cannot exceed those powers, and must
always imagine its role as serving the common good of the
states, considered collectively. Citizens owe obligations to their
states first, and then to the central government. Courts begin
with a presumption of state power, so that when they are in
doubt, they are likely to find for the states. And the federal
government remembers that it has been entrusted with certain
goals by the states, and those goals do not include the
subordination of the states themselves.
Again, as a practical matter it may not seem to matter very
much whether the federal government or the states came first.
Either way, we will end up with a constitution that divides
power between the states and the federal government. So
why does it matter how this constitution came to be? Again,
the answer is psychological. If the states came first, then their
legitimacy is presumed, in all their variety. They do not depend
on a central authority to give them their legitimacy. And so
built into this model is the idea that it is legitimate for states to
be different; we need not be all the same; and disagreement is
not treason. It can therefore be a useful device for making the
transition from a unitary government to a federal one. I
understand that some time ago, the NRP made the decision
to adopt this model. You are beginning by writing your state
constitutions, and then you will create a union government
with powers delegated from the states. I assume therefore
that you are already quite familiar with the benefits of this
model.
So at the level of the union, you have already decided
which comes first, the states or the union, the answer is the
states. But in your state constitutions, you must also make a
similar decision: which came first, the state governments or
the local governments? Perhaps the local governments existed
first, and then they created the states by delegating power to
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them. Or perhaps the state existed first and then delegated
power to local governments. And if the state came first, is
local power to be guaranteed in the constitution, or can the
state government decide when and how much power it wants
to give away from time to time?
There is no one right answer to this, it all depends on
your perceptions of your own needs and goals. You are trying
to strike a balance here that is right for you. If you give too
much power to the local governments, then the state may be
divided, weak, inefficient, and full of strife. But if you give
too little power to the local governments, the state government
may become over-powerful and bureaucratic, stifling all local
initiative. Now how you deal with those two risks, how you
strike the balance, will depend on how much you worry about
each risk in your particular context. Do you have many local
cultures that need protection from the state? Do you worry
that your state legislature may become too powerful? Are you
afraid that the state government may bog down in bureaucracy
and keep anything from getting done? Then maybe you want
strong local government. Are you worried, on the other hand,
that many strong local governments may take the loyalty of
their citizens away from the state? Are you worried that these
governments may adopt different rules for governing things,
and these rules may be in conflict, and that may frustrate the
creation of common rules across the state, in areas where a
uniform system is important, such as the economy? Are you
concerned that local governments may even become seedbeds
of violent resistance to the new states? Then you may want to
leave most of the power in the state government.
The Chins disagreed among themselves on this question,
and so they asked me to draft up two different versions of the
section of their constitution that deals with local government.
In one version, their local governments are mere creatures of
the state government, which can decide how much power it
wants to give them. In the other, the constitution protects
certain local powers from state meddling, and it carefully gives
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the local governments their own tax powers and administration.
In the Chin Forum, people disagreed precisely over the sort
of worries that I am here outlining. Some thought that the
legislature could be trusted to make these decisions, and too
many local governments would be inefficient and might block
a spirit of unity. Others worried that local governments needed
constitutional protection because the state cannot so readily
be trusted. These people worried that the state would take all
the taxing power from local governments, would favor some
localities over others, and would block local initiative.
I suspect that the Chins will be discussing this question
for some time, and they may never all agree on an answer,
which is fine. But the important thing is that they are talking
about the right issues. They have their eye on what matters.
And so their question is your question: you want both a spirit
of unity within the state and also local freedom, so how do
you balance these two?
In answering that question, one critical issue is our second
subject: we need to generate a list of subjects over which the
central government shall have primary power and a list of
subjects over which more local governments shall have primary
power. In pondering this large question, it is worthwhile to
bear three sets of subordinate questions in mind, and this list
applies whether you are diving power between the union and
the states or between the states and local governments.
First, you must try to identify areas where you need
uniformity, provided by a single system of rules. Again, many
people think that in the area of national defense, foreign
relations, and the economy, it is important to have one system
of rules. So in these areas, you may want to give primary
power to the union government, less power to the states, and
no power at all to the local governments.
Second, you will want to identify those areas where it is
very important to states and localities that they retain power
so as to assert their particular identity. Many people feel, for
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example, that more local governments should control culture,
primary education, and religion. So you may want to ban the
union government from acting in these matters, and you may
want reserve power to the states. You may even want to give
the state the power only to set general guidelines, and then
reserve the rest of the power to local governments. So, for
example, the state might be able to prescribe general standards
of excellence for the schools, but the local governments might
be able to control curriculum, teaching method and the like.
The Chin Forum has adopted essentially this general division
of power in their constitution.
So when thinking about federal powers, you need to think
about those areas where you need unity. When thinking about
state powers, you need to think about those areas particularly
important to your culture as states. And then finally, when
thinking about the division of power, you always need to be
thinking about issues of trust: which arm of the government
can you trust in which area and why?
For example, perhaps you think that local governments
should make most educational decisions. For that reason, you
constitutionally reserve power over education to local
governments. But then you think some more, and you might
conclude that the state legislature can actually be trusted to
make this decision: if local governments should have control
over education, you can trust the state to realize that fact. So
in that case, instead of constitutionally reserving power to the
local governments, you may want to give full power over
education to the state, in the expectation that the state will
delegate to local governments when appropriate. But, on the
other hand, perhaps you don’t trust the state with the taxing
power because you fear that it will keep all the money. In that
case, you may want to constitutionally guarantee some
independent taxing power to the local governments, and to
keep the state from interfering with it.
Now in deciding which government should have power
over which areas, it is also important to remember that it is
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possible to give both governments some power over a given
area. In the USA, for example, both the Federal Government
and the states have power over commerce. In this case, we say
that the governments have concurrent power over the subject,
meaning that they can both exercise power at the same time.
Often the two governments will work together on a problem,
and that is all to the good for everyone. Sometimes, however,
the governments will disagree about how to handle a problem,
and they cannot work out a compromise. In such cases of
conflict, the constitution should specify which government
will win. For example, in the area of the economy, perhaps
the union government should set the basic rules, but states
can add extra ones, as long as they do not conflict with union
policy. If they do conflict, the central government’s rules win.
But in the area of education, you might want just the opposite
arrangement: the federal government can develop educational
polices only so long as they do not conflict with the states’.
And so forth.
When you divide power in this way, of course, it is critical
that the constitution designate somebody reliable to enforce
the divisions. Often, enforcing the division calls for
interpretation of the constitution, and for that reason, many
constitutions give this power to the courts. For example,
suppose that you give the union government power over the
economy, but you give the states power over culture. The
central government then starts to regulate schools on the
grounds that education has a big effect on the economy. Who
wins, the state or the federal government? Is this economy or
education? Someone must decide.
If you decide to give such decisions to the High Court,
then you need to help the court in a variety of ways. You need
to guarantee that it will not be punished for disagreeing with
powerful politicians. You need to pay it enough so that the
judges will not be tempted to take a bribe. You need to train
the judges into a deep respect for the rule of law, rather than
political power. And you need to give it enough respect so
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that the country will follow its decisions, rather than
disintegrate into civil war whenever people disagree over a
constitutional question.
But it is not required that you assign the courts alone this
task. It is possible to give other actors, such as the state
legislature, the responsibility for interpreting the division as
welland the Chin Forum has chosen to do so. If you pursue
this course, however, it is important that the legislature exercise
this power with the greatest care and balance, rather than acting
merely for its political advantage. If you worry that the
legislature will behave badly, it might be best to stipulate that
it can invalidate federal legislation only by a super-majority
vote, or it might, in the end, be better to give it no role in this
particular process.
OK, so now imagine that you have made some important
decisions. You have decided which comes first, the states or
the union government. And you have decided which comes
first, the local governments or the state governments. And
you have decided which powers to give to each set of
governments. And you have appointed someone to enforce
that division of powers. None of that is worth anything unless
you then create an administrative apparatus to ensure that each
level of government is actually able to use its power to benefit
its citizens. Federalism cannot be merely a theory; it must also
be a lived reality. People must feel it in their daily lives. Local
officials must have real power, and local people must take it
upon themselves to make the system work. Only if people
actually become fond of their local or state governments will
they defend and support these governments. Federalism works
because everyone in the system has a sense of how it works,
and they are personally committed to the system.
So how does this happen? How do we make local
government into a lived reality, instead of only a theory? There
are several important parts to a good answer.
First, the constitution must give to the state and local
governments a form, a body that allows them to function; in
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other words, they need executive officials, legislators, and
courts. And so your state constitutions need to specify the
form of government, both for the states themselves and
localities as well, if you are going to give local governments
some constitutional protection.
Second, the constitution must not only give state and local
governments power in the abstract; it must also specifically
give them the ability to carry out those powers, to act in the
way that governments generally act to pursue the goals assigned
them.
Third, the constitution must give these governments some
degree of immunity from the actions of higher governments.
For example, state officials should not be punished by the
union government for attempting to carry out their job. State
institutions should not have to pay exorbitant federal taxes, so
high that they cannot do their job. Similarly, the federal
government cannot just take over the states and tell them what
to do. That would destroy state independence. For that reason,
you might want to block the federal government from forcing
the states to carry out a federal policy, at least in certain areas.
The job of the states is to carry out state policy; the job of the
union is to carry out union policy itself. On the other hand, if
the states want a role in carrying out federal policy, it is possible
that they should have one, as they might be better able to
execute policy near to the people. But the important point is
that states cannot be forced to be mere instruments of the
union government. And if you really are concerned to protect
local governments, you could grant them similar immunities
against the state governments.
Fourth and finally, if you want to give real life to local or
state governments, you must give them an independent ability
to raise taxes. There are several ways to do this. Some
constitutions let the higher government raise taxes, but it must
then pay a particular share to the lower governments. The
downside to this procedure is that the higher government may
never pay the monies out, or may pay out only a small fraction
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of what is actually due. Another alternative therefore is to let
the lower government collect all the taxes and pay to the higher
government what is due to it. And then some constitutions
completely divide the taxing powers of the various
governments: they give certain taxing powers to the central
government (for example excise taxes), other taxing powers
to the state government (for example income taxes) and still
other taxing powers to the local governments (for example
real property taxes). Each level has its own ability to collect
taxes as it will. Under the right circumstances, any of these
schemes will work. The important thing is that the lower
government be guaranteed a certain amount of money;
otherwise, they will simply cease to function.
Finally, let us talk a little about the administration of local
government. All of this wonderful federalist theory will be
meaningless unless state and local governments have an
administrative structure that will put it into practice. For
federalism and local government to work, the people must
actually experience it in their daily lives. When one is used to
looking to the center for money, decisions, and initiative, it
can be hard to imagine such a world. So even after you have
designed a constitutional structure to create federalism, officials
and citizens must still put it into practice. To this end, training
and direct experience in federal systems are invaluable.
I cannot, of course, offer you such training or experience
in this context. But perhaps I can offer a picture of how one
federal system works by explaining to you the way that I spend
a typical day back home, with reference to the way that my life
intersects the various levels of government. I live in Monroe
County, Indiana. The county has a government. Inside the
county is the city of Bloomington, which has a separate
government. Above both the city and the county is the state
of Indiana. And above the state of Indiana is the federal
government of the United States.
When I wake up in the morning, I am in my bed in my
own house. I own this house under a system of property law
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that is run by the state of Indiana but that is administered
through Monroe County. The house is in the Lake Monroe
watershed, which means that it is subject to environmental
regulation run by the state of Indiana. I pay real property
taxes on this house to Monroe County, and those taxes go to
support the public school that my children attend. If I do not
leave the house, there is no reason for me ever to interact with
the federal government.
But I do leave the house: I drive my children to school. I
drive on roads that are owned, maintained, and regulated by
Monroe County. I arrive at my children’s school, which is
financed from local taxes. Most of the decisions about my
children’s education are made at that school, by the principal,
teachers, and parents in association. Some are made at the
county level, such as the school calendar and opening and
closing times. A few are made at the state level, such as
educational standards. And an even smaller number are now
made at the federal level, though that is a recent innovation
and many people are unhappy about it.
After I drop my children off, I might go to the post office.
The post office is run by the United States Postal Service,
which is a semi-private organization under contract to the
federal government to run the postal system. Employees of
the post office are therefore not exactly federal employees,
but the federal government performs certain services through
this organization. Today, I mail some packages, and I apply to
have my passport renewed. The states have no role in the
postal service or foreign relations, so for this moment I am
really in federal territory. In my whole day, however, this is
the only moment during which I interact with the Federal
Government.
Now I drive into work in the city of Bloomington. I pass
by a recycling center run by Monroe County, where I drop off
some bottles and trash. If I commit a crime on the way, I will
be arrested by the Monroe County police, or if I have reached
Bloomington, by the city police. They will prosecute me under
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state criminal law. The federal government prosecutes a few
crimes, such as drug trafficking and political corruption,
because it is thought that we need a uniform approach to those
areas.
I work at Indiana University School of Law. The university,
the most important in the state, is owned by the state of
Indiana. Technically, the state can make law for the university,
but it rarely does. Instead, the state leaves the administration
of the university to the faculty and administration of the
school. The university even has its own police force. Under
the state constitution, the state must maintain a public
university, but its primary role is to give us money. The law
school also sets and collects its own tuition, and it raises money
from private sources, so that we have an endowment that the
state cannot touch.
At the law school, the faculty acts as the local legislature.
We set policy by democratic vote in faculty meetings. In many
ways, the university is the most important government in my
life. This arrangement makes me quite happy, because it means
that the important decisions about my life are made by people
that I know and that are generally like me in their interests and
values. I am eager that the state legislature should not become
over-involved in the life of the school.
At the close of work, I pick my children up and go out to
dinner with them and my wife. The restaurant must get a license
from the state, and it must undergo periodic inspections by
state health officials. Smoking is not allowed because the city
of Bloomington has recently adopted a regulation prohibiting
smoking in public places anywhere within the city limits. After
a good dinner, I go home and go to sleep.
Now notice that over the course of this day, I have been
subject to laws made by the federal government, the state of
Indiana, Monroe County, the city of Bloomington, and Indiana
University. Because the jurisdictional arrangements are
generally clear, each government knows what it can do and
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what it cannot do. They often work together to make sure
that they are not intruding on each other,s territory. Because
I live under this system, I know which government to call if I
have a problem. If I see a crime, I call the county sheriff. If
I want to offer a new course, I bring it before the law school
faculty.
Notice also that I am most affected by those governments
that are closest to me, and as you go up the ladder, I am less
and less affected. The result is that most of the decisions
about my life are made locally, often by people that I know,
people that live in the same place as me. In many cases, I can
just pick up the phone and call these people. Because I am
their neighbor, they are generally polite, friendly, helpful, and
honest.
Now this system works well because it has been in place a
long time, and everyone knows more or less what is expected
of them. But it was not always so: once, there was no such
system, and it had to be created, just as you are in the process
of creating a federal system for yourself. The important thing
to remember is that even if you design a good system, that is
not enough. You must then make it work and live in the lives
of your friends and neighbors. In addition, you need a fairly
clear structure of responsibility, so you know that who is
responsible for what. The day that I just described can occur
only because the state government and the local governments
keep that structure clearly in mind.
D. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In this session, we will be discussing electoral systems and
their role in producing a stable, representative democracy. An
electoral system is the method by which we elect our
representatives. In particular, it refers to the way that we count
votes to choose a winner. There are a number of different
ways to do this, and different countries do it in different ways.
90

Designing Federalism in Burma

In other words, there is not just one legitimate form of
democracy. Different electoral systems will produce different
sorts of politics and will distribute power in different ways.
Each electoral system will thus produce a slightly different
kind of democracy, and each kind of democracy is good in
different ways and for different purposes. And because each
nation has its own particular problems, each nation may need
its own particular democratic design.
For example, some nations might want to ensure that every
group, no matter how small, has some representation in the
legislature to make its views known. These nations think that
the right to be heard is very important, and they also think
that it’s a good way to keep small groups committed to the
system, because they have some stake in it. On the other
hand, other nations might be concerned to have as stable,
steady, and moderate a politics as possible. They want to
encourage people to move toward the center of the political
spectrum, and they want to discourage extremist groups from
getting any real access to power. These nations may take this
position because they have recently had difficulties with civil
war or ethnic hostility or both.
The important thing to understand is that different
electoral systems can help to produce different sorts of politics.
And so different nations with different problems may need
different electoral systems; there is no one-size-fits-all scheme.
And for that reason, each of your states may want a different
electoral scheme, and you may want still another and different
scheme for the union government. But the way to start
thinking about designing such systems is to begin by thinking
about the problems that your states will face after the transition
to democracy. Those problems will not necessarily be the
same for each of your states, nor will they necessarily be the
same for the union government. So there is no reason to
think that your electoral systems all have to be the same.
There is an infinite variety of electoral systems, but let me
offer you three general categories. The first is a family of
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systems generally called majority/plurality systems. The second
is a family of systems that use some form of proportional
representation. And the third is a group of systems that
explicitly guarantee various minority groups some amount of
representation. All three of these kinds of systems seek to do
two things, to ensure that minorities have some voice and some
power, but also to promote a sense of the common good, so
that minorities do not become warring factions. We need to
recognize that we are different, and that’s OK, but we are also
the same in some fundamental sense, so that we have a unity
to bind us together. The question is how best to balance these
two desires, and the different systems answer that question in
different ways.
In a plurality/majority system, whoever gets the most votes
wins. In a majority system, you need to get 51% or more (the
majority), and in a plurality system, you just need to get more
than anyone else, so you could win with much less than half
the votes if there are a lot of candidates who split the vote.
The simplest form of plurality/majority election is one in
which the voters are choosing someone for just one office: so,
for example, in an election for President, the candidate with
the majority or plurality of the votes will become the president.
The situation is a little more complicated when you are
electing a body with many members, like the legislature. Then,
most typically, a plurality/majority system divides the voters
into geographical areas called districts. The voters in each
district then choose one person to represent them in the
legislature by majority or plurality vote. Again, what makes it
a majority electoral system is that within each district, the
majority chooses the representative, and the minority is left
without any real control.
This system has one clear advantage: because it divides
the people into relatively small geographical districts, each voter
has a real opportunity to know and call upon his or her
representative. For a people who are learning to govern
themselves, who don’t have a lot of experience making their
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will known in a distant central government, it can be a great
advantage to have someone close to home whom you know
and who can make your views felt in the legislature. It is also
easy to hold that person accountable for his actions: because
you can keep an eye on him, if you don’t like his performance
in the legislature, you simply vote him out at the next election.
But there is an aspect of this sort of system that might be
more troubling: plurality/majority systems tend to
misrepresent the relative strength of different voting groups.
In each district, the winners send their candidate to the
legislature, but the losers get no representation at all. They
just lose. So if we have an election in District A in which the
voters divide 60/40, then 40% of the voters in that district
feel that they have no direct representation.
Now suppose that we multiply this effect across the
country. Suppose there are two groups, the pinks and the
greens, and they don’t like each other and share very little.
Suppose that the greens are 60% of the voters and the pinks
are 40%. And now suppose that they are both spread out
pretty evenly across the country. In every district, therefore,
the greens outnumber the pinks: the pinks are 40% of the
population as a whole, and because they are spread evenly,
they are 40% in every district. What is the result? In every
district, the greens are a majority and the pinks a minority.
Therefore, in every district, the greens will elect the
representative’in every district! The legislature will therefore
be all green. Although they are 40% of the population, the
pinks have no representation at all.
I have described an extreme case, but less extreme cases
are very common. Majority/plurality systems almost always
over-represents the majority, in the sense that they majority
commands a greater share of the legislature than its share of
the voters. This sort of misrepresentation gives rise to a
number of problems. First, small groups are excluded from
their proportional share of power, a situation that many regard
as undemocratic. Second, those groups may grow so
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dissatisfied that they will resort to civil unrest, making for an
unstable country. And third, because they are so secure in
their power, the ruling group may ignore the needs and interests
of the minorities altogether.
Now to counter these problems, constitutional designers
have developed slightly different versions of the plurality/
majority system that will empower minorities somewhat more
fully. The simplest of these versions is called alternative voting.
In this system, you have relatively small geographical districts
but with multiple candidates running for each office. Each
voter then lists these candidates in order of his preference.
After the votes are counted, very likely no candidate will have
50% or more of the first place votes. In that case, the candidate
with the fewest first place votes is eliminated. We take all the
ballots that put him first and we go down to their second
choices and make them into first place choices, giving them to
the appropriate candidates. Then we check to see whether
anyone has 50% or more of the first place votes under this
new distribution.
Now all that sounds complicated, but it is a lot simpler in
practice, because it gives the candidates a clear incentive. If
you are a candidate in a district with multiple groups, you realize
that you will not be able to win with the first place votes of
just one group. So you will need to appeal to other groups to
get their votes as well. And even if they won’t give you their
first place votes, they may give you their second place votes,
and those may be necessary for your election. Now that means
that you can campaign primarily to pick up voters of your
group, but you must also try to appeal to others, so you are
unlikely to spread a message of division and hatred. And the
result is commonly that you have legislatures that are trying to
govern the country well, instead of legislatures that are always
angry and divided against each other.
So alternative voting has a lot of promise: you can keep
your small districts, so voters know their representatives, but
minorities also have some influence because candidates need
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their second place votes. But again there are drawbacks to
alternative voting as well. Imagine that we have several groups,
pinks, greens, blues, and greys. Now if the pinks are an absolute
majority of the district and the pink candidate can count on
their votes, then he has no incentive to appeal to other groups.
So the system works best when no group has an absolute
majority. Even then, however, if the animosity among these
groups is severe, people from one group may simply not vote
for people whom they regard as their enemy. Everyone knows
this, so candidates may not even bother making appeals to
voters from certain other groups.
But suppose that the system works as it is supposed to
suppose that the animosity is not profound and no group holds
an absolute majority, so you need some second place votes
from voters outside your group. There is still a problem, or at
least people could regard it as a problem. Here is the promise
of alternative voting: candidates from the pink group will try
to appeal to the greens to get some of their second place votes.
Now if the pink candidate wins, we can hope that he will feel
grateful and will support the interests of the greens in the
legislature. But the greens have influence only through this
legislator; they have no actually managed to get one of their
own elected. In many cases, that influence may matter a great
deal. But we can also imagine that the pink candidate will
think of the pinks first, and he will help the greens only
secondarily. And meanwhile, the blues and the greys are totally
out of luck; they have no-one to represent them even partially.
So alternative voting may help reduce the tension between
groups, but only to a limited degree. And it may help to make
the system more representative, but again only to a limited
degree.
Now the most significant alternative to plurality majority
systems is proportional representation (PR). You create quite
large districts, and each district sends multiple representatives
to the legislature, let’s say 100. Parties then run lists of
candidates, generally one candidate for every slot open, and
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they are ranked, 1 to 100. After the votes are counted, the
party gets a number of seats in the legislature that is
proportional to their share of the vote. So if the pink party gets
35% of the vote, then their top 35 candidates become members
of the legislature. If they get only 2% of the vote, then they
send two people to the legislature. And the result is that even
very small parties can get their fair share of legislative power.
So the first big contrast with plurality/majority voting is
that PR is more representative. In a plurality/majority system,
in each district, only the majority sends any representatives to
the legislature. In any given district, If you are in the minority,
you just lose. If your party is in the minority in every district,
it will elect no-one, even though nation-wide it may have 20 or
30 or even 40 percent of the voters. By contrast, with PR,
even very small groups sometimes manage to send someone
to the legislature, because if they have 1% of the vote, they
will elect 1% of the representatives.
That kind of inclusiveness has several advantages. First,
it more accurately represents the will of the people, which
makes it more democratic. Second, even small minorities may
feel that they have some influence in the current system, so
they may feel more committed to the process. So if it is very
important to include all voices in the discussion, this is a good
system.
But this system has drawbacks as well. First, for this system
to work, you need large districts because they will be sending
a number of people to the legislature. In some states, the
whole country is one large district. And the result is that people
do not feel a close connection to their representatives. The
legislators are not familiar with the people of their district,
and they may not push vigorously for their interests. So you
get more accurate representation, but you lose close connection
and familiarity. And that does seem to be a real tradeoff.
Second, in traditional PR, the parties have a lot of control.
They choose candidates, and they list them in order. The
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people then just choose one or the other list. So the political
elite have a great deal of influence. Now this arrangement
can be good or bad. If you worry that your political party
leaders may be corrupt or power-hungry or manipulative, then
you want someone else to choose the candidates and their
rank order. On the other hand, your political elites may be
more moderate and responsible than the rank and file. Because
they have to run the system, they may choose only candidates
who will work responsibly within the system, and they may
better understand what makes someone a good candidate.
Because they want to appeal to a lot of voters, they may choose
candidates who are moderate in their views. And for the same
reason, they may develop a list of candidates with all different
sorts of candidates on it, people from different groups, from
different regions, and so forth. And when different sorts of
legislators interact in the legislature, they may find ways to
work together, even across their differences.
Third, some have claimed that unlike alternative voting,
PR gives political parties no incentive to compromise with
each other because all are assured their share of the legislature,
so why should they bother? Again, however, it depends on
the circumstances. As just noted, sometimes in a PR system,
if the divisions are not too severe, the parties will put out
candidate lists with people from all groups, in an effort to
broaden their base of support. And if there are a number of
groups in the legislature, none with an absolute majority, then
they must form coalitions in order to form a government or
to get legislation passed, so they must compromise and learn
to live together. The one time that PR does not do much to
encourage compromise is when one party, based on group
identity, has an absolute majority; then it has no need to
compromise or to build coalitions.
Some people think that PR has still another drawback: it
makes governments less stable and more divided. Remember
that in a majority/plurality system, you need to have a large
number of votes to get any representation at all, because you
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have to win a majority or plurality of votes in any given district.
The result is that only large parties tend to have any power.
Indeed, most often there are only two significant parties. By
contrast in PR, you don’t need a majority of the votes cast. In
fact, you may need only 1% in order to send someone to the
legislature. PR countries therefore tend to have a lot of parties
represented in the legislature, and none may command a
majority. As a result, to form a government or to pass
legislation, the parties have to enter into coalitions with each
other. But those coalitions are made up of people who have
different views and agendas, and so they may be unstable,
breaking apart on any controversial issue, which is precisely
when they need to stay together to govern the country. (On
the other hand, if they do stay together, then they all have to
moderate their views, compromise with others, and move to
the center. That pressure to the center makes the legislature
less representative of the country as a whole, but accurate
representation was the whole promise of PR to begin with).
In addition, because small groups may manage to elect
representatives under PR, you may end up with extremist
candidates in the legislatureBcandidates who are pledged, for
example, to restoring the generals to their place of power, or
something like that. And these people may make all kinds of
trouble. Now remember that the promise of PR is accurate
representation, and in sending these extremists to the
legislature, it is simply delivering on that promise, because some
voters want these candidates. So if you don’t want these
extremists in the legislature, you are really saying that you do
not want the legislature to be that representative. But many
people think that when it comes to representation, you can
have too much of a good thing; in this view, irresponsible
extremists should not have power in the constitutional
structure, especially if they are pledged to the destruction of
that very structure by unconstitutional means.
Empirically, it is not clear how great these problems are
for actual PR systems. As to the claim that PR systems are
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unstable, many PR countries turn out to be quite stable. In
some countries, the political culture is centrist enough that
they in fact have only a couple of major parties. In others,
though they have many parties, the difference between them
is not so great, so the coalitions tend to be fairly stable. So
whether PR is in fact unstable will in part depend on just how
politically divided the society is.
As to the worry about extremist parties, you can eliminate
them simply by adopting a threshold requirement: in order to
send anyone to the legislature, a party must get more than a
certain percentage of the vote, 2% or 5% or 8% or something
like that. So to elect a representative, you must appeal to a
certain number of voters, and inevitably that means that you
will be more moderate. But there is actually a question about
whether you really want to keep those small parties out of the
legislature. It may be better to allow them to send a couple of
people, who will have little power anyway, but then they feel
that they have had a chance to express their views, and the rest
of the legislature can keep an eye on them.
So in practice, PR and majority/plurality systems may not
differ very mch when it comes to extremism and instability.
Instead, the choice between PR and majority/plurality systems
may ultimately boil down to one difference: because it uses
small districts, a majority/plurality system allows a closer
connection between voters and their representatives, but PR
leads to more accurate representation of different groups,
especially of minorities. So you need to decide what matters
most to you. And again, that decision need not be the same
for each state constitution or for the union constitution,
because the people of each government have different issue
and problems.
It is also possible to combine the two systems in different
ways. I know that some of you have studied Germany’s
electoral system, and they use a combination. Some of the
seats in the legislature are elected by plurality vote from
relatively small geographical districts. And then some are
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elected by proportional representation, and they are allocated
in such a way that the legislature as a whole is roughly
proportional.
And finally, there is one other kind of system that may be
relevant to Burma: by formal law, one might reserve certain
offices to people from certain groups or certain areas. So, for
example, one might reserve a number of seats in the legislature
for people of a threatened minority group: only people from
that group may vote in elections for those seats, and only people
from that group may be a candidate for those seats. You might
adopt the same sort of system for the cabinet or the high
court: under the constitution, these bodies would have to
include people from a number of different groups.
Usually it is new democracies that choose this sort of
system. These countries may have been wracked by civil war.
Sometimes various minority ethnic groups feel that they have
never had appropriate influence, and they are very concerned
to ensure that they get a certain share of the power. Neither
plurality/majority systems nor PR absolutely ensures that
minority groups will get any significant representation. In a
plurality system, minorities will elect someone only if they are
geographically concentrated so that they are 50% of the votes
in some electoral district. If they are evenly spread out, they
will be a minority everywhere and so may elect no-one at all.
In a classic PR system, minorities are more likely to elect
someone, but even here there is no guarantee. They must
organize, they must create a party to represent their interests,
and they must get their members to vote. So if your
overwhelming goal is to ensure that a particular group gets a
particular share of power, you may want simply to guarantee
that group a certain share of power.
But there is a risk in this method of proceeding: by law, it
divides people into groups. As a result, they may come to
think of themselves primarily as members of groups, and they
will contend with other voters as members of other groups.
Pretty soon you may have a deeply divided citizenry, with
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different groups feeling that they are all in competition. As a
result, the politics may be deeply divisive, and eventually the
system may break down entirely, and you are plunged back
into civil war.
So it is good to hesitate before you adopt this sort of
practice. If you do adopt a system of reserved seats, it is
perhaps best to view it as a transitional scheme. It may be
necessary to guarantee traditionally oppressed groups some
power, and those groups may insist on it. But you hope that
as the country gains some experience with democracy, as the
groups come to interact with each other, group lines will appear
less significant. Even though group identities will not and
should not disappear, people in different groups will not
distrust each other or the government so much, because the
system has worked for them. So, again, you hope that voters
from one group will come to care about voters from another
group, and vice-versa. And they will all come to think that
what they have in common is as important as what they don’t.
All countries must struggle with this task: we need to allow
diversity, but we also need to instill unity. Now the risk of a
system of reserved seats is that it tends to institutionalize
division, and so it can make it very difficult to move to a system
characterized by trust and unity.
So you ideally want a system that will do two things at the
same time. It should allow particular groups of people to
express their identity as a people, to tell their story, but it should
also allow people to form bonds between groups, so that you
can create a unified nation. Now one way to do that is the way
that the Chins have proposed in their constitution. Instead
of reserving seats for particular ethnic groups, the Chins have
proposed that the union constitution reserve seats for certain
regions, the traditional states of Burma, Chin State, Shan State,
Karen State, and so forth. So, for example, the Chins think
that the government should include ministers from each of
these states, and the High Court should include judges from
each of these states, and the upper chamber of the legislature
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should include an equal number of representatives from each
of these states, regardless of their population. And all these
provisions are designed to ensure that the people in each of
these states are guaranteed a certain share of power.
But these provisions guarantee power to geographical
regions, not to ethnic groups as such. To be sure, most of the
people in Chin state are Chins, and so the effect of these
provisions will, in the short run, be to guarantee ethnic Chins
a certain share of power. But the constitution does not
recognize this ethnic difference as such. It guarantees power
to people in Chin state as citizens of that state, whether they
are ethnically Chin or not. And that means that the law does
not divide people into contending ethnic groups; it merely
divides them into geographical areas. In some states, the
population may be very mixed, and as time goes on, the ethnic
composition of all the states may become increasingly
heterogeneous. Yet regardless of their ethnic identity, the
people in these states hold power based on where they live,
not on their ethnicity. The result is that the law does not
create hard and fast divisions between people based on their
ethnicity. It guarantees to local communities some share of
power, but it does not divide these communities based on their
language or religion or ethnicity or clan. And the hope is that
as a result, people from very different groups may learn to live
and work together, to trust each other and support each other.
So again we try to achieve unity in diversity; we recognize and
allow for difference, but we also hope to create a state with
enough unity to work.
And again, you must make these decisions at the level not
only of the union government but also at the state. Even if
you want some reserved seats in the union government, it
may be that you want no reserved seats within your state
governments, because you do not feel that there are any
minority groups within your borders that need a guaranteed
share of power. Or, on the other hand, maybe you do want to
create some reserved seats, because your state contains a
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particular, sharply defined and politically militant group, and
they do not particularly want to be included in your state. One
way to appease them, to buy their support, may be to give
them some sort of special status through reserved seatsBat
least until they come to trust you, so that the special status is
no longer needed.
So where does all this leave us? For now, let us put to one
side the union constitution and instead talk about your various
state constitutions. It may be that you do not even want to
prescribe a particular permanent electoral system in your
constitution. Instead, you could prescribe some method to
elect the first legislature and then leave it to them to choose
the electoral system for the future, which may change with
time. This approach has some advantages: the legislature is
likely to know a good bit about conditions in the state, and
they can easily respond as they learn more about what might
work for the states. The drawback to this approach is that the
legislature may prove resistant to change, because they will
want to keep the system that put them in power, so that it will
continue to put them in power into the future. If they change
it at all, it may only be to make even more sure that they will
retain their grip on power.
So if you are worried about the legislature’s motives, you
may want to prescribe a constitutional method of election,
and if you need to change it, you can still do so by constitutional
amendment. But which method? The conventional wisdom
is that alternative voting may be a good choice if the divisions
between your groups are not too severe and the groups are
geographically intermixed. Remember that under alternative
voting, voters rank order their preferred candidates, and the
winning candidate may need some second place votes from
people outside of his own group. Now if the groups are
intermixed, then a candidate will have to appeal to a number
of groups to get elected, so that people will start building
bridges. And if the groups are not too divided, then people
will feel comfortable listing candidates from another group as
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their second or third choices. So alternative voting under these
circumstances can lead to greater trust and connection among
citizens. Even under these good circumstances, alternative
voting still may not be very representative: in each district,
some minorities may not be able to elect the person who is
their first choice, but they may still have some influence on
their representatives, because their second choice votes were
essential to his election. So, in short, under these conditions,
you may give up a little in representative accuracy, but you
gain by giving candidates an incentive to appeal across ethnic
divisions, and also by keeping the close geographic link
between representatives and voters.
On the other hand, if your divisions are severe and/or if
your groups are concentrated in particular areas, then
alternative voting will not deliver on its promise of mutual
accommodation. If minorities are concentrated in particular
areas, so that they form a majority, candidates will not need to
appeal across ethnic lines, resulting in so-called “ethnic
fiefdoms,” where the majority always wins and the minority
goes without any representation at all. If minorities are
intermixed but the divisions are severe, then candidates just
will not appeal across ethnic lines, so you will still end up with
extremist politicians. And because the minorities are all spread
out, they will be a minority in almost all districts, so that the
majority group will win the election in almost all elections.
The result is that under these circumstances, alternative voting
will suffer from the primary defect of all majority/plurality
systems: it tends to give the majority even more control than
their numbers would suggest. So we end up with a legislature
in which politicians appeal only to their own groups and the
larger groups are over-represented.
So the conventional wisdom is that proportional
representation is probably best if the divisions among your
groups are rigid and intense, and/or if your groups are
geographically concentrated in particular areas. Above all, PR
will ensure an inclusive, broadly representative legislature. In
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a divided society, it is critically important that everyone feel
that they have a voice in government; otherwise, those who
feel on the outside may just take up arms again. So PR is a
good choice for countries with deep divisions or when when
groups are geographically concentrated. In those cases, if you
use a plurality majority system, the dominant group will always
win, and the minority will have no representation. By contrast,
in a large PR district, those minority voters may still have
enough of the vote, even if a minority, to send some
representatives to the legislature. And so again they feel that
they have a stake and a voice, and they may become committed
to the system.
But even in this situation, PR is not without its faults. It
still uses large districts, so the close connection between voters
and representatives will become more attenuated. And because
all groups have a real chance to elect representatives on their
own, they may feel little requirement to build bridges beyond
their groups. The party leaders may try to field lists with people
from every group, so as to get a lot of votes, but if the divisions
are severe, the leaders may be as unwilling to work with people
from other groups as the voters are. So there are clearly
drawbacks, but most feel that the benefits of broad inclusion
are worth it.
In conclusion, let me say that I know that this material is
technical, and it is something that you have to work with for a
while before you become comfortable with it. But it really
matters. We have good evidence that choosing an electoral
system can make a big difference in how a democracy functions.
It is never possible to control the future through constitutional
design with perfect certainty, but getting the right voting
method can really help.
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E. THE UNION CONSTITUTION
We come at last to perhaps the most important, most difficult,
and most delicate question of all: the construction of a Union
government. And the reason that it is important is also the
reason that it is difficult, and the reason that it is delicate. And
that reason is that Burma has historically experienced some
tension between the center and the margin, and we must speak
frankly about that tension.
I am told that those wounds have started to heal, as the
ethnic Burmans and the ethnic minorities have built a common
cause in opposition to the military government. And all agree
that the primary goal here is to move to a democratic
government in Rangoon. But at the same time, there are
groups within Burma that want some control over their own
future, with some independence from the center, even if that
center is democratic.
Now a society like Burma is sometimes called a plural
society, meaning that there are a number of groups within it,
who have their own distinct life ways. I intend to use that
term. I do not intend to use the term divided society, which
suggests hostility and division between the groups. I will not
use that term because I don’t think we know whether a
democratic Burma will in fact be divided. There is a history
of tension, but there is also a history of struggling together
against a common foe. So we don’t want to assume that there
will be bad feelings between the center and the margin after
democracy arrives.
But even if Burma is not divided, plural societies always
present special problems in constitutional design. Some believe
that the best path is to encourage everyone to forget their
differences and ignore their distinctive cultures. In this view,
the overriding goal of a constitution is to dissolve difference.
And in some places, where the anger between groups is
absolutely poisonous, that may be the only possible course.
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I think, however, that you have concluded that is not the
best course for Burma. You have already had too much of
the government demanding that everyone should be the same.
Instead, I think that you have decided to try to strike a balance,
and I think that you are wise in this decision. On the one
hand, you want to assure local groups the right to measured
self-determination and to a meaningful share of power in the
center, because you do not want them to be swallowed up by
the majority. But on the other hand, you are still one country,
so you must create a common enterprise that binds you
together. You want to be many, but you also want to be one.
And it is important to remember that both are important
and that you cannot just choose one over the other. If you
are only one, all the same, with no local control, local people
will still feel out of control of their own future, and the peace
may not last very long. But if you are not one in any way, the
nation will surely fall apart in short order, and again the peace
may not last very long.
Now in practice, as I understand the project in which you
are engaged, you wish to do two things. First, you want some
protection for the states, but second, you will want to encourage
all groups to work together to form a common framework.
You want local government, but you also want a central
government that all experience as their government, as their
agent. You cannot ignore either. The whole system has to
work together to accomplish both.
And it is extremely important to remember this: you cannot
design a constitution that makes anyone feel oppressed,
because in the long run that sort of constitution will not
survive. If any group feels that they have really been left out,
then they will eventually start to resist the government.
Burma cannot afford to return to civil war, and that means
that the ethnic Burmese must strive to make the ethnic
minorities happy, and the ethnic minorities must strive to make
the ethnic Burmese happy. If you are in one country, you
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depend on each other, and you must therefore care for each
other, and at the same time, allow each other to be different.
So let us take those two pieces in turn. First, you need to
protect local government; second, you need to make the central
government a place of unity and mutual regard. How do we
do this?
Start with local government. We talked yesterday about
federalism, and that discussion is of course relevant here. Your
very method of proceeding rests on a federalist view, because
each state is here drafting its own constitution to govern itself.
Now when it comes time to create a union government, you
will want to delegate certain powers to that government. You
want to keep for yourself everything that is critical to your
own identity, but you want to give away those powers that you
think can best be exercised by one central unit.
And so I remind you that many countries have taken the
view that a union government has advantages in putting
together an economy, in waging external war, and in handling
foreign relations. I will suggest shortly that you may also want
to give the central government two other powers: first, the
power to protect individual rights for all; and second, the power
to equalize tax revenues between poorer and richer states. So
the central government needs some powers of its own. But
on the other hand, many plural societies have taken the view
that local governments should retain powers over culture and
education. On other matters, such as criminal law,
environmental protection, and the like, different nations
proceed very differently, and there is not one general answer.
So in the Union constitution, you want to insert some
protection for local governments, so as to ensure that your
own local cultures have a chance to rule. But you do not want
these states to become hostile and angry at each other; you
want them to feel some sense of connection. How do we
accomplish this end? First, I believe that you may want to
ensure that all Burmans are welcome in every state, regardless
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of their ethnicity, so that a Chin can move to Burma proper,
or a Kachin to Shan State, or an ethnic Burmese to Karen
State, and they will feel safe and protected there. Now that
means that in general the various states should not create
legislation to favor their own primary ethnicity over other
people. To be sure, the whole point in federalism is to allow a
people to protect their own distinctive life way. And so the
various states may be allowed to protect their own culture and
preserve their customary law. But at the same time, each state
constitution should protect the fundamental rights and
opportunities of all people under its jurisdiction, regardless
of ethnicity.
As always, the question is how to strike the balance. If
you are from Arakan state and you are living in Chin state, you
may inevitably feel a little out of place. People speak a different
language, they have a different customary law, and they just do
things differently. But you knew that when you moved there,
and you may not feel too angry. Imagine, however, that the
legal system systematically treats you worse than your friends
and neighbors who are Chin: you cannot vote, you will be
punished more harshly for crimes, you cannot speak your
language in public, you are prevented from pursuing your
occupation. Very soon, you may become very angry. And
instead of making friends, you make enemies.
So the state constitutions need both to create a haven for
local cultures and also to welcome those from outside these
local cultures. The way that the Chin constitution tries to
strike this balance is this: on the one hand, it allows the
government to promote Chin culture and customary law; but
on the other hand, it discourages the government from
discriminating against outsiders, especially with regard to their
basic rights. So again, you are different, but you are also
connected.
Now to help realize this goal, you may want to empower
the union government to protect people from one state who
are living or visiting in a different state. For example, suppose
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that someone from Mon State goes to live in Kachin state,
and the Kachin government, for some reason, refuses to allow
him to buy a house. The Kachin government is not supposed
to do this under its own constitution, but they do it even so,
and their courts go along with it. What can this poor Mon
man do? One option is to say that we are very afraid of the
union government, so we do not want them to intervene, so
the man should simply go back home or go without a house.
But remember this could happen to any of your people: they
go to a different part of Burma for a job, and they need some
protection there.
So another alternative is to conclude that the federal
government must step in. Because we have structured it to
represent everyone, we hope that it will not discriminate and
it will stop the states from hurting outsiders. Now in this
case, we may want to give the union government some power
to protect individual rights against the states. One possibility
is to include an expansive bill of rights in the union
constitution, and then give the union high court the power to
enforce it. Another is to give the union legislature the power
to adopt legislation to ensure the well-being of all Burmese
when they are in other parts of Burma.
Now if all this works, then Burma will look like this: each
state will have its own culture and way of life, and the state
legislature may promote those things. But people from every
state will also feel comfortable going to other states, where
they will be welcome guests or even equal citizens if they
choose to stay. And so Burma will be many peoples but also
one. Hopefully, over time, people from all over Burma will
feel part of their own state, but they will also feel fondness
and respect for Burmese people everywhere and for the union
government as well.
But all of this will work only if the central government
really does care for all alike and is not the servant of any one
group. And so we must figure out how to structure the federal
government itself so that you can all view it as your agent and
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not as your master. I know that many of you are worried
about any central government, and many might be in the mood
to give it almost no power and to spend all your time protecting
yourself against it. But in the long run, the experience of
other countries suggests that such a deeply defensive mood
will not work. It is critical that in addition to protecting the
states, you find a way to create a union government that you
can actually trust. This task is critical for several reasons. First,
you will be giving the federal government a certain amount of
power, and you really need it to perform its assigned works in
a trustworthy way, such as creating a vibrant economy,
equalizing tax revenues, and protecting your people when they
are in other states of the union.
Second, if the union government is not trustworthy, it
will simply ignore the barriers that you set before it in your
constitution, and it will take all the power to itself. Third, in
the long run, if people from all over Burma cannot trust each
other when they meet in the center, then Burma may well
dissolve again into war. So, in short, it is not enough to protect
yourself from the central government; you must also remake
the central government so that it does not cause such fear.
Now obviously the most important part of that remaking
is that the central government must be democratic. But as we
have seen, there are many ways to be democratic. Imagine
again a plural society, a society with many different groups
and peoples. In this society, there is a majority group with
60% of the population and several minority groups totaling
40% of the population. And imagine that these groups have
different ways of life. Suppose now that we hold a simple
election to decide whose way of life should win, and the
election shall be decided by a majority vote. Well, obviously,
the majority group here will always win, and the minorities
will have very little self-determination. For them, this system
is unlikely to feel like democracy. It is more likely to feel like
prison.
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So how do we change this system, so that we still keep it
democratic, but we also protect these local groups? Well, the
first piece of an answer is federalism, as we have seen: we
create state governments and give them some power. But
that’s not enough: we must also ask how we make the central
government itself more truly representative of all local
cultures?
Many think that in a plural society, it is important to avoid
majoritarianism, that is to say, a system in which you decide
things by simple majority vote, so that the majority wins
everything and the minority loses and has no real power. Now
in the legislature, what this means is that proportional
representation is probably better than a majority/plurality
system. I remind you that in a majority system, you create
districts and elect one person from each district by a simple
majority vote. The result is that the majority wins everything,
winner-take-all, and the minority loses everything. By contrast,
in a PR system, you create large districts, with many seats, and
you win a fraction of the seats that corresponds to your fraction
of the vote. So if you win 10% of the votes, you win 10% of
the seats. And that means that the minority is not wholly
excluded from power; it has a say in the government that
corresponds to its numbers. And so in a PR system, governments
are often very inclusive, broad coalitions.
There is another implication to the idea that you should
avoid majoritarian systems: parliamentarism is probably a better
choice for a plural society than is presidentialism. I remind
you of the difference. In a parliamentary system, the legislature
chooses the executive branch from among its members. If
there is no majority party, then various smaller groups must
band together to form a coalition government. Usually, the
government has ministers from all the different parties that
went to make it up. And at the end of the day, the government
is responsible to the legislature, which means that the legislature
can dissolve the government by a vote of no confidence and
choose a new government.
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By contrast, in a presidential system, the president is elected
independently of the legislature by a direct, majoritarian
nationwide vote. He holds his office for a fixed term. The
legislature does not choose him, and the legislature may not
unseat him. So as a result, he has a great deal of independence.
In presidential systems, rival groups find it very important to
hold the presidency, because the president tends to be powerful
and important. But remember that the president is just one
person, elected by a majority vote. That means that only one
party or one group will hold the presidency, and everyone else
will be left with nothing. A minority with 10% of the votes
will not have 10% of the presidency; that minority will have
zero percent of the presidency. So we have here again, a winner
take all system.
By contrast, in a Parliamentary system, the government
often has more balanced membership, because it includes
members from all the groups that together formed the coalition
that put it in power. In addition, the various minority groups
still have some influence over the executive, because if they
don’t like it, they can try to put together a vote of no confidence
to unseat the executive.
A parliamentary system might have another advantage for
Burma as well. In a presidential system, all the executive power
is concentrated in one person, the president, who ultimately
makes all the executive decisions. In a state like Burma, where
the military government has tended to concentrate power in
itself, it may be very important to make executive power broadly
accountable and to break up the concentration of power. And
parliamentarism probably does that better than presidentialism.
So in short: in a fairly large, plural society, it is very
important to give everyone a share of power, and the best way
to do that may be through a parliamentary system elected
according to proportional representation.
But in the end, suppose that Burma breaks up into ethnic
parties: these parties represent the interests only of their
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groups, speak only for their groups, and are hostile to other
groups. Now in this system, the ethnic Burmese party is still
more than half the population.
Even with proportional representation, it will control more
than half the seats in the legislature, and so it will be able to
put together a government without entering into a coalition
with anyone else. So if you have pure ethnic parties, even PR
and parliamentarism will not save you from the tyranny of the
majority. What is to be done? We must find some way to
make the government accountable to all, and to make these
groups interact with each other in a better way.
One path is to reserve some seats for the various minorities
as such. Yet this course might harden the ethnic lines even
further, as everyone comes to think of politics in ethnic terms,
as us against them. A different and, I think, better plan may
be to guarantee the states some share of power. Each of
these states may have a core ethnicity, but they are not defined
by their ethnicity. Anyone from Shan state may vote for the
reserved representatives for Shan state, regardless of their
ethnic identity. So this might be a way of protecting minorities
without fueling the fires of ethnic hatred.
I should stress, however, that as always, there are both
risks and promises in using reserved seats. The whole point
in reserved seats is to recognize that in a plural society, majority
rule is not the only value; in fact, majority rule can become
oppressive. So the general use of reserved seats is to give
minorities more power than their numbers would suggest in a
purely majoritarian system. Used rightly, such an arrangement
can give to minorities some real self-determination, and it can
cause them to be committed to the regime. But used wrongly
or too much, reserved seats can prompt anger from the
majority, who feel that they have lost control of their own
self-determination and who will therefore abandon the regime,
causing, perhaps, another war. So for reasons of both justice
and stability, it is important to get the balance right.
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How might you reserve seats in the government for the
various states? There are at least four possibilities, and they
can be used together or separately. The Chins believe that all
four should be present in the union government, and so we
have included them in the draft constitution that you have
before you. First, you might reserve seats on the high court
of the federal union. The current Chin draft calls for one
judge from each state, regardless of population.
Now this arrangement clearly gives the minorities more
representation than their proportional share, but that does not
seem much of a problem because judges are not supposed to
represent voters anyway. Their loyalty is to the law, not to the
political will, so presumably their origin should not make too
much of an impact on their decisions. The reason to spread
the power around among the different states is simply that
they will keep each other honest and they may each bring a
different perspective to bear. But they should not think of
themselves as politicians representing a state. With luck, the
High Court, committed to law and drawing from all groups,
might become an institution trusted by all the peoples of
Burma.
The second method is to create an upper house of
Parliament designed not to represent population but the states
as states. So, each state might send the same number of
representatives to this body, regardless of actual population.
This arrangement is not uncommon in the world; indeed, the
United States Senate works this way. The idea is that in a
legislature, you might want to represent two sorts of political
actors: first, you might want to represent individuals on a
population basis; and second, you might want to represent
the states as states, on the view that different states have
different interests, and you need to protect the smaller ones
against the larger. Now usually, the upper house at a minimum
has a role in making law: a statute must secure the approval of
both the lower and the upper house, and so the states as states
effectively have a veto over the content of the legislation.
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Customarily, if the upper house represents states as states,
then the lower house represents population. The Chin Forum
was concerned, however, that if the country divides along
ethnic lines, the ethnic Burmese would hold an absolute
majority in the lower house. So, to balance the power, their
current proposal is that the seats shall be shared fifty percent
between the ethnic Burmans and all the other ethnic groups
combined. To be frank, this is an unusual step, but it was
based on the Chin Forum’s concern that no one group should
be able wholly to dominate any organ of government. And
they particularly wanted balance in the lower house, because
they are thinking that the lower house will form the
government. In that case, if one group has an absolute majority
in the lower house, then it will also be able wholly to control
the executive branch.
And finally, just to be safe, the Chin Forum also would
like to stipulate that the executive department should be
balanced as well, such that every state has at least one minister
in the government. Balance in the executive branch is surely
quite important, as it prevents any one group from taking
control of the government and bending it to its will. And
again, in a country with a pattern of military government, it is
particularly important not to concentrate executive power into
one set of hands.
In truth, there are a number of ways to secure balance in
the executive branch. The Chin Forum has adopted a method
to make doubly sure: in their view, the constitution should
require that the lower house, which chooses the executive, must
be balanced between ethnic Burmans and everyone else, and
it should also require that the executive be balanced. But it
may be that in practice, you only need one or the other. If the
constitution, for example, requires that the executive be
balanced, then it is less important that the lower house also be
balanced into halves. You might then make the lower house
elected on a purely population basis. So in this arrangement,
the ethnic Burmans would dominate the lower house; the
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ethnic minorities would dominate the upper house; and the
executive would be balanced.
Or, on the other hand, you could keep the requirement
that the lower house be balanced, so that no group will hold
more then fifty percent. As a result, in order to form a
government, any group must form a coalition with other
groups, so that the government will automatically be balanced
between those groups. It is also possible to mandate that the
upper house choose the government. Then, because the upper
house gives power to the ethnic minorities, it will ensure that
the minorities also have power in the government.
So there you have the four possibilities for reserved seats
for the states: the high court, the upper house, the lower house,
and the government. And now we have three elements that
might go into a union government. We might protect state
government through federalism; we might ensure that the
union government broadly represents everyone through
proportional representation and parliamentarism; and we might
experiment with reserved seats to protect the states.
But there is one more piece. In some ways, it is the hardest
of all, but perhaps the most important. In the long run, the
only thing that will keep any constitution, any government,
from dissolving is that the people of the country, all the people
of the country, feel committed to each other. People in a
country stay together because they want to stay together. To
be sure, people often disagree, and they fight things out in the
political arena. And that’s fineBdissent and disagreement are
a natural part of democracy. But at the same time, all these
people recognize each other as fellow citizens, so that even
when they are disagreeing, they feel closely connected.
Now in practical terms, to achieve this goal, the politicians
in the union government must seek to serve all the people of
Burma, not just their own ethnic group. And so it is important
to build into the system some incentives for politicians to be
moderate, to appeal to a number of groups, to work for
compromise and mutual support. How do we do this?
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Again, the first answer is that the constitution itself should
not divide people into ethnic groups, we have local state
government, for example, not ethnic government. Second, a
system of proportional representation and reserved seats will
ensure that minority groups have some power in the union
government. We have some evidence that simply having
minority people around and having to work with them helps
to create good relations. If they hold key positions, it is harder
to ignore them or treat them with simple hostility.
Third, we want to find a way to reward politicians who
have support among a broad number of groups. Constitutional
designers desperately search for ways to realize this ideal, but
we know much less about this subject than we would like.
One possibility is to design electoral systems that will encourage
politicians to appeal for the votes of people other than their
own ethnic group. The more that we can build this into the
system, the better. For example, suppose that you choose to
have some office filled by a majority vote.
You might use a majority vote, for example, in electing
representatives to the upper house or filling legislative seats in
your state assemblies or choosing a president if you decide to
have one. In these circumstances, it is always better to use
alternative voting rather than a simple majority vote. I remind
you that under alternative voting, if no-one has a majority of
first place votes, then you consult the second place votes and
add them into the count. The result is that politicians will
seek to get the first place votes of their own group but also
the second place votes of other groups. To do that, they will
have to develop a message that appeals broadly to people.
I noted another method earlier, you might choose to have
the upper house elect the executive department. Because by
definition the upper house includes equal numbers of all states,
to get elected the executive will have to appeal broadly to a
large number of representatives from a large number of
groups.
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In addition, proportional representation for elections to
the union parliament might lead politicians to be conciliatory
toward ethnic groups other than their own. If there is no
majority party in the parliament, there is a built in requirement
of compromise, because in order to form a government, the
parties must put together a coalition. If there is a majority
party, the pressure is much less, but there is always the
possibility that dissidents within the majority party will split
and make common cause with minorities.
It is also possible to create a PR system that directly gives
incentives to politicians to moderation. For example, I have
said that under classical PR, a party that gets 20% of the votes
will get 20% of the seats. But you could add a rule that if any
party gets a lot of support in a large number of states, they
get some additional seats in recognition of their broad appeal.
And if a party gets its only real support in just one state, they
correspondingly lose some seats. Because they are aware of these
rules, parties will try to develop a message that appeals to a lot
of people, and they will seek to avoid calls for ethnic hostility.
And finally, it might be wise to create some independent
commissions staffed with experts, especially in the area of
economic policy. Expert commissions may set policy for the
good of the whole, rather than for the political advantage of
some political party, especially if you protect them from
political pressure.
If they do good for the country, they will also make the
system more stable, because people will feel committed to the
nation, rather than to some narrow ethno-partisan ideology.
And if the commissions are themselves multi-ethnic, then some
of the leading people from every state may have the experience
of working together for the good of the whole, and that
experience usually causes people to be committed to each other,
even across ethnic boundaries.
I am sure that there are other possibilities, and I am eager
to hear your ideas. The important thing is to remember always
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to be on the lookout for these possibilities, to try to build into
the system an incentive to moderation wherever possible.
So those are the four elements of a constitutional structure
that might promise real political freedom to all the peoples of
Burma after the transition to democracy. The first is federalism,
some constitutionally guaranteed self-government for the
states. The second is a union government that is broadly
inclusive, that has representatives from all the major groups,
and this might best be achieved through proportional
representation and parliamentarism. The third is some
reserved seats, perhaps on the High Court and the upper house
of the legislature, to give the less populous states some
protection against the majority’s sheer weight of numbers. And
the fourth is a system that gives national politicians an incentive
to moderation, compromise, and broad appeal, so that all
citizens of Burma will feel committed to all other citizens of
Burma.
F. JUDICIAL REVIEW
We have this morning talked about the four structural elements
of a safe, stable, and democratic union government for Burma.
But lying under beneath all of them is a profound belief in
the rule of law. The rule of law is an idea that people can
govern themselves in accord with principles and ideals, instead
of always pursuing only their own interests or desires. For
any country to make a constitution work, it must embrace the
rule of law. Otherwise, you may adopt a constitution, but
then people will just ignore it, because they don’t really believe
that people can or should govern themselves according to law.
There are new democracies where democratic constitutionalism
becomes stable and reliable; there are other new democracies
where democratic constitutionalism last for a few years and
then dies. One of the biggest differences between these two
is culture. In countries where democracy thrives, the people
are deeply committed to the rule of law.
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In this connection, the organizers of this conference have
asked me to speak a little more about judicial review. I remind
you that judicial review is the practice of having judges test
government action, a statute, an executive order, or whatever,
for its constitutionality. If the judges think that the government
has acted unconstitutionally, then they strike it down. In this
way, for those areas where judicial review applies, the court is
the ultimate judge of the meaning of the constitution, and in
a certain sense the ultimate authority in the country.
The rationale of judicial review is that judges are more
likely to be faithful to the constitution than the political
branches. Ultimately, of course, for the constitution to live
and be significant, the people must embrace it and put it into
practice. Judges therefore cannot be the only guardian of the
constitution; all must be involved to some extent. But on a
day to day basis, you need someone responsible for putting
the constitution into effect, and many think that judges are a
good choice.
Judges are a good choice because their ultimate fidelity is
supposed to be to the law. In this sense, they are different
from politicians, whose ultimate loyalty is supposed to be to
their constituents. Sometimes, under pressure from voters or
just their own ambitions, politicians might be tempted to
behave in unconstitutional ways. But the whole point in a
constitution is to limit the politicians, to bind them to a
permanent structure. And so we ask judges to intervene and
protect the constitution against the politicians.
But if we go down this path, it is important to ensure that
judges really are faithful to the law, rather than to political
pressure. How do we achieve this goal? First, it is important
to give judges some structural immunity from political pressure.
Most particularly, they need long terms in office, either for life
or for a number of years, so that they need be re-elected or reappointed for a long time. The hope is that they will therefore
rule according to the law, rather than according to the whim
of whoever would re-appoint or re-elect them. In addition,
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many constitutions contain a guarantee that judges, salaries
shall not be diminished during their term in office, so that
regardless of how they rule, even if they displease powerful
people, they will still have an income.
So it is important that judges structurally be immune from
political pressure. But that’s not enough, because that immunity
has merely freed a bad judge to rule badly. So in addition to
these structural measures, judges must be deeply acculturated
into the ideals of the rule of law, the idea that everyone should
receive justice according to the merits of the case, rather than
according to favoritism or bias or power. It is infinitely valuable
for a culture to prize the rule of law, and so it needs to be a
daily part of everyone’s life.
Mothers and father should instruct their children in these
ideals and tell them stories about heroes who struggled and
even died for the rule of law. So everyone needs to embrace
these values. But judges especially need to embrace them, and
in most countries judges believe that going to law school was
an important part of acculturating them to rule of law ideals.
I certainly believe that the primary goal of a law school
education is to introduce students to the idea that they are
servants of the rule of law, not of their own interests or
ambition or greed.
OK, so for judicial review to work, for judges to be faithful
to the constitution, you need them to have long terms in office,
a guaranteed salary, and an acculturation into rule of law ideals.
If you have all that, does judicial review work? Do judges
remain faithful to the constitution even when everyone else
has fallen away? Well, there is evidence both ways.
America is the country that created judicial review, and
there, the practice is the subject of enormous controversy.
There are many people who feel that the judges do not show
the requisite fidelity to the rule of law. Instead, they are partial
toward certain sectors of the population or certain classes or
certain political parties.
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On the other hand, outside America, judicial review is
spreading very rapidly. More and more countries have
introduced it into their system, and once they have gotten a
taste of it, they apparently like it, because they have not since
rejected it. So the judgment of the rest of the world is
increasingly more positive than the judgment of America itself.
The reason for the difference may be a difference in
expectations. For the rest of the world, judicial review is very
new, and they notice that it improves their system for the better,
on balance. In America, judicial review is so familiar and
traditional that people expect it to be perfect, to satisfy the
idealBand it may never do that. So it may be that Americans
need a more realistic approach to the practice.
My own view is that judicial review is a critical piece in the
constitution of any new democracy. New legislatures are often
turbulent, and they sometimes do things that they later regret.
New democracies are often fragile, as people are not yet fully
committed to the system. In this sort of situation, a high
court can serve many functions. It can remind people of the
importance of the rule of law; it can place limits on the
legislature; and it can act as a stabilizing factor in this unruly
time. In the end, if the country is really committed to getting
rid of the constitution, the judges cannot stop that. But if the
people are on the court’s side against a corrupt legislature,
judicial review can help to keep the country attached to its
constitutional system and thereby avoid a renewal of civil war.
Having said that, however, I should also stress that judicial
review is not appropriate for all types of cases and subjects.
For that reason, I think it best that a constitution should specify
which parts of it are judicially reviewable and which not.
Otherwise, if the constitution does not say, you are setting up
a conflict between the courts and the other branches for control
of the constitution.
So let me summarize the general view on when judicial
review is appropriate. Most people think that judicial review
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is clearly appropriate to protect individual rights, because
individuals need a guardian to stand against the legislature.
Most people think that judicial review is not appropriate for
foreign affairs, because the judiciary does not know enough
about that field to have good answers. For the same reason,
many people would say that military affairs should not be
reviewable, but in the special case of Burma, I think there is a
strong case that military matters should be governed according
to the rule of law, not the will of the officer corps.
On federalism, people are divided on how strong the
judiciary,s role should be in policing the boundaries. In
America, the tradition has been that the Supreme Court has
been active in defining the relative powers of the states and
the federal government, because it has been thought that the
justices could serve as an outside, neutral umpire. More
recently, some have begun to argue that federalism is like
foreign affairs: the Court understands little about the real
workings of the different governments, and so it is not in a
position to judge where their boundary should be. Despite
this argument, the Supreme Court continues to hand down
federalism decisions. I suspect that in a democratic Burma,
federalism will be politically controversial, and it might be useful
to ask the court to act as a neutral umpire, so that arguments
can be settled short of war.
Let me again reinforce one idea. The most important
function of judicial review may be broadly cultural: the court
stands as an icon for the possibility of the rule of law. It
reminds us that life is not just about the pursuit of money or
power or fame. Instead, it can be about a commitment to
deciding questions according to general rules, for the common
good, without bias or hatred or partisanship. The broad
diffusion of this hope is one of the most important elements
in constructing a new democracy.
**********
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A. Introduction
It is a great pleasure to talk with you about writing constitutions
for a democratic Burma. I just finished an eight month visit
to Europe, where I spoke about you to many people. I found
that everywhere I went, people knew about your movement,
your courage, your resolution to live according to democracy
and the rule of law. Your hope gives them hope that the world
can be a better place, because there are people striving to make
it so. Hope is one of the greatest gifts that people can give to
each other, and so I bring you thanks from people that you
have not even met.
Over the last couple of centuries, one of the things that
has made the world better is the ideal of the rule of law. In
politics, people are often selfish: they want their own way, to
rule others. But now and then, a miracle occurs: people get
together to proclaim that government should rule for the good
of all, rather than just the good of the rulers. In this view,
rulers are obligated to care for all, without favor, because they
receive their power on trust and only so long as they govern
well. One way to express this idea is that government should
govern according to the rule of law (meaning a set of general
impartial principles) not according to the mere wishes of the
powerful. Of course, it is difficult to put the rule of law into
effect, and no country has ever honored it perfectly. For that
reason, many are cynical about the possibility that governments
can ever govern well. But that view is a self-fulfilling prophecy:
if you are convinced that governments will always be bad,
then you will never do anything to make them good, and
governments will stay bad.
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I have said that living according to the rule of law requires
living according to genera principles for the good of all. But
what are these general principles, and how do we discover
them? Constitutionalism is one way that people have tried to
discover these principles and put them into practice. A
constitution is a set of political and legal ideals that is regarded
as more fundamental than any other set of ideals. The citizens
of the country and the government promise to pursue these
ideals. In writing a constitution, then, we are trying to identify
those principles that we hope will allow us to live according to
the rule of law, rather than the mere whim of our rulers.
For many years, constitutional theorists imagined that you
could develop one perfect constitution that would work equally
well for everyone–all countries, peoples, and provinces.
Constitutionalists strove to discover that one perfect
constitution, the Holy Grail of constitutional theory. Once it
was discovered, then constitution-writers the world over could
just adopt it as their own. I am sad to say that the United
States government has often insisted that the United States
constitution is perfect for everyone. Sometimes the US
government has tried to force other countries to use the US
constitution as the model for their own constitution, without
considering whether it was right for them.
But in more recent years, most constitutionalists have
denied that you can discover a one-size-fits-all constitution.
It is true that all around the world, people have much in
common, so some constitutional principles may be important
for everyone–such as liberty, equality, impartiality and the like.
But every country will understand these principles in a
somewhat different way, and each country will likely add some
principles to this basic core, according to its own traditions.
As a result, the world’s constitutions are somewhat diverse.
This diversity is quite a good thing. It is good for each country,
because each governs itself in its own way, rather than trying
to live under someone else’s constitution. And it is good for
the world, because countries can learn from each other’s
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constitutions only if they are different; and they might even
learn to respect each other across their differences.
Let me offer one illustration. The constitutions of the
world have different arrangements for dividing power between
the center and localities. Some constitutions are unitary: they
give all power to the center. Local governments are servants
of the center, which can give them power, take it away, or
eliminate them altogether. Some constitutions, by contrast,
are federal, which means that they divide power between the
central government and the more local governments, such as
those of provinces or states. In a federal constitution, the
central government has some powers, and the states have other
powers, and neither may invade the others’. Now neither
system is right for everyone: unitary constitutions are right
for some countries and federal constitutions are right for
others. So what is right for India or Thailand may not be right
for you.
Two countries offer good examples of this difference:
the US and France. The United States is often seen as the
paradigm of a federalist country, and federalism suits us well
because we value our diversity at the local level. By contrast,
France is often taken to be the paradigm of a unitary country,
and this arrangement suits the French well, because national
unity is deeply a part of their culture. Perhaps France
sometimes over-emphasizes national unity, and perhaps the
United States does not care enough about national unity, but
by and large each has picked the right system for itself.
Unfortunately, the people of each country, even the lawyers,
have difficulty understanding the constitutional system of the
other. And because they don’t understand it, they tend to
dislike it. Too many Americans imagine that the central French
government is dominating and oppressive, and too many
French people imagine that American federalism is chaotic
and irrational. I wish that we could manage more respect.
In short, then, we must fit the constitution to the people:
we must design a system of principles that will work for a
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particular country. When I think about Burma, one of the
things that I first note is that Burma has a magnificently diverse
range of local cultures: the Shan, Karen, Chin, Kachin,
Arakanese, Karenni, Wa, Pa-O, the ethnic Burmans themselves,
and all the others. Each has much to teach the others and the
rest of the world. To live in its own way, each culture may
need its own constitution and an appropriate degree of selfdetermination. With luck, the people of each constitution
will love the people of the other constitutions–not despite
their differences but because of them, as differences bring
richness to our lives. Sadly, people in Burma have sometimes
hated or feared people different from themselves. This
problem afflicts the whole world, and no place is free of it.
But hatred can destroy a country, and we need to find ways to
reduce it. Constitutionalism has long struggled with this
problem, and many believe that the right constitution can help
to lead a country away from internal division and toward the
rule of law.

B. State-Building and Nation-Building
To understand the way that constitutionalism can help with
task, let us begin by talking about two concepts: the nation
and the state. As a quick summary, the state refers to a
sovereign government–the legislature, the army and so on. The
nation by contrast, refers to a group of people who believe
themselves to share a common destiny, as members of the
same people or culture or kin. A nation-state is a sovereign
state whose citizenry is largely composed of people who share
a nationality, so that the state is the alter ego of the nation. In
this case, the purpose of the state is to promote the good of
the nation, by allowing it to express its will through sovereignty.
In the past, many Europeans have claimed that all nations
should have their own states, and all states should grow from
a single nation. In other words, all states should be nationstates. But in fact, this common claim is false. A state need
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not contain just one nation. Indeed, most states are
multinational: they contain a number of nations. The state
may have one dominant nationality with a number of smaller
ones, or it may have two nationalities of roughly equal numbers,
or it may have many, many nationalities, all so small that none
could ever dominate by force of numbers. In all these cases,
we have not a nation-state but a multi-national state. And a
multi-national state need not be–and usually should not be–
the alter ego of one of its nationalities. Because the state
governs all, it would be unfair for it to find its soul in the
traditions of just one group. And so such states do not exist
for the good of just one nation, nor do they express the
sovereign will of just one nation.
States always face tensions and conflict. When that
happens, we need to find some unity to help us stay together
in peace. In nation-states, leaders often hope to find unity by
nation-building: they hope to reinvigorate the national culture,
so that everyone feels connected to it. In other words, they
try to make everyone more the same, because more strongly
identified with the nation. A constitution in this kind of state
might try to express the national identity of the state, by
establishing a national religion or one national language or the
like.
But in a multi-national state, nation-building can spell
oppression. If the state contains many cultures, but the state
tries to impose just one national culture on all, then the minority
groups will inevitably be forced to give up their national identity,
which commonly they prize highly. For multi-national states,
then, nation-building may not be the answer. Instead, the way
to find unity may be state-building. What the citizens of a
single state all share, despite their different cultures, is that
they live under one scheme of law and governance. In such a
state, unity can be found only in that very scheme of state
organization. Citizens do not share a culture, religion, or
language, but they are committed to the structure that allows
them to live together in peace. The constitution creates that
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structure, and so constitutions are central to state-building in
multi-national republics. A good constitution in a multinational state therefore must ask for unity where it is essential
for the groups to live together; but it must otherwise allow the
different cultures to govern themselves in their own ways. In
this kind of state, we are bound together in one framework of
basic law, but one of the main goals of that framework is to
allow us to be different.
What goes into this common framework of basic law?
This is a complicated question, and we will spend a great deal
of time contemplating a possible answer for Burma. For now,
the most important point is what it does not include: the
constitution does not pledge the state to be the servant of its
most powerful group. Indeed, the constitution may forbid
the state from becoming the servant of its most powerful
group. Instead, when it strives to create a common framework
of law, the constitution may pursue one of two strategies: it
may take pieces from each of its cultural groups, so that it is
really a blend; or it may try to create a national law that does
not come directly from any of its groups, so that it, so that it
stands on its own feet. Now if the state’s identity is not yoked
to one of its groups, then it can allow all the individual nations
to govern themselves, within the general framework of federal
law. And because the nations together form the state, then
the individual nations need not fear the central government.
In other words, because the state is unified in a way that gives
no group pre-eminence, then state unity need not involve the
elimination of all difference. The state can find unity in the
resolution of all its parts to accept each other’s differences.
Here then is a quick summary: a state is a government; a
nation is a people; in a nation-state (a mono-national state),
the state represent only a single nation, and the leaders look to
nation-building; but in a multi-national state, the state must
not serve just one nation, and so it cannot look to nationbuilding; instead, it must build a state that allows all of its
groups to live together and also to keep their differences.
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So that’s the point in a nutshell. Any constitutional system
for Burma must address how you want the nationalities to
relate to the state and vice-versa. Outside Burma, people have
strong views about how state and nation should relate, and
they will press their views on you. One French law professor,
for example, told me that Burma needed to be unified around
a single national identity, so that it won’t disintegrate. My own
view is different: I think that multi-national states must find
unity in something other than a single national identity.
Imposing one national identity will likely lead to real disunity,
because the nationalities will fight to protect their identities.
Paradoxically, to get unity, you must allow for diversity: if the
nationalities feel that the state permits them their differences,
then they will feel committed to it. They will support and
protect the state that in turn supports and protects them.
So there you have two different views about the
relationship between state and nation in the context of Burma.
But in the long run, it matters not at all what some law professor
thinks about your future. What matters is what you think,
because this is your constitution: you must live under it, and it
will work only if you feel attached to it. And because the
relationship between state and nation is so controversial, I
would like now to outline the controversy about states and
nations. I hope that with this information, you will be better
able to navigate the storms of opinion. That way, when people
throw advice at you, you will know that even the experts
disagree among themselves, so no-one’s view is
incontrovertible.
(i). States
Let us start with the idea of the state, which refers to a sovereign
government and its agencies. Concretely, the concept refers
to the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, the regulatory
agencies, the military, the public schools, the diplomatic corps,
and so forth. At the level of theory, the state refers to a
133

Designing Federalism in Burma

sovereign body. Sovereignty has two dimensions, internal and
external. Internally, sovereignty refers to the ultimate authority
to govern. In other words, the sovereign is the one who has
the final say in decisions about how society shall be ruled.
Many think that for this reason, the sovereign must have a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This means that
only the sovereign can rightfully decide how force shall be
used in society. The sovereign may allow someone else to use
force: for example, the state may authorize you to defend
yourself. In practice, many people do use force without state
permission. But in this theory, only the sovereign may rightfully
decide how force shall be used.
Externally, sovereignty means that states have a right to
govern themselves without outside interference. In other
words, sovereign states may not intervene in each other’s
internal affairs. For this reason, many groups want to claim to
be a sovereign. That way, they can insist that others leave
them alone. Many people think that this principle began with
the Treaty of Westphalia in Europe in 1648, and the
background to that treaty gives a sense of why people think
that states should not interfere with each other. Europe had
been engaged in a great war, called the Thirty Years’ War, which
caused great misery. Eventually, the European nations decided
that henceforth, they would leave each other alone to determine
their own affairs, so that such a war would never recur. They
agreed in the Treaty of Westphalia to respect each other’s
sovereignty, and that idea has been a cardinal principle of
international law ever since. Of course, nations sometimes
ignore this rule, so war occurs. But in truth, most states obey
this rule most of the time, and in theory it binds always.
The principle of non-interference has limits. For one
thing, it requires only that states stay out of each other’s internal
affairs: for example, you may not invade another nation because
you don’t like its ruler. But states may and do interfere with
each other in their external affairs. For example, if a nation
invades you or a third country, you may invade the aggressor
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so as to restrain it. In addition, international law has recently
come to allow nations to interfere in each other’s internal affairs,
but only to a very limited extent. For example, there are now
international conventions protecting certain human rights, so
that governments are theoretically required to respect those
rights, even in their internal affairs. But international law is
struggling to find ways to enforce these provisions. Suppose
that a sovereign state simply decides to ignore these
requirements: can the United Nations or another country force
it to comply? It is not entirely clear what can be done, either
legally or practically.
Obviously, this idea of external sovereignty has
implications for Burma. At present, many states regard
Myanmar as a sovereign, which means that they feel required
to keep out of its internal affairs, even if it is oppressing its
people. Theoretically, it is illegal for Myanmar to violate the
human rights of its people, but it is unclear how this rule could
be enforced. On the other hand, whenever Burma becomes
democratic, it will still be sovereign, so other nations may not
interfere in its internal affairs. The ousted generals could not,
for example, enlist the support of the Chinese to overthrow
the democratic government of Burma.
Defined in this way, the state is a relatively recent
phenomenon of Europan origin. There have always been
governments, but the state is a special kind: it claims ultimate
authority over everything that happens in its territory, and no
other polity may intervene. But if the state began only recently
in Europe, it has since come to sweep the globe. We now live
in a world of states, and because states recognize only other
states, there is tremendous pressure to organize yourself that
way. But that pressure has sometimes had bad effects for
countries outside Europe. Many such countries were not
traditionally states. First, they did not assert internal
sovereignty: the ruler did not assert absolute control over
everything that went on in the state; instead, there were multiple
authorities, each with its own claim to power, such as local
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warlords or religious authorities or the like. Second, they did
not enjoy external sovereignty, because the Westphalian states
did not recognize an obligation to stay out of their affairs.
Commonly, European states colonized countries like this for
decades or even centuries. But eventually, they withdrew,
generally after World War II, and they left the newly
independent states in a problem
Imagine for a moment that we live in such a decolonized
state, and you may not have to imagine very hard, as Burma fit
this description in 1947. We have suddenly been plunged into
international society, a world of states that expect us to behave
as a state. To claim sovereignty-which we very much want–we
must get organized. We have a lot of state-building to do and
little time to do it. We must develop a legislature to make laws,
a diplomatic corps to pursue our interests in the world, a
military to defend our borders, schools to educate our children
in the rights and duties of state citizenship, agencies to keep
the environment and our workplaces clean, courts to apply
state law in complicated cases, and so forth. It seems a daunting
task, because it is all new. In the midst of all this pressure, the
citizens of new states often fall to squabbling. In response,
leaders look for ways to unify the people for the difficult time
ahead. Remember that our task here is state-building, but to
find the unity necessary for state-building, the leaders often
look to nation-building. They try to pull the citizens together
into a patriotic effort by encouraging them to sacrifice for the
nation. If citizens are devoted to the nation, in this view, they
will support the state, because it is the alter ego of the nation.
In other words, in this program, we achieve state-building
through nation-building. We become a powerful, healthy,
affluent, harmonious state by becoming a nation-state.
(ii).Nations
And so we return to the second of our concepts, the nation.
The exact meaning of the nation has been the subject of an
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enormous amount of recent writing. For a while, many thought
that nations and nationalism might die out, but in the last two
decades, nationalism has gained a new lease on life, especially
in places where it seemed to have gone to sleep, such as the
Soviet Union. Two decades ago, for example, Kazakhs mostly
thought of themselves as part of the Soviet system. Now,
with independence, many ethnic Kazakhs think of themselves
as belonging to the Kazakh nation. Because non-Kazakh
citizens of Kazakhstan identify with other nations (such as
Russia), the state faces problems in getting these nations work
together. Because of places like Kazakhstan, many more
scholars have begun again to study nations and nationalism.
But as always, they disagree: on where nations come from,
how they function, how long they have existed and will exist,
what role they play in the lives of their members, and even
what they are. As a result, no matter what I tell you, someone
somewhere will disagree, and you need to know that. But I
will try to outline the areas where people are mostly in
agreement.
Fundamentally, a nation is a group of people who identify
with each other. When I look at others of my nation, I see
people that are like me in some way that is important to me,
so that we belong together in a way that we don’t belong with
other people. The idea of a nation therefore has two parts:
first, some people believes that they are similar; and second,
because of this similarity, they believe that their fates are
intertwined. We might call the first element a perception of
common identity; we might call the second element a belief in
a shared future through collective action.
As to the first element: students of nations and nationalism
have struggled long and hard to determine exactly what nations
have – or are supposed to have – in common. Many nations
share a language or religion or ethnicity or common origin.
Yet clearly you do not have to share any of these to be a nation;
there are famous examples of nations with multiple religions,
races, languages and so forth. After all, similarity is in the eyes
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of the beholder. What makes you a nation is that you think
you share something so fundamental that your identity is bound
up with others of your nation. But different nations may think
that different characteristics are fundamental. Some nations
may think that language ties them together, even when they
have many religions: perhaps the French fit this description.
Others may think that religion unifies them, though they have
different languages: perhaps the Arab world fits this
description. Arabs tend to be committed to the welfare of
other Arabs, and French citizens to the welfare of other French
citizens. But the two groups feel united on different
characteristics. As another example, closer to home, some
Chins regard the Chin people as a nation, but Chins are both
Baptist and Buddhist, and they sometimes have trouble
understanding each other’s dialects: neither religion nor really
language forms their national identity.
So the point in the first element is really to set up the
second: because we think we have something in common, we
believe that we share a future. We define ourselves collectively;
I know who I am by seeing what I have in common with you.
Membership in a nation tells me something about my identity.
It gives me a home and people to whom I belong. And because
my nation provides me with a home, I want to be able to make
that home with my fellow nationals. By definition, then,
members of a nation do not just perceive a commonality; they
also want to act on it. Through common action, they want to
create a common future, where they can live out their distinctive
life-ways in freedom, safety and dignity. If we are a nation,
then, we are jointly committed to creating a space for people
like us. In this sense, the Chins are a nation insofar as they
believe that they share a public culture different from the public
culture of those around them, so they need self-determination.
In other words, though nations need share neither language
nor ethnicity nor religion, they must share a sense of
themselves as an actor in history. They must imagine that as a
group, they have acted together in the past, are acting together
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in the present, and will act together in the future. They must
be able to tell a story about themselves as a collective agent –
not strangers but participants in a common venture.
Commonly, people think of their nationality as similar to their
family in that they come from the same place and feel
permanently bonded. We imagine that we are the descendants
of our national heroes, kin to our fellow nationals, and we
give birth to those who will come after us. So we feel as though
the nation is our family. But it is important to understand that
this is only a feeling. The nation is not literally one big family
or kin group. The members of a nation are not necessarily
related, and they do not necessarily come from the same
ancestors. Many members of current nationalities came in
from the outside. Often, they brought great resources to the
nation, and sometimes, they revitalized the nation by changing
it. In fact, there are long-standing nations composed primarily
of the descendants of those who were once outside. To
belong, then, what is required is not birth but participation in
the common culture of the nation. Nations that start excluding
people because they do not have the right ancestors pretty
soon become rigid, oppressive, and inflexible. They die or
explode in civil war.
(iii). States and Nations
What is required for a nation to tell its common story and
create its common home? Some claim that by definition,
nations must desire separate sovereignty for themselves. In
this view, if a group does not desire self-government – if it is
happy to live within a larger state – then it is not really a nation
but something else, such as an ethnic group. For similar
reasons, many argue that a national group must have a claim
to an ancestral homeland: after all, if the nation is to claim
statehood, it must have a territory over which it can exercise
sovereignty. In fact, when Europeans first started to talk about
the nation as a concept, they commonly insisted that every
139

Designing Federalism in Burma

nation was entitled to its own state on its own ancient territory.
Only a state would allow each nation fully to realize its own
destiny. Many European nationalists wrote stirring poems on
the importance of statehood for their peoples. Some of these
are quite moving, and they testify to the courage and hope of
a nation long oppressed. And thus was the born the idea of
the nation-state.
In fact, some historians believe that most nations are not
very old; instead, they were imaginatively created just at this
time precisely so that they could claim their own state. For
thousands of years, people were divided into much smaller
groups, and they were ruled in different ways. They certainly
did not recognize bonds of nationality with people who lived
hundreds of miles away. But in Europe in the eighteenth
century, nationalist leaders tried to convince these scattered
people that they were really part of one larger nation. The
motives of these leaders were complex, but at least one was
that at this point, becoming a nation meant getting a state.
And getting a state meant that local people could throw off
foreign rulers and choose their own leaders – who would
presumably include the very same nationalist elites pushing
for national unification. In other words, in this view, the
conventional account has the causality wrong for many groups:
the nation did not exist before the state, calling for its own
sovereign state; instead, the prospect of statehood galvanized
people to make themselves into a nation that could then cal
for sovereign rights.
But whether nations are old or new, statehood and
nationhood have often gone hand in hand for at least the last
two centuries. Nonetheless, it is not true that every nation
must have its own sovereign state, nor that every state must
have only one nation. To be sure, nations desire to work out
their shared destiny in a home of their own. But that desire
does not always and everywhere require full sovereign selfgovernment. As we will see, different constitutional structures
allow nations to govern themselves, to some degree, within a
140

Designing Federalism in Burma

larger overarching state that includes other nations as well.
Whether a nation really needs full sovereign government
depends on circumstances. For example, imagine a nation
that has always hated and feared all the other groups in the
vicinity, who feel the same way back. All these nations feel
that part of their fundamental identity is to hate the other
nations. Without some change, it is hard to see how these
nations could live together in the same state. They may all
need independent sovereignty. Sometimes, however,
conditions are not so dire. Today, many nations can and do
live together in a single state. There may be some tension
between the different nations, but every state has its tensions.
There are many prominent examples of multinational states:
Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, the United States (with its Native
American nations), Spain, Italy, and even France itself. All
these states are successful in the sense that though they may
have tension, they are stable, affluent, mostly peaceful
democracies, in which the member nations are mostly
committed to the state apparatus.
It is a good thing that nations can live together in a single
state, for a number of reasons. First, the globe does not have
enough space for every nation to have its own viable state. To
be viable, a state cannot be too small; otherwise, it cannot
stand on its own. There are of course some very small states–
such as San Marino, Andorra, and Vatican City. But in truth,
those are not really sovereign nations; we just call them that.
They are really part of the surrounding countries, and they
retain independence in only very limited ways. The second
reason that multinational states are important is that many
states in fact contain multiple nations, so they must find a way
to live together. Commonly, when the European nations rolled
up their empires, they left behind them new states that
contained multiple nations. These states then had to find a
way to make a multi-national republic work.
In this regard, we must distinguish two moments in history:
the moment that European nations first began to claim
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statehood, and the moment that colonized states outside of
Europe began to claim independence. At the former moment,
European nationalists s believed that each nation could have
its own state because European nations inhabited discrete
ancestral territories, were readily distinguishable from each
other, and mostly were large enough to make viable states.
Even at this moment, many thought that some European
nations were too small to make viable states, and even the
larger nations seldom had such clear ancestral territories or
such discrete cultures as the nationalists claimed at the time.
Still, let us concede for a moment that the ideal of the nationstate might have been appropriate for Europeans in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Conditions, however,
were very different when colonized nations managed to free
themselves of European domination and to establish their
own states in the twentieth century. Many of these states
contained a number of nations. Some were traditionally hostile
to others. Often they had different goals, ideals, practices,
and theories of government. When they all merged into one
government, they often fell to squabbling. Sometimes they
even fell apart in civil war. Many of these nations looked to
Europe for an answer to their problems (though they often
refused to admit that they were actually looking to their former
colonizers). Following European ideas, they concluded that
they needed nation-building. Even if they were not one nation,
they needed to become one so that they could live together in
one state. And they began to use the state apparatus to make
themselves into a single nation.
Notice that there is an irony in this strategy. Europeans
first claimed that wherever there was a nation, there needed to
be a state, so that the nation could express itself through
statehood. There is a nation, so there must be a state. But the
leaders of these newly decolonized states reversed that order:
in their view, wherever there was a state, there had to be a
nation to support it. In other words, the Europeans claimed
that because of their unity, nations had to have sovereignty.
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The new states claimed that because they had sovereignty, they
had to have unity – even if they had to force people into it.
Fortunately, states do not have to be composed of people
from a single nationality; indeed, few are. Unfortunately, when
leaders do not realize that fact, they often do bad things to
their people in the attempt to make them all alike. And so
nation-building, which can be a good thing under the right
conditions, can also be a bad thing under the wrong conditions.
What is involved in nation-building? In the sense in which I
am using the term, it refers to forcing everyone to be more
the same, to share a single cultural identity. Sometimes these
leaders come from the dominant nationality in a state, and
they try to achieve unity by forcing the minority peoples to
become like that dominant group. Sometimes, nationalist
leaders instead try to impose a culture borrowed from some
other state: they may insist that everyone become pious Russian
communists or American capitalists. But wherever they find
their preferred culture, the important point is that nationbuilders choose one way of life, anoint it as the only loyal way,
and try to force everyone to follow that way.
When a dominant nationality tries to force the minority
nationalities to give up their culture, the result is usually tragedy.
Everyone must now speak the dominant language, practice
the dominant religion, identify with the dominant culture, and
forget their old ways. The leaders of the dominant nationality
(who are often military officers) claim that the true soul of
their country is the dominant nationality: people from other
groups are grudgingly tolerated at best, persecuted at worst.
They are always seen as potential traitors. The leaders may
even use the army or law enforcement to force people to adopt
their ways. The irony is sad and savage. A group of colonized
people managed to throw off a foreign master, only to become
subject to a local master; they went from external to internal
colonization. The two great ideas – nationalism and
decolonization – promised liberation, but instead they led to a
new form of oppression. Nation-building became another
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name for nation-destroying, as those from one group tried to
destroy the cultural identity of those from another group.
Multi-national republics should therefore eschew nationbuilding, at least in this extreme and oppressive form. But all
nations need unity. To find it, multi-national republics might
look not to nation-building but to state-building. All states
must build the apparatus necessary for the government to
function and for citizens to participate. Building up the courts,
the legislature, the executive, the agencies, the military, the
schools, the roads, the rail, air, and communications systems,
and so forth – all these are part of state-building. But in a
multi-national state, state-building also involves the creation
of a general scheme of law and governance that allows nations
to relate yet also to keep their differences. Frequently, the
people entrench this scheme in a constitution. Such
constitutions take a different approach to creating a stable
nation from that pursued by the nation-builders. Nationbuilders try to remake the citizenry so that they are all one
nation. Multi-national constitutionalists instead try to create
a shared legal and political framework that will allow people
to live together, with all their differences. They share, not
their language or religion or any of the other things that
characterize a nation, but instead a common body of
constitutional principle and a public culture associated with it.
Good multi-national constitutions must therefore
accomplish two things. First, they must allow enough internal
diversity, so that their various cultures can govern themselves
in their own way. But second, they must also find some basis
for unity across the various cultures. This unity is necessary
to allow people from all parts of the country to participate in
national politics, to relate to each other in positive ways, and
to have some control of the federal government. If the nations
isolate themselves, then the state will likely fall apart. To make
the whole work, everyone needs to agree on some basic ways
of relating across difference. So it turns out that some unity
is necessary after all, and the nation-builders were not wrong
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in thinking so. They were wrong only in the way they went
about the task, by trying to make everyone alike. Nationalists
strive for unity; multi-nationalists strive for diversity within
unity and unity within diversity. The attempt to find a good
balance between these two principles is most characteristic of
multi-national constitutionalism.
To put the point another way, we can think of the state in
terms of layers, from the most local to the most central. Each
of these layers needs some amount of unity, some shared
culture and common ways of relating. But as you go from the
bottom to the top, the amount that is shared goes down, and
the cultures become thinner, so as to allow more diversity. At
the very base we might find families, whose members are
probably much alike, at least when compared to other people.
When we move up the ladder to villages, people still share a
great deal; they mostly have the same language, the same family
structure, perhaps the same religion and so forth. But then
when we move up to the level of state governments – such as
Shan state, Karen state, and the others – we run into more
diversity. Within each of these states, people speak different
languages, practice different religions, follow different styles
of government, etc. At this level, we must allow for a good
bit of diversity, because people cannot be expected to share as
much. They still need unity, but thinner. And when we jump
to the federal government, we should thin the public culture
down even more. We must still share enough to participate in
the governance of the country, so we cannot be strangers or
enemies. But we must also be careful not to demand more
unity than the country needs to work. At every level, we balance
unity and diversity, but at each level, the balance will be
different. Unity matters more as we move closer to the ground,
and diversity matters more as we go up the ladder. The trick is
getting the balance right. Because every group is different,
the balance will not be the same everywhere, even for everyone
at the same level. For example, some states may be quite
homogeneous, and they may look for a good bit of unity; but
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others may be very diverse, and their public space must be
accordingly thinner.
At the federal level, people must share at least one thing:
a shared devotion to the principles of the constitution, such
as democracy, free speech, separation of power, voting rights,
and the like. They may have different languages, religions,
ancestors, myths, cultures, and so forth. But because they
must live together, they must agree on a framework to allow
them to interact in peace. If this constitutional system is secure,
it frees us to be different in every other way; in fact, the
structure of the constitution should explicitly protect our
freedom to be different in ways that do not touch on
constitutional stability. In that sense, it might be said that our
difference actually depends on our unity: without a shared
constitutional structure that protects our home rule, our right
to be different would be in peril. And in turn, our unity depends
on our difference: because the constitution protects our rights
of home rule, we join together to support it and the state; if it
did not protect our difference, we would likely fall apart in
civil war, losing whatever unity we might have had. And this
truth holds even at the global level. Even sovereign states
must work together to create a global culture of international
law. This project is important not only to restrain war, clean
up the environment, expand human rights, eliminate genocide
and so forth. Its is also necessary precisely so that states can
be sovereign, to control their own destinies. In order to be
different (that is, to have the sovereign right to govern
themselves), states must be unified in a scheme of international
law that protects their right to be different.
Many people think that America illustrates the possibility
of a state unified primarily in its constitution. America contains
all different sorts of people, and we tend to be very
individualistic. We have no sense of belonging to the same
ancestral group, even metaphorically. Yet despite these
differences, America somehow hangs together. Why? Many
believe that America’s unity is provided by just one thing: the
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veneration that Americans feel for their constitution, which
they venerate precisely because it protects their right to be
different within a shared framework of law.
There is a germ of truth here. Most Americans are devoted
to their constitution, and that devotion has gotten us through
some difficult times. For example, you may remember that in
the year 2000, the presidential election in America was very
close, and for months, no-one knew for sure who had won.
Democrats and Republicans were angry at each other, and in
a few places, there was rioting. But most Americans assumed
that the Constitution would somehow carry us through this
mess. They believed that as long as we stuck with the
constitutional system, we would find a way to settle the election
despite our differences, and everyone would go on with their
lives. And the two presidential candidates – Mr. Bush and Mr.
Gore – repeatedly insisted that they would go along with the
result of the process, even if they lost.
So clearly the American constitution is an important part
of our unity, perhaps the most important part. But Americans
do not just share a set of legal rules codified in the constitution.
They also share a public culture, however thin it might be and
however reluctant we are to acknowledge our similarities.
Overwhelmingly, we speak English; we follow the same market
economy; we desire many of the same things from life, and so
forth. And in truth, our constitution depends on this public
culture to work: if we did not have this culture, we would
probably fall apart. No set of legal rules – even constitutional
rules – without firm roots in the public culture can long survive.
When we say that we find our unity in the constitution,
therefore, we must have in mind a specific meaning of the
term. Constitution, in this context, refers not just to a set of
legal rules administered by courts and addressed to
government. Instead, it refers broadly to the country’s shared
public culture, its ideals and commitments, its mutual devotion
and its acceptance of difference. This culture expresses itself
in the constitution, and the constitution in turn depends on it.
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But of course how much shared public culture you need will
depend on circumstances.
To this point, I have fairly strictly defined the terms nationbuilding and state-building, for the sake of clarity: nationbuilding refers to cultural assimilation to one national identity,
and state-building refers to building a scheme of governance
that allows people to live together without assuming the same
nationality. But in fairness, it must be said that some nationbuilders really espoused a nation-building that was not far from
state-building, as I have used the term. They believed that
building a nation involved developing a civic culture shared
across the state – constitutional principles, political practices,
a shared vocabulary, and so on. In my view, these civic
nationalists were right to think that every state needs such
commonalities. They were wrong only in thinking that the
state could tolerate no more than one public culture, and this
conviction too often led them to force their minority
populations to give up their own life-ways. If they had kept
the state-level culture thin enough to allow for local variations,
they might have been more successful in creating a stable state
– because the minority populations would have felt committed
to any state that treated them so fairly.
Finally, the relationship between state and nation highlights
a basic principle of constitutional design, so important that
every constitutionalist should engrave it on his front door and
read it every day. The principle is that good constitutions
balance multiple values; they rarely make simple choices. Many
political leaders would like for a state to have only unity, and
others would like only diversity, as they distrust any talk about
the need for unity. But good constitutions must balance both
diversity and unity, and because states are different, they will
strike the balance in different ways. There is no magic formula
that you can just adopt, and so no constitutional consultant
can tell you what constitution is best for you. But constitutional
design theory can offer some guidance as you think your way
through. It can point to the major questions that you must
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ask and some of the considerations to ponder as you answer
them. And in a multinational constitutional republic, the first
place to start is federalism.

C. Federalism
Traditionally, constitutional design has four primary parts:
separation of powers, federalism, electoral systems, and
individual rights. Separation of powers refers to a division of
power between the various parts of a government, such as the
executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and perhaps the
bureaucracy and the military. Federalism refers to a division
of powers between different geographical levels of
government, such as the central government and more local
governments. Electoral systems refer to the process by which
the people elect their leaders, such as rules about who can
vote, when, where and how they vote, and how their votes are
counted to decide a winner. Individual rights refer to the sphere
of autonomy guaranteed to each individual which the
government may not invade, even if it really wants to.
For Burma, federalism has been a particularly burning
issue. A federal system is one in which the constitution divides
power between a central government and more local
governments. (Across the world, these local governments have
different names; they are variously called provinces, states,
territories, lander, and so forth. Following American practice,
I will call them states.) Federalism thus means that the
constitution divides power between levels of governments.
Placing this division of power into the constitution has an
important implication: constitutions, as we have seen, contain
rules that the people regard as fundamental to themselves.
Usually, it is difficult to change, or amend, the constitution,
because the point in a constitution is to entrench certain rules,
to make them durable. If we put federalism in our constitution,
then, we are saying that we regard it as fundamental to us, and
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we do not wish it to change.
All truly federal states thus believe that federalism is
fundamental, not merely convenient, to them. But there are
many different sorts of federalisms. To be a federal state,
your constitution must divide power between state and federal
government, but there are many ways to divide power. Some
federal systems are very decentralized: the constitution gives
most power to the states. Some federal systems are very
centralized: the constitution gives most power to the federal
government. And there is everything in between. So once
you have decided to adopt a federal system, you must still decide
what kind. To answer that question, you need to examine why
you want federalism, because your particular style of federalism
should serve the purposes that you have in mind.
There are at least three goals that a federal system can
serve. First, federalism can help different groups to live
together by guaranteeing some self-government to each. We
might call this the “plural societies” rationale for federalism,
because a plural society is one which contains multiple groups,
each with its own way of doing things. Second, federalism
can promote local democracy. Local people often understand
their problems better than does the central government; they
can respond more quickly; and people are often more willing
to get involved in the local government than in the central
government, because it is closer and filled with their neighbors.
As a result, giving power to local governments can encourage
people to participate, to initiate projects, and to believe that
they really can govern themselves. Let’s call this the “local
democracy” rationale for federalism. Third, federalism can
allow state governments to keep the central government from
getting out of control. It is well and good to write a nice
constitution, but if the federal government decides to ignore
it, then it is worth nothing. So it is a good idea to give the
states some tools to keep the center in line. Usually, state
leaders are professional politicians, with the expertise and time
to keep track of the central government. They often command
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the loyalty of their citizens, so they can serve as a rallying
point for resistance. We might call this view the “checks and
balances” rationale for federalism, because the idea is that state
governments can check and balance the central government.
The way that you divide power in your federal system
should reflect your reasons for dividing that power. For
example, if you pursue the plural societies rationale, you need
to identify those areas in which it is important for the various
groups to govern themselves. Your constitution should
guarantee those areas to the states. If, by contrast, you pursue
the local democracy rationale, you need to identify those areas
in which local democracy will work best: areas that the local
authorities know better, or that don’t need a unified approach
for the whole country, or that are likely to attract citizen
participation. Again, the constitution should reserve those
areas to the states. Finally, if you pursue the checks and
balances approach, you should determine which powers the
state governments will need to check the central government.
For example, state officials might need a right to federal
information, so they know what the federal government is up
to. State governments might also need way to attract the loyalty
of their citizens, such as the power to regulate areas in which
citizens feel themselves to be directly affected, such as property
rights.
And of course you may want to create a federal system
for all three of these reasons, and then you will need to give
the state governments all these sorts of powers. Indeed, in
my view, a federal system might help to correct Burma’s
problems for all three of these rationales. The SPDC has
tried to make everyone live according to one centralized system.
In so doing, it has repressed the self-government of local
cultures–so we have grounds for federalism on the plural
societies rationale. Because the SPDC has quashed local
democracy, everything gets handled from the center,
government has become unresponsive, and people assume that
the central government will control everything, so they don’t
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bother to get involved. Ergo, the local democracy rationale
for federalism might demand a shift in power to more local
governments. Finally, although the military government has
created various states and divisions, they are really just servants
of the central government. As a result, they cannot stand
against the government when it is oppressive. The people are
left without an official rallying point for resistance. They must
therefore look to “unofficial” groups (“unofficial” in the eyes
of the regime) such as the Karen National Union and the
Shan State Army. The checks and balances rationale for
federalism would set the states up to keep an eye on the central
government in the future.
Burma might therefore benefit from all three rationales
for federalism. I intend, however, to devote most of my
remarks to the plural societies rationale, for three reasons. First,
Burma is an uncommonly plural society. Second, many of
Burma’s problems for the last half century have grown out of
its pluralism. Third, crafting a federal constitution for a plural
society is one of the hardest tasks in constitutional design, so
it needs particular attention.
As a technical matter, you must do three things when
writing a federal constitution. First, you must decide why you
want to be unified. Second, you must decide why you also
want to be different. And third, you must figure out how this
new federal government can work, without falling apart into
angry squabbling. Let me take those up in turn.
First, you must determine why you want to be in a single
country with all these different groups in the first place. There
are important reasons to join in a government larger than your
own nation. Across the world, democracies have tried to
organize themselves into larger organizations, because they
see the benefits of unity. The European Union is the best
current example, but other regions have started down that
path. Again, I stress that everyone is different, so the reasons
for unity need not be the same for all. Nevertheless, across
the globe, people tend to unite for two remarkably consistent
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reasons: power and productivity.
Power: a central government is stronger and can better
protect your interests in the world. For that reason, almost all
federal constitutions give the central government the primary
role in foreign affairs: when a larger country speaks with one
voice, other countries are more likely to listen. For example,
the international community tends to pay a lot of attention to
what the United States says. But if my home state Indiana
tried to set its own foreign policy, the world would pay it very
little heed. As a result, Indiana is glad to be part of the United
States when it comes to foreign policy – even though people
in Indiana do not always agree with what the central
government is doing. Relatedly, almost all federal constitutions
give the central government primary power over military
matters. Again, the reason is that a relatively large, united
country can field a more powerful military force than can
smaller republics. If the rest of the world knows that the
country will be able to deploy that military in a unified way,
speaking with one voice, they will sit up and take notice.
Productivity: a good central government can make your
society more efficient and productive by organizing larger
systems of activity. For example, a single large market can
allow people to concentrate on their own area of expertise:
some people can produce good, cheap rice, and others can
produce good, cheap computers; if they are all in a single
market, they can just exchange goods freely, and then everyone
will have access to good, cheap rice and good, cheap computers.
For a large market to work, however, a single government must
have the power to regulate it, so at to keep trade free and to
create a single set of rules by which everyone must live. When
the economy is divided into different jurisdictions with
different rules, people find it hard to plan, to compete fairly,
to know the law and obey it. Foreign companies are less likely
to invest, because it is harder for them to know the rules and
to calculate the likely return on their investment. For similar
reasons, countries usually find it more efficient to create unified
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regimes for transportation (particularly an interstate road
system) and communications (particularly telephone, internet,
and television). Those networks in turn help make the
economy more efficient, because it is easy to communicate
and to move goods and people around.
To summarize: the first of your three tasks is to identify
those areas where you need unity, and for reasons of power
and productivity, most federal constitutions give the central
government primary responsibility over foreign affairs, the
military, the economy, transport, and communications. But
the second task is to identify those areas where you need
diversity, because the point in federalism is to allow local
cultures to govern themselves. So you should identify those
areas where it is particularly important that local cultures play
the dominant role. Again, every country is different, but across
the world, people commonly find that a few areas are especially
important. In plural societies, the states are concerned to
protect their own cultures, so constitutions often reserve
cultural matters to the states. Because education is important
to acculturation of the young, many constitutions give the
states the power to set much education policy. Because nations
often want to speak and preserve their own language,
multinational constitutions sometimes give the states some
power over language policy, particularly the power to keep the
local language from dying out. Similarly, because religion is an
important part of cultural identity for many, some constitutions
give the states the power to regulate religion as well. Many
other constitutions take a different approach: to protect local
regions, they deny all governments the power to regulate
religion, so that believers can make up their own minds. In
this case, the states have no power to regulate religion – but
importantly, the center has no such power either, so it cannot
impose one religion on the whole country.
In short: first you decide which subjects demand unity
and so should belong to the center; second, you decide which
subjects demand diversity and so should belong to the states.
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But third, you must decide how the states and the center should
relate to each other in practical ways; in other words, you must
figure out how to make this system work in practice. Inevitably,
plural societies face strains and stresses. The different nations
may try to dominate each other; or the center may try to
dominate the states; or the states may try to prevent the central
government from fulfilling its responsibilities. It is not enough
simply to give some power to the central government and some
to the states; you must then set up a structure to enforce that
division, so that people have an incentive to make it work.
The key is getting all of the actors to feel committed to the
system as a whole: the central government must want to allow
the states their self-government; and the states must want to
allow the national government its unifying functions; and all
must feel that they are in a common venture.
To accomplish these ends, the constitution might pursue
two strategies. First, it should give people a concrete incentive
to do the right thing. And second, it should cause people
from different backgrounds to come into regular contact, so
they can learn to understand and trust each other. Let me
offer you three ways that a constitution could pursue those
strategies. First, to keep the center from over-reaching, the
states themselves should have some place in the structure of
the federal government. Second, to keep the states from
becoming closed and hostile, the state constitutions should
require the state governments to treat all their people well,
regardless of national identity. And finally, when disputes arise
–a s they inevitably will – over who has the power to regulate
something, the constitution should contain detailed
instructions about how to settle them.
Let me elaborate. First, the states need to have a role in
the federal government itself. The reason is that when the
two levels of government are kept rigidly separate, they may
become hostile toward one another. They get the idea that
they are separated because they are opposed. The constitution
itself seems to confirm this view, because it assigns them
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radically distinct spheres, as though they were competitors.
But when two governments are hostile toward each other, they
tend to invade each other’s space. As a result, you may write a
wonderful constitution, but the government may just ignore
it. In particular, the central government may overlook all the
limits on its own power and do whatever it wants, invading
the sphere reserved to the states. The constitution may order
the federal government to stay in its own space, but that barrier
is made only of paper. If it wants to, the center will have not
trouble demolishing a paper barrier. So we need to structure
the federal government in such a way that it will not want to
invade the sphere reserved to the states.
One way to control this problem is to design a constitution
under which each level of government wants the other level
to succeed, because each is convinced that the other serves
important constitutional goals. One way to ensure that the
central government cares about the states is to ensure that the
central government is full of people who come from the states,
identify with the states, and are politically beholden to the states.
For example, in every draft constitution for Burma that I have
seen, the legislature has two houses. Members of the lower
house are to be elected by the citizens of the Burma considered
as a whole, from districts created by the federal government.
But in the upper house, each state of the union will send an
equal number of representatives – say, two. In this house, the
legislators will likely identify with the states, because they are
elected by the people of a particular state to represent the
interests of the state. To be re-elected, the legislator will need
strong roots in the state. Also, each state no matter how small
has the same amount of influence in this assembly, because
each sends the same number of representatives. As a result,
the larger states should be unable to dominate the weaker.
Finally, once you have created this assembly, you can assign it
tasks that you feel the states should influence. For example,
you might assign the upper house the role of ratifying treaties,
so as to give the states a role in foreign affairs that they might
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not otherwise have.
You can give the states this sort of role in any branch of
the federal government. We just discussed the legislature.
Regarding the executive branch: Switzerland has a group
executive that must include members from different cantons.
It is also possible to have one chief executive, but with ministers
in roughly equal numbers from the different states. One could
also require that high-ranking military officers come from
different states. And finally, the constitution could require
that the highest court of the Union of Burma include equal
numbers of judges from the different states. As always,
however, the key here is balance, and it is important not to get
carried away. The more that you require that the federal
government contain representatives from different states, the
more that it will feel tied to the interests of the states. But if
you go too far in this direction, it could backfire. If the federal
government includes only representatives of the various states,
then there may be no-one to think about the interests of the
whole. People might start to think that the states are opposed
to each other, and then they might try to hurt each other. As
a result, some people in the federal government will again
become hostile toward some of the states. So the goal is
balance: you want to fill the federal government with people
tied to the states, but you also want some people looking to
the interests of the whole country.
In making federalism work, then, the first goal is to give
the states some role in the federal government: the whole needs
to care about the parts. But the second goal is to ensure that
the states do not become closed and hostile toward each other
or toward the federal government: the parts need to care about
the whole. When we look at the experience of the world, the
great risk here is that if a state has a dominant nationality,
such as the Shans in Shan state, then the state will see itself as
existing just for the benefit of that nationality. The slogan
will be Shan State for the Shans. Again, a balance is appropriate.
If the point in federalism is to allow nations to govern
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themselves, then the Shan nation should be able to make law
based on its own cultural values. But it is one thing to govern
the state according to local cultural norms; it is another thing
to enact legislation that turns some people – i.e. non-Shans –
into second class citizens or unwelcome guests. To varying
degrees, all of the states in Burma contain more than one
nationality. It would be tragic for one of these groups to throw
off the SPDC, get control of the state government, only to
turn around and oppress some smaller group in their midst.
Over time, such treatment will also lead to hostility between
states: if Shan State hurts local Chins, then Chin State will
likely hurt local Shans. In short order, no-one will feel safe
living anywhere except in a state dominated by their own
nationality. And then the union will slowly – or maybe violently
– fall apart at the seams.
In short, then, the goal of federalism is to allow local
cultures to govern themselves, but those cultures cannot
become closed, hostile, or rigid. They must work to open
themselves to all of their citizens, regardless of background.
One common way to strike this balance is the following: the
state government has power to nurture local cultures, including
the culture of the dominant nationality if there is one; but it
may not erect an official religion, language, or ethnicity for its
citizens, nor may it discriminate against people on the basis of
their nationality, nor may it infringe the basic human rights of
any of its citizens. Each state constitution might protect these
rights for its own people. In case the state supreme court fails
to protect them, the union constitution might also include
similar protections for all the citizens of Burma. That way, if
Shan State hurts one of its Chin citizens, he can appeal to the
Union supreme court for a remedy. If that court is made up
of judges from all the different nationalities, he should be able
to trust it. The result is that each state expresses the values of
the local culture, offers a special home for the local culture,
but also strives to welcome others. If a Chin goes to work in
Shan State, he can be assured decent treatment, and the same
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for a Shan who goes to work in Chin state. (I should mention
that I have used the Shan State as my example because I know
that it is particularly heterogeneous, and I have observed that
the Shan leaders have been very sensitive to this problem).
Another way to achieve the goal of diversity in unity and
unity in diversity is to draw state boundary lines in such a way
that you have a good population mix in each state. Each state
might have a core culture, because the point in federalism is to
allow local cultures to express themselves. Ergo, Chins might
make up the majority in Chin state and so forth. But it is also
important that each state include more than trivial numbers
of people from other cultures. The reason is to keep the states
from becoming closed and xenophobic. If the state includes
people from multiple nationalities, the politicians may have an
incentive to appeal across ethnic lines. As a result, politics
might not become ethnically divisive. In the state or states
populated primarily by the ethnic Burmans., it may be especially
important to include people of other nationalities. It may
also be good for the Union of Burma to include more than
one state in which Burmans are the majority, but always mixed
with different minority populations. That way, politicians in
all the Burman states will have reason to appeal to people
from other groups. As a result, Burman politicians will be
less likely to unite on a nationalistic platform of Burma for
Burmans. Instead, there will be many different kinds of
Burman leaders with many different kinds of views, because
they must respond to different political incentives in the
different states. I know that the boundary lines for many of
the states and divisions may be traditional, and so it may be
hard to move them. But actually, the existing states and
divisions may already be sufficiently heterogeneous. (When
we discuss electoral systems, we will return to this issue, because
even with heterogeneous states, you need the right electoral
system to encourage politicians to reach out to people outside
their own group).
The third requirement for making a federal system work
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is that there must be clear mechanisms to resolve disputes,
and people must be committed to living by the outcomes of
those mechanisms. Even if you write a clear constitution,
with a sharp division of powers, there will still be many
uncertain cases, in which you just cannot be certain who has
the power. Let me give you an example. Imagine a constitution
that gives the states exclusive jurisdiction over education, gives
the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the military,
and gives both governments concurrent (or shared) jurisdiction
over the economy. Now the central government passes a law
requiring all schools in Burma to provide mandatory basic
education in military science. The states claim that this is a
law about education, and so it is beyond the union’s power.
But the central government claims that it is really a law about
military preparedness, so that Burma will have a citizenry well
grounded in military matters. Which is it? In truth, it is both,
and you need some way to decide who wins these mixed cases.
As another example, suppose that the federal government
prohibits child labor, but one of the states affirmatively protects
it. These rules are about the economy, which all agree belongs
to both the states and the federal government concurrently –
but when they disagree, who wins?
To resolve these cases, you need a rule of decision and
also an authoritative decision-maker, like a court. In cases of
concurrent power (like the child labor case) or in cases of
exclusive powers that overlap (like the military science case),
who wins? Different federal countries have adopted different
rules to resolve such cases. In the US, so long as the federal
government is acting within one of its enumerated powers, it
wins–even in cases where the states might also have some
constitutional power. In other countries, in mixed cases, the
courts try to determine whether the state or federal elements
predominate. In our military science case, they might decide
that the issue primarily involves curriculum in the public
schools, rather than military preparedness, so the states win.
But the important point is that because you will face hard
cases, the constitution needs to specify some such rule of
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decision. When the states and the federal government are
locked in a turf battle, tempers flare. To the extent possible,
you must ask people to be loyal to the system, even when they
lose. One way to earn that loyalty is for the constitution to
adopt a clear rule of decision and assign it to a clear decisionmaker. That way, people may believe that the issue is being
fairly decided, even when they don’t agree on the outcome of
particular cases.

D. Federalism in Foreign Affairs
We now come to the subject of federalism in international
relations – how power may be divided between the states and
the union government in setting foreign policy. In all federal
states, the federal government holds the dominant role in this
area, and usually it has exclusive power. As a result, the states
play little part in foreign affairs. Some have observed that
federal states exhibit a kind of schizophrenia: for internal
matters, they carefully divide powers, but for external matters,
they behave as though they were unitary states.
There are several reasons for this federal dominance. First,
people join federal states in part because they want to present
a united front to the rest of the world. They want to speak
with one voice, because they think that they will command
more respect. But then it is important that foreign policy be
controlled by only one government – necessarily, the federal
government as it can speak for the whole. In fact, many
constitutions concentrate foreign affairs powers not only in
the central government, but particularly in the executive branch
of the federal government, because it can act in a decisive
way. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court
has insisted that the President is our sole agent in foreign affairs;
Congress can set policy but not conduct our international
relations.
Another reason for federal dominance is that the
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international system is more comfortable with unitary states.
International law presumes that the world is composed of
sovereign states. Legally, sovereignty means that no state may
interfere in the domestic matters of another state. But in order
to respect this rule, states must know exactly who holds the
sovereignty in any given country. For that reason, international
law has insisted that over any territory there can be only one
sovereign–the central government. In addition, for practical
reasons, states prefer to deal with unified governments. It is
often difficult for one state to understand the legal system of
another state. When you conduct business with a foreign
country, before you even get started, you want to know who
can speak for this country. Ideally, you want a simple answer,
and you never want to guess. Most states are unitary states,
with limited understanding of federal systems, and so they
like to deal with other unitary states. Even federal states like
to deal with unitary states, because they are easier to understand.
As a result, the international system puts pressure on federal
countries to behave as though they were unitary states. For
example, many states are unhappy with the United States,
because we cannot speak with an entirely unified voice. The
president negotiates treaties, but they do not become law unless
the Senate ratifies them. Sometimes, the president agrees to a
treaty but the Senate afterwards rejects it; commonly, the other
country feels that we have reneged on the deal. Imagine their
consternation if not only the Senate but also the state
legislatures had to approve a treaty!
For all these reasons, state participation in foreign affairs
has never been common, and it has become less common
over the last hundred years. It is an uphill battle to carve out
a place for the states in foreign affairs. But there are good
reasons that member states might wish to participate in foreign
affairs. For one thing, states might have different views about
foreign affairs process. For example, once Burma becomes
democratic, the government will have to decide how it wants
to relate to three major nearby powers – India, China, and
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Thailand. The different states of Burma may feel differently
toward each of these countries, and so they will want some
influence over Burma’s relations with them. Similarly, Burma
will need trade agreements with other countries, and these
will have different effects in different states. If Burma decides
to allow the importation of cheap rice, for example, it will
help consumers feed their families, but it will hurt rice
producers, who may not be able to produce such cheap rice.
If the rice growers are concentrated in a particular state, then
it will be particularly burdened by the agreement. Again, it
will want some role in foreign affairs to protect its interests.
Or, as one last example, in order to secure international grants
of money, Burma may have to hold free and fair elections,
and the funding agencies will send in observers. But some of
Burma’s states may not be well organized enough to hold the
kind of elections that these observers will demand. In the
long run, Burma will need to apply that money, but the timing
is critical. If Burma takes an international grant, promises to
so something, and then fails to honor that promise, it may be
harder to get another international grant. It would have been
better to hold off taking the money until all the states were
ready. For that reason, the states will want to have a role in
the foreign affairs process, so that they can express their
concerns about not being ready. In the long run, if the states
feel that the federal government is ignoring their worries, the
union may experience great strain.
Luckily, though it may be hard to create a role for the
states, it is not impossible. In fact, in many federal systems,
the states do have a role, though usually only a limited one. I
would like therefore to outline the different ways that a
constitution can allow for state participation. There are two
basic methods. First, each state might conduct its own foreign
policy: it might make its own treaties or wage its own wars or
receive its own ambassadors, and so forth. Second, even if
the state cannot conduct its own foreign policy, it might
participate in the making and implementation of federal foreign
policy: before signing a treaty, the federal government might
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have to consult the states or get their permission, and so forth.
(i). The States’ Ability to Make Their Own Foreign Policy
Even in federal systems, states are usually prohibited from
making their own foreign policy. Generally, the constitution
itself gives plenary power to the central government over
foreign affairs and denies the state any power. Sometimes this
rule is explicit in the constitution; if not, constitutional
interpreters usually infer it. This conclusion is not surprising
because of the pressures on states to act in a unified way. If
the states had the power to formulate their own policies, that
unity would disintegrate. In fact, one definition of statehood
is unified authority in international affairs. If each member
state could formulate its own foreign policy, then the union
would not really be a state at all, but a treaty association. Most
of the prominent federal states – the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Switzerland, for example – deny their
subdivisions (provinces, states or cantons) the power to make
treaties independently of the federal government. By contrast,
the European Union, which is not yet a true state, makes its
own treaties but also allows its member states to make treaties.
Sometimes the EU makes mixed treaties, in which both the
EU and the member states sign a treaty made with states or
organizations outside the EU. In mixed treaties, the EU pledges
to honor the treaty in its sphere of power, and the member
states promise to do so in their theirs. The states of Europe
are therefore still independent sovereign states, not part of a
single sovereign state. In Europe, some would like for the EU
to have a common foreign policy, so that only the Union can
make treaties or wage war, but they are not there yet, and they
may never be.
In the foreign arena, then, states may not generally go off
on their own. On the other hand, it is fairly common for
member states to make international agreements so long as
they have federal permission. In this case, the risk of disunity
is not present, because the states are acting as agents of the
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federal government. For example, the United States
Constitution forbids the states from making treaties, but it
allows them to make compacts or agreements with foreign
states if they have federal permission. The Supreme Court
has never clearly told us the difference between a treaty (which
states cannot make) and a compact or agreement (which states
can make, so long as they have federal permission), but
presumably it has to do with the significance of the issues. A
treaty would be a large-scale attempt to deal with matters of
some moment; a compact would be a relatively small-scale
attempt to deal with matters that primarily affect just one state
and its foreign neighbors. In practice, Americans have followed
that distinction: the federal government negotiates all the
agreements with important effects for the nation as a whole,
but the states have entered into compacts with neighboring
countries to govern border issues, such as waterways or bridges
that connect the two countries. In fact, sometimes, the states
do not even bother to get federal permission in advance on
such issues. They just go ahead and make the compact in
confidence that Washington will approve it after the fact. In
truth, they are right to have this confidence, because the central
government always ratifies. This system works pretty well:
the states never try to make large-scale treaties, and the federal
government always authorizes the states’ small-scale
agreements.
In short, federal constitutions generally do not allow the
states any international power. But suppose that a federal state
wanted to give such authority to its member states: could it?
Clearly, as a matter of domestic constitutional law, it could:
constitution-makers can put anything they want in a
constitution. But here’s the harder question: would
international law allow these states to enter into foreign
relations? The short answer is that because so few states have
tried this practice, we don’t really know. There is no definitive
answer, partially because it has not come up very often and
partially because international law does not speak with one
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voice on this question. On balance, however, the most likely
answer is that international law would not permit states to
make treaties against the union’s will.
International law rests on both formal documents (treaties,
UN resolutions, and the like) and state practice (just what states
do). The formal documents of international law suggest that
the subdivisions of federal states cannot maintain their own
foreign policy. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
is probably the most important instrument, and Article 6 is
the relevant section, as it recognizes the right of sovereign
states to make treaties. The article does not speak explicitly to
whether units of federal states can create treaty obligations.
For guidance we must therefore look to the Reporters’ Notes
for the convention. In 1953, the reporter claimed that member
states may make international treaties, but in 1958 the reporter
held that member states could make treaties only as agents of
the central government. In 1962, the reporter explained that
only the central government possesses in principle the capacity
to make a treaty. He did leave open one possibility: member
states could enter into binding international treaties if the
federal state recognized their power to do so and the other
contracting state agreed to recognize that power. So in this
view, it all depends: whether Chin State can make a treaty
depends on whether the Union constitution and also the other
contracting state agree to recognize that authority. That makes
Chin State’s power to make a treaty depend on the discretion
of other states, but at least it is a window of opportunity.
That window seemed to close, however, as the 1960s wore on.
The International Law Commission proposed a revision of
the Vienna Convention that would allow member states to
engage in foreign policy so long as their own federal
constitution allowed. In other words, your international power
would depend on your own domestic constitution. The Vienna
Conference, however, severely criticized this provision on the
familiar ground of uncertainty: if you were thinking about
making a treaty with a member of a federal union, you would
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have to parse that other states’ constitution to determine
whether the member had treaty-making authority. In other
words, the participants in the conference rejected the idea that
units of federal states should have power to make treaties,
even if their own domestic constitution gave them that power.
International law does not come just from
pronouncements of legal conventions; it also comes from state
practice. Overwhelmingly, the practice of federal states is not
to allow their member states to make independent foreign
policy. There are only two possible exceptions – Germany
and Quebec. But because their situation is confused, they are
only possible exceptions, and probably not reliable evidence
of state practice. In Canada, Quebec has claimed power to
make its own international policy, largely because it feels closer
to the French-speaking world than does the rest of Canada.
So Quebec has entered into cultural ententes with France and
Gabon, and it has participated in meetings of franco-phone
states. The federal government of Canada has denied that
Quebec has this power, without federal permission, and most
people think that the Canadian Supreme Court would agree.
This conflict might have created some real tension, but the
governments of France and Canada found a solution. They
signed their own agreement allowing Quebec to make these
concordats. As a result, even if Quebec needs federal
permission, it now has it. For that reason, we have no definitive
answer whether the Canadian constitution gives Quebec the
power to make its own foreign policy; the matter has never
been forced to a head.
The situation in Germany is even more confused but more
significant, because Germany has probably gone the farthest
toward giving its member states independent authority in
foreign affairs. In the 1950s, the German Constitution seemed
to give the treaty-making power to the federal government in
some areas and to the states in others. It also seemed to require,
however, that the states get approval from the central
government before concluding any treaties, though some
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experts thought that the federal government was required to
give approval. But mostly, the whole area was murky. No-one
really knew what the law required, and everyone needed some
clarity.1
1. For those who want all the details: In most federal
constitutions, the federal government has the power to make
a treaty on any subject, even on subjects reserved to the states
under the constitution. It would be illegal for the central
government to pass domestic legislation on the subject, but a
treaty is different. Germany may be the single important
exception to this rule. I say that it “may” be the exception
because German constitutional law is not very clear on this
point. Article 32 gives the central government the power over
foreign relations, including a power to make treaties. The
constitution does not, however, explicitly tell us on which
subjects the federal government may make a treaty. Some
experts take the view that the Federation’s treaty power is
plenary; others opine that the central government may make a
treaty on any subject of great political moment; and still others
argue that the federal government may make treaties only on
those subjects that fall within its exclusive or concurrent
powers. The German High Court has not offered a recent,
clear opinion on the question.
(The Concordat case is now old, written in 1957, and was never
very clear. It seems to hold that if the federal government
makes a treaty on a subject of exclusive Lander power, then
the Lander would not be bound. It does not seem to decide,
however, whether the treaty would be wholly invalid, such that,
for example, federal courts could not apply it in an appropriate
case).
One reading of the German constitution, then, would
confine the federal treaty power to those subjects over which
the federal government has been given power. And since the
central government can make treaties only on some subjects,
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it seems logical that states have the power to make treaties on
other subjects. In fact, another part of Article 32 gives the
Lander power to make treaties in their own areas of exclusive
and concurrent authority. We could thus interpret the German
constitution to give the federal government power to make
treaties on subjects given to it, and to give the states power to
make treaties on subjects given to them, and to give both of
them power to make treaties on subjects that they share. So
the German constitution seems to give the states some
independent power in foreign affairs.
To clear up the problem, the states and the federal
government entered into an agreement in 1957, called the
Lindau Compact. In the years since, state and federal
governments have followed this compact, rather than the
confusing constitution itself, in this area. Under the compact,
the states delegated to the federal government broad treatymaking power over consular relations, commerce, navigation,
residence, trade, financial transactions, immunities and
privileges, and adherence to international organizations. These
subjects cover an enormous amount of ground, so the central
government can make almost any treaty that it wants. But–
and this is another large but–the federal government has given
the states a very important role in the process of treaty-making.
Under the compact, the central government has agreed that
whenever a treaty implicates the interests of the Lander, the
federal government will not sign unless the Lander agree to
the treaty as well. These days, the Lander even have permanent
representatives to the central government to advise it of the
states’ views on particular treaties. And although the Lindau
compact does not require it, the federal government generally
includes Lander representatives in the teams sent out to
negotiate treaties.
Despite its complexity, this system seems to work well for
Germany. The states feel that they have a role, and the
arrangement is even fairly efficient. Importantly, whenever
Germany enters into a treaty, both the states and the federal
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government have already consented, so both are prepared to
stand behind it. But note that the Lindau Compact allows the
states to participate in making federal foreign policy – our
next topic – rather than to make their own independent foreign
policies. Under the current arrangement, the federal
government must work with the states, but in the end, there
will be only one foreign policy for Germany. The Lindau
Compact does not allow states to go off on their own. The
states still do make some foreign agreements, but they have
been on the decline since the Compact. And these state
agreements involve local issues, such as the management of
bridges, boundary rivers, or parks that fall across an
international border. Such agreements are small-scale and
uncontroversial, and if federal permission were needed, the
central government would surely give it. In practice, then,
German states behave much like American states in working
out international agreements, even though federal permission
is clearly required in America but not so clearly in Germany.
It is time to summarize. We asked whether international
law forbids states within a federal system from making their
own treaties. We have seen that the Vienna Convention on
Treaties indicates that they may not do so. We have now seen
the state practice is confusing to all concerned. Quebec claims
to have the constitutional power to make its own treaties, but
that claim is dubious at best. The German constitution appears
to give the states some independent treaty-making power, but
it is so murky that it was effectively replaced by the Lindau
compact. Under that compact, the Federation makes treaties
with state participation. In practice, the states make only
uncontroversial agreements on issues that are geographically
localized and with implicit federal permission.
At last, let us go to the bottom line. Suppose that the
drafters of Burma’s constitution wanted to give the states
power to conduct their own foreign policies. Could they? We
can offer several conclusions. First, the states certainly could
make international agreements so long as they were acting with
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federal permission. Such an arrangement would not violate
international law, and it would not even be unusual. Second,
however, international law probably would not recognize
treaties made by the states in defiance of the wishes of the
central government. Third, in addition, the international
community would bring a great deal of pressure to discourage
states from making treaties in defiance of their central
government. In all probability, no foreign state would be willing
to make such an agreement with one of Burma’s units. In
short, then, even if the states somehow managed to secure a
constitutional power to make their own foreign policies,
international law would probably reject that authority, and no
other state would be willing to deal with Burma’s member
states anyway.
It is therefore probably not worthwhile for Burma’s states
to struggle for a constitutional power to make their own foreign
policy. But it would not be at all unusual – and it might be
very wise – for the states to have a constitutional right to
participate in the making of federal foreign policy. And that
is the subject of the next section.
(ii).The States’ Participation in Federal Foreign Policy
How could the states participate in the making of federal
foreign policy? To understand the possibilities, let us begin
with two basic models of federalism: “competitive federalism”
and “co-operative federalism.” In competitive federalism, the
states and the federal government imagine each other as a rival
for power. They fear the other, and so they compete with it to
seize as much power as possible. In the constitution, they
divide power as clearly as possible so that the limits of the
other’s power will be sharp. And they look for a neutral umpire
– like a court – to police the division of power, to make sure
that everyone stays within the bounds. The key device is the
boundary line, to mark off the property of the central
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government from that of the states. The chief worry is
trespass, that one government should intrude on the others’
preserve.
Sometimes competitive federalism is necessary. When the
elements of a federal state deeply distrust each other, they
naturally want protection for their own separate domain. But
competitive federalism has costs: if the system is based on
distrust and separation, the parts may end up fearing each
other ever more, until the country falls apart. Sometimes it is
better to structure a constitution so that the parts must depend
on each other. To get what they want, they must co-operate,
and as they work together, they develop a shared history of
mutual support. As a result, the country becomes stronger as
a whole, and the parts even become more secure because the
federal government is less likely to invade their spheres. This
strategy thus has two pieces: we should structure the
constitution so that (1) people from different states and the
union all interact regularly under conditions that (2) give them
an incentive to do the right things, i.e., to care for each other.
For states, the idea of co-operative federalism may be
especially important in the field of foreign relations. Because
the federal government will be dominant in this area, states
cannot expect to go their own way. If they think of
international policy in terms of competitive federalism, they
will try to erect a border between their own turf and the union
government’s. But in this field, if you draw a line, then all of
foreign affairs will fall on the federal side of the line. The
union will end up with all the property, and the states will be
homeless wanderers. In other words, all that a boundary line
can do is to wall the states off from any role. Instead, the goal
should be to create a co-operative system, under which the
parts rely on each other and the states have a real role in the
federal foreign relations process.
More concretely, countries have experimented with three
different approaches to giving the states a role in foreign affairs.
In the first, the federal government sets foreign policy by itself,
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but the states have a lot of political power, so they can influence
federal decisions. Let us call this the political pressure model.
In the second, the federal government sets foreign policy, but
it must rely on the states to implement it. Let us call this the
state implementation model. In the third, the federal
government does not set foreign policy on its own but must
consult the states or even get their permission. Let us call this
the direct participation model. The political pressure model
is most associated with the United States, the implementation
model most associated with Canada, and the consultation
model most associated with Germany.
(iii).

Political Pressure

In the political pressure model, the constitution gives the
central government plenary power over foreign affairs, and it
gives the states no formal role. The government is structured,
however, so that the states can put a lot of political pressure
on the federal government, which will therefore try to make a
foreign policy that will please the states. Under this model,
the states’ power in foreign affairs is just part of the general
power that they have in a federal system. This style of
governance is particularly associated with the United States.
For example, the President will hesitate to sign a treaty that
would hurt some or all of the states, because it would be
politically unpopular. State governors might denounce the
President and urge state citizens not to vote for him next time.
Remember also that before a treaty becomes binding, the
Senate must ratify it, and that Senators are supposed to
represent the collective interests of the states as states, rather
than as collections of individuals. As a result, the Senate will
seldom ratify a treaty that the states find objectionable. The
President knows this, so he will seldom even propose such a
treaty. Many draft constitutions for Burma propose an upper
house in the Union legislature that would be similar to the
United States Senate, and it might have a similar effect on
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foreign affairs.
(iv).

Implementation

In the implementation model, the constitution gives the federal
government plenary power over the making of foreign policy,
and it gives the states no formal role in the process. After a
treaty has been made, however, it must be implemented. Often
the government must pass laws to enforce the treaty against
its own citizens. Imagine, for example, that the union
government agrees to a treaty banning child labor. To make
this treaty effective, the government must then pass a statute
to ban child labor, and it must assign investigators and
prosecutors to the task. May the federal government pass
such legislation implementing the treaty, or must it rely on the
states for that task?
Different constitutions offer different answers. To
understand this variety, we need to review some background.
Remember that a federal constitution may reserve some powers
exclusively to the federal government (say, A, B, and C), some
exclusively to the states (say G, H, and I), and some
concurrently to both (say D, E, and F). Now suppose that the
constitution gives the federal government a general treatymaking power. This arrangement faces us with two questions:
does the constitution give the federal government the power
to make a treaty on any subject it likes? And does it give the
federal government the power to enforce a treaty on any subject
it likes?
Let us start with the first question: can the central
government make a treaty on any subject? On the face of
things, the constitution generally gives the federal government
power only over certain subjects; in fact, the constitution is
careful to indicate that the union has power only over those
areas. So clearly, the union can make a treaty in areas where it
has exclusive power – A through C – because those areas
belong to it alone. And presumably it may make a treaty in
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areas where it has concurrent power – D through F – because
it has shared authority over them. But may it make treaties in
areas that are reserved to the states under the constitution–
areas G through I?
Let us use a concrete example. Suppose that the
constitution gives the federal government exclusive power over
the economy, the military, and foreign affairs, including the
power to make treaties. The constitution gives the states
exclusive power over education. The federal government
makes a treaty with a nearby country: in the interests of regional
solidarity, the two countries agree to teach regional history in
all their schools. They think that students will feel more
connected to nearby countries, if they understand how their
histories have entwined. In form this agreement is a treaty, so
it appears to fall within federal power. But in content, it is all
about education, which the constitution reserves to the states.
May the federal government regulate education so long as it
does so through a treaty? Would this destroy federalism?
As another case, suppose that the constitution gives the
states and the union share authority over civil rights. The
federal government has been pushing for protection of more
civil rights, but the states like things the way that they are.
Now because the states and the union have concurrent
authority, the constitution must specify a process for resolving
cases where they disagree. But the federal government does
not want to use that process, either because it fears that it will
lose or because it’s too time-consuming. So what does it do?
It signs a multilateral treaty under which it agrees to protect a
whole range of civil rights. It claims that the constitution
gives it exclusive power to make a treaty, and that’s all it has
done, make a treaty. But the states will respond that the treaty
is on the subject of civil rights, over which the federal
government and the states share power. By using a treaty, the
federal government has made the field of civil rights its own
exclusive arena, rather than one in which it has only concurrent
authority. Would this destroy federalism?
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How do we deal with such cases? The general answer is
that in most federal constitutions, the federal government has
the power to make a treaty on any subject, even on subjects
reserved to the states under the constitution. It would be
illegal for the central government to pass domestic legislation
on the subject, but a treaty is different. Whenever the union
signs a treaty, the subject automatically has international
implications. And when we are in the international sphere, we
want to speak with one voice through the federal government.
Many federal countries have adopted this rule, including the
United States, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia. The most
famous case to articulate this rule is an opinion by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, called Missouri v. Holland. For that reason,
the rule is sometimes called the Missouri v. Holland rule. In
technical terms, the way that lawyers express this rule is to say
that the federal government has plenary treaty-making power.
Plenary power has a precise meaning: the power is not limited
to certain subject matters but can instead reach any issue that
the central government would like to put in a treaty.2
But we are not done. Even if the federal government can
make any treaty it likes, it does not necessarily follow that it
can implement any treaty that it likes. Perhaps it can make certain
treaties but must rely on the states to enforce them. If we
allow the union to make a treaty on any subject, we have
obviously allowed some intrusion on the states. But if we
allow the union to enforce a treaty on any subject as well, we
have perhaps given it the power to do anything that it wants,
even in the domestic arena. First, it negotiates a treaty on any
subject that it wants, and then it passes law to implement the
treaty. As a result, the central government can reach anywhere.
Some have predicted that such a reach would mean the death
of federalism. So how have federal countries responded to
this worry?
In all federal states, the central government may implement
treaties in those areas over which it has exclusive or concurrent
authority–in our hypothetical, subjects A through F. For
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example, if the constitution gives the federal government
power over trade, then it may enforce a treaty governing trade.
But here is the harder question: may the central government
enforce a treaty in areas reserved to the states? For example,
if education is reserved to the states, may the central government
enforce a treaty mandating a certain curriculum in the schools?
Different countries have adopted different rules to answer
this question. In fact, the United States and Canada have
adopted polar opposite answers. Under the rule of Missouri
v. Holland, the United States government can enforce any
treaty, on any subject. It can therefore regulate areas that it
might not be able otherwise to reach, so long as it uses a treaty
to get there. According to Justice Holmes, the author of
Holland, for the federal government to make international
promises, it must be able to follow through on those promises.
If it cannot implement treaties – if it must rely on the states
to do so – it will make few treaties, and the national interest
will suffer.
Canada’s constitutional law is somewhat unclear on this
subject, but it appears to take the opposite approach: the federal
government may make any treaty, but it may enforce only those
on subjects within its exclusive or concurrent power. If
education is reserved to the provinces, for example, then the
federal government may make an education treaty, but it must
rely on the states to enforce it. According to the Canadian
judiciary, this rule is necessary to keep the federal government
from gaining unlimited power. This rule is often called the
Labour Conventions rule because the Supreme Court most
notably propounded it in a case of that name. (Australia’s
practice is someplace in between the United States and Canada:
the federal government can make treaties on any subject, but
it can enforce them only when they address “external affairs.”)
So here was have two opposite views, and each predicts
that if the other is rule is adopted, dire consequences will follow.
In point of fact, both America and Canada are still alive and
well, despite having such different rules. In America, the rule
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of Missouri v. Holland theoretically would allow the federal
government to rule all of American life, but in practice that
doesn’t happen because the states have enough political power
to stop it. In Canada, the Labour Conventions rule theoretically
threatens the federal government’s ability to develop a coherent
foreign policy: it can make promises, but the states might refuse
to enforce them, to Canada’s great embarrassment in the
international sphere. (In fact, Canada would then be in
violation of international law, because at international law, it is
never a defense that your domestic constitution forbade you
from complying with your international obligations). But in
practice, the states do voluntarily enforce federal treaties,
because the Labour Conventions rule has forced Canada into
a kind of co-operative federalism.
Let us examine how a system like Canada’s works at its
best. In a federal constitution, the states receive powers over
subjects that the framers think belong with the states. But the
Framers also think that treaties belong with the federal
government, and sometimes treaties must address matters
reserved to the states, because of international demands. So
we have a tension here: on the one hand, some subjects belong
to the states, but if they are in a treaty, they also belong to the
federal government. How to split the difference? If we insist
that the federal government rely on the states for enforcement,
the states gain several significant powers in the foreign affairs
area.
When the states enforce treaties, they actually have some
power to control the meaning and scope of the treaty. From
one thing, the state must make choices about how aggressively
to enforce the treaty. To implement a rule, you must commit
resources to it, such as prosecutors, investigators, and judges.
No government every fully enforces any law; they don’t have
the money. Every government must of course enforce the
law in good faith, but they have some discretion about how
enthusiastically to do so. If a state disagrees with a federal
treaty or thinks it unimportant, then the state may decline to
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dedicate many resources to it. In fact, the state could in practice
choose not to enforce the treaty at all – though this would
probably be illegal. When the states does enforce the treaty,
state officials will likely be more sensitive to local people and
local ideas, and local people will accept them more since they
are more like neighbors. Because it has the power to implement
the treaty, therefore, the state has the power to oversee how it
affects the lives of its citizens.
In addition, before the state can implement a treaty, it
must decide what it means: it must interpret the treaty’s terms.
But treaties are not always clear; their language will sometimes
bear several meanings. If the state has the responsibility to
enforce the treaty, in practice it has the power to choose which
meaning it prefers, because it has the power to enforce the
treaty according to its own interpretation. For example,
suppose that the federal government wants to encourage the
harvesting of timber throughout Burma, but the states want
to restrict it. The union makes a treaty with Thailand to allow
Thai companies to cut down Burmese trees above thirty meters
in height; clearly, the central government is trying to win its
disagreement with the states by adopting a treaty, which it has
plenary power to do. Remember, however, that the treaty
allows the Thai companies to take only trees over thirty meters
in height, and the treaty does not say how the trees are to be
measured, before being cut down. The states take the view
that someone actually has to measure the trees with a tape
rule to make sure. . The union government and the Thai
logging companies believe that using this method would be
too expensive; if they have to use it, the companies will not
harvest any trees. So, the companies and the union take the
view that Thai loggers may just estimate the height of the
trees by sight, based on their experience. The treaty does not
tell us in so many words which method is required; it will bear
either meaning. So who wins? Under the Labour Conventions
rule, the state wins in this case, because it is charged with
implementing the treaty. To implement the treaty, the states
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must allow the loggers to take tall trees–but only if they actually
measure each one by hand! The federal government may make
a promise for the country, but it falls to the states to decide
how to fulfill that promise. When states receive the power to
apply the rules, they have some discretion in deciding what
the rules mean.
In short, if the states have the power to implement foreign
policy, they also have some power to make foreign policy. This
state power will in turn change the behavior of the union
government itself: because the union knows that it must rely
on the states for enforcement, it will make no treaties that the
states find truly objectionable. The union knows that the states
can read treaties very narrowly or even decline to enforce them.
The country would then suffer serious international
embarrassment, maybe even sanctions. As a result, the union
will adopt only those treaties that it feels confident the states
will enforce. So to give the states an implementation role is to
give them an indirect influence over the making of federal
foreign policy.
(v). Direct Participation
Our last model allows the states directly to participate in making
federal policy. In our first two models the federal government
has plenary power in the field of foreign affairs. The states
have some influence, but only by way of a threat: if the federal
government makes bad treaties, then the states may turn the
federal officials out of office (political pressure), or they may
refuse to enforce the treaties (implementation). Knowing this,
the federal government will hopefully control itself, adopting
only good treaties. But that’s only a prediction about federal
behavior. If they really want to, federal officials can still ignore
the views of the states. By contrast, the direct participation
model requires the federal government to involve the states
directly in the formulation of foreign policy. In this model,
the state cannot make their own separate policy, so the country
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still speaks with only one voice. But the constitution guarantees
the states some direct say over what that voice has to say.3
How do we secure this interest? Again, Germany provides
the must instructive example, as the Lindau Compact suggests
four primary ways that states can participate in making foreign
policy. First, they might have a veto over some federal actions;
in other words, the union must get state permission before it
acts. For example, the constitution might prohibit the union
from going to war without the agreement of a majority of the
states. There is a risk in such a rule: because other countries
know that the union must get permission to wage war, they
might not fear its anger. But there is also a benefit to this rule:
the federal government is unlikely to get involved in a conflict
without widespread support. As another example, the
constitution might provide that a treaty becomes law only when
a majority of states approve it.
The second possibility is that the states have consultation
rights: before it can act, the federal government must inform
the states and ask for their input. Even when the states do
not have a veto power, they might have the right to be informed
and consulted. In other words, the federal government might
be required to inform the states about almost all its
international activity, even when the states have no power to
block that activity. In a scheme of co-operative federalism,
the federal government should always listen to the states’
concerns and respond appropriately. Of course, with no state
veto power, the union could theoretically listen politely and
then ignore the states’ advice. But at some level, constitutional
democracies must believe that sometimes people actually listen
to rational arguments. For that reason, consultation
requirements are quite common: government agencies very
often must listen before they act. And we must hope that if
the union listens and discovers widespread resistance, it may
actually change its mind. If the union is negotiating a treaty
that only the states may implement, then the union has a
particularly good reason for listening. If the states implacably
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oppose the treaty, the union might worry about whether they
will enforce it. As a result, the union might decide not to sign
the treaty in the first place – but only because it asked the
states for their views. Finally, as a general matter, it is good
for the government to be as open as possible about its actions.
The people cannot govern themselves unless they know what
the government is doing.
In short, the constitution might give the states the right
to veto some actions and to give their views on more. But as
good as they are, these rights empower the states only to react
to federal moves: the federal government initiates policy, and
the states merely have a chance to criticize or block it. But it is
also possible to give the states a more pro-active role by
including them in the commissions that formulate foreign
policy in the first place. For example, states could send
representatives to the federal teams that negotiate treaties. Or
the states could send representatives to national security
agencies to consider whether the government should start a
war or target a group of terrorists. If the states already have
veto, consultation or implementation rights, any sensible union
government should include the states in this way, even if the
constitution does not require it. After all, if the federal
government must eventually inform the states, get their
approval, or ask them to enforce the treaty, it is just more
efficient to do it early on by including them in the negotiations.
And if the states participate in developing foreign policy, they
will more likely be committed to it down the road. That’s
good for the federal government, because that way, the policy
will more likely be successful and win broad popular support.
And if it ultimately fails, the federal government will not have
to bear the blame alone.
For the states, inclusion on foreign policy teams offers
two important opportunities. First, the states can keep watch
on the federal government to protect the states’ constitutional
prerogatives. Second, if the states are in the negotiations from
the beginning, they can have an early, directive influence. If
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they have the right only to veto after the fact, then they have
much less flexibility. A veto right allows you only to accept or
reject the federal policy as it stands. But what if the states
really want to keep part of the federal policy but reject other
parts? For example, suppose that the federal government has
made a treaty with China agreeing to free trade and mutual
military support. The states might really want free trade but
not entangling military alliances. If they have the right only to
veto, then they cannot pick and choose; they must either give
up both or swallow both. Neither option is good. But if the
states had been included from the beginning, they could have
pushed for a different strategy – to get free trade without a
pledge of military support.
(vi). Permanent Staffs
Finally, the fourth way that states might participate in foreign
affairs is by sending permanent delegates to the union for
foreign policy. The primary job of these delegates would be
to carry out the functions described in the first three options:
the federal government would keep them informed, get their
permission when necessary, appoint them to negotiating
commissions, and so forth. In that sense, this fourth device is
just a way of carrying out the first three. Nonetheless, I list it
as a separate method because it adds two elements to the first
three methods. First, if you have a staff that permanently
resides in the national capitol, devotes itself to foreign affairs,
acquires expertise and long-term contacts in the foreign
ministries of Burma and other important countries, then the
states will be able to exercise their constitutional prerogatives
much more effectively. Second, even apart from the states’
formal constitutional roles – that is, even in a case where the
states have no consultation, veto, or direct participation rights
– a permanent staff can keep track of federal initiatives, make
sure that the union government has the benefit of the states’
views, and inform the people of troubling federal projects. In
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other words, a permanent staff can serve as a kind of catchall to keep the states involved even where the other three
devices are not relevant. And so the constitution might
explicitly allow the states to maintain such permanent
delegations.
In short, if the states want to have a role in foreign affairs,
they would probably be ill-advised to agitate for the right to
make their own policy. They would be much better advised to
ask for a way to implement or participate in the creation of
federal foreign policy. There are federal systems that include
such features, Germany being the best example. It may still
be an uphill battle for Burma to work this way. Federalism in
foreign affairs is very uncommon. For that reason, if you give
the states a substantial role, other states may be unhappy with
you. But increasingly, foreign policy affects the states. It is no
longer possible – if it ever was – to discern a bright line between
international and domestic affairs. The world is becoming
globally integrated. The SPDC has kept the country relatively
aloof from that integration, but only at great cost in health,
wealth, and openness. A democratic Burma will likely want to
become part of the global order. As a result, events in Bangkok,
Beijing, Brussels, Berlin, New York, and Washington will have
direct and substantial effects in all the states of Burma. In
order to govern themselves, the states of Burma may need to
participate in foreign affairs. But doing so will take courage,
imagination, and a willingness to experiment, because you will
be marking your own path.

E. Electoral Systems
An electoral system is the system by which voters elect their
representatives. Because electing representatives is virtually
the definition of democracy, choosing an electoral system is
at the heart of creating a democratic state. There are many
electoral systems; different countries, all stable and successful,
structure their process in quite different ways. In other words,
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there is no one right way to elect people; you must choose the
way that is right for you. All these systems have different
advantages and disadvantages, so you must consider which
system best suits your particular circumstances. In
constitutional design, it is never possible to predict exactly the
effects of a particular constitutional provision. But these days,
constitutional designers know a fair amount about the likely
effects of different electoral systems, and the choice of an
electoral system is clearly important to the success of a new
democracy. It can have dramatic long-term effects on the kind
of politics you have, the degree of commitment to the
constitution that different groups feel, and the general level
of harmony between different groups. Unfortunately, electoral
systems are technical and complicated, so we will use many
examples in explicating these systems.
(i). Majoritarian Systems
The most basic distinction in this field is between majoritarian
systems and proportional systems. I will explain the difference,
describe their respective advantages, and then talk about the
ways that people have tried to combine the two to get the best
of each.
The essence of majoritarianism is winner-take-all: whoever
gets the most votes wins (he is elected to office), and the loser
gets nothing (he goes home). In a classic majoritarian system,
the country is divided into electoral districts, and the people
in each district elect one representative: we call them single
member districts, because each elects just a single representative
to the legislature. The candidate who wins the most votes in
the district becomes the representative, and all the other
candidates have no role in the government. The great
advantage of this system is that because each district elects
only one representative, the districts can be fairly small. Each
city or county or town can be its own district, and it can elect
its own representative. As a result, the representative and the
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voters have a chance to forge a close bond. Many of the
voters may know the candidates personally. If they have a
problem, they know where to turn. In fact, representatives
usually keep offices in their home districts, so people need
only show up there to get some attention. Because the
representatives are from a particular place, they are likely to be
sensitive to the concerns of people from that place. In a new
democracy, when people are trying to figure out how to make
democracy work, this bond can be important, because it shrinks
the gap between the people and the government. I want to
emphasize this upside to majoritarian systems, because I am
now going to explain the downside at length.
The Majority Premium
There is a large drawback to majoritarian systems, usually called
the majority premium. Let’s imagine a district – call it District
One – with two major parties, the pinks and the greens. The
pinks have 52% of the vote, and the greens have 48% of the
vote. The pink candidate therefore wins, and the green voters
are left with virtually no influence on their own representative.
Theoretically, the pink representative might pay attention to
the green voters out of the goodness of his heart. But
remember that he has just gone through an election in which
the greens voted against him, maybe said insulting things about
him, and generally did everything they could to block his power.
He is likely to be somewhat hostile towards them. When they
ask for help, he is likely to say no.
Let’s make this more concrete. Imagine that you are a
green voter, and the pink candidate has just won from your
district. In the legislature–and this could be either the state or
the national legislature–there is a proposal to allow construction
of a paper plant on a river near your home. You find out that
in other places, this company has built paper plants that have
polluted the environment and injured the health of people
nearby. So you want it stopped, and you ask your representative
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to stop it. It turns out, though, that almost all the people who
live near the site of the plant are green voters. It also turns
out that many important pink voters have investments in this
company, and they own the land that the company wants to
buy for the plant at a premium price. So when you go ask the
pink representative – your representative – to stop the plant,
he ignores you, because the plant is good for pinks and bad
for greens. You are left without direct influence over the
legislature, because no-one feels accountable to you, the green
voters of District One. Worse, your own representative now
goes off to the legislature, and he tells the other representatives
that the paper plant is good for the people of District One, so
they should all vote for it. Those other representatives know
that in the future, they may need the support of your
representatives for their own pet projects, so they all vote for
the plant to help him out. The plant is built, the environment
becomes polluted, and pretty soon, your family becomes sick,
just as you feared they would.
So the problem with majoritarian systems is that they tend
to under-represent the minority in a given district. That’s why
we call it the majority premium: these sorts of systems give
the majority a premium, an added influence over and above
their numbers. That premium can become even more
exaggerated than the example that I have given you. Suppose
that instead of two candidates, there are five: the pinks, greens,
purples, blues, and reds. The vote is split between all of these
candidates, so that the front-runner (the pink, let us say)
receives only 23% of the vote. Although he has not received
a lot of votes, he has still received more than anyone else, so
he is elected. In this case, 77% of all the voters in District
One voted for someone else, and they are left without any real
influence over the legislature. It is even possible that those
other voters would have preferred anyone to the pink candidate,
because he has based his election on a promise to oppress
anyone outside his own party. The pink voters – with 23% of
the vote – have effectively become the rulers of this district.
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This example is not just hypothetical: in the United States,
when there have been three-way races for the presidency, the
wining candidate has often received less than 45% of the vote.
Although less than a majority of the country voted for him,
he became the president.
Situations like these are so troubling that some countries
now require that the winning candidate must receive at least
50% of the vote. How do we arrange that? The usual solution
is called a run-off or double ballot system. In this system, we
hold two sequential votes. In the first, all the candidates run,
and if one gets a majority, he becomes the representative. But
suppose no-one gets a majority: then we take the top two, and
we run a second vote with just these two on the ballot.
Everyone votes for his preferred candidate as between these
two.
As there are only two, one will receive more than half the
vote and the other less than half. The winner then goes to the
legislature with the support of a majority of his constituents.
We have language to describe this system: if you can be elected
with less then half the vote, then you are in a plurality system;
if you must have more than half to win, then you are in a
majority system.
The run-off system helps to limit the majority premium,
but only to some extent. Suppose that on the second vote,
the winning candidate gets 52% of the vote. In this situation,
48% voted for someone else, and they are left with very little
influence. In addition, even among the 52% that voted for
the winner on the second ballot, we know that many voted for
someone else on the first ballot – someone other than the top
two who went on the ballot in the run-off. As a result, for
them, the second ballot just offers a choice between the lesser
of two evils.
In short, within each district, majoritarian systems overrepresent the majority. But now let us consider the country as
a whole, rather than just each district at a time. Suppose that
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we have only four districts, for simplicity’s sake. Suppose that
in the country as a whole, 48% of the voters are green, and
52% are pink. And finally suppose that in each district, the
proportions are the same as for the country as a whole, 48%
green and 52% pink. So in District One, who wins? The pink
candidate, with 52% of the vote. And in District Two? Three?
Four? In each case, the pink candidate wins. So let us now
imagine the legislature. How many pink representatives? Four
– out of how many? Four. In other words, the pink party
holds all of the districts. How much power does the green
party have? Essentially none; this is one-party rule. But how
many of the voters support the green party? 48%. So, by the
magic of the majority premium, 48% of the voters hold zero
percent of the power. Again, this situation is note merely
hypothetical: in most majoritarian countries, the majority has
far more than its proportional share of the legislature, because
they are a majority in most districts..
How in the world does this happen? Remember that in
each district, the minority elects no-one; they just lose. If that
happens in each and every district, then they elect no-one in
the whole country, because they are a minority everywhere.
In every electoral system, the minority will receive only a
minority of seats in the legislature. But in a majoritarian system,
the minority usually gets a disproportionately small fraction
of the legislature – smaller than their fraction of the voters.
In some cases, the minority may receive virtually none of the
legislature.
Now suppose that the minority and the majority believe
that they have systematically different interests and concerns,
so that the lines between them are rigid. The majority – the
pinks – will therefore govern wholly in the interests of the
pinks, with some hostility to the greens. If this continues for
decades, the greens may come to feel that the electoral system
allows them no power. Democracy is supposed to be about
self-government, but for the greens, it has begun to feel like a
prison. If they get angry enough, they may resort to armed
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resistance. And Burma, of course, cannot afford a return to
violence.
Districting
Can majoritarian systems limit this majority premium? Can
they find a way to give minorities a proportional share of
power? Most majoritarian systems have tried to find an answer
by drawing district lines in such a way that each group holds a
majority in its fair share of the districts. In other words, if
you are 48% of the electorate, we can try to draw district lines
so that you are a majority in 48% of the districts. That way,
you have a chance to elect your fair share of the legislature.
For example, imagine that we have four districts, 25 voters in
each, 100 voters in all, 25 green and 75 pink. Is there a way to
give each party is proportional share? Sure. We put 15 green
voters and 10 pink voters in district one–who wins? The
greens. In District Two, we put 15 pink voters and the ten
remaining green ones–who wins? The pinks. And the last
two are therefore all pink–who wins? The pinks. So pinks
have three districts to the greens’ one–75% to 25%, exactly
their share of the electorate. In this case, through careful
districting, a majoritarian system has resulted in proportional
representation, with no majority premium. Here is the way
that majoritarian systems can correct the majority premium:
they can deliberately group minorities into their own districts,
so that they control roughly the same percentage of districts
as their share of the citizenry. Abracadabra! The majority
premium goes away.
But we must also remember that we can draw district lines
in a bad way, to further increase the strength of the majority.
When district lines are drawn for dad reasons or in a bad way,
we usually call it gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is named
after Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts politician who figured
out how to use district lines to keep his party in power for a
long time, even against the wishes of the voter. How did he
manage this feat? Again, imagine a country with four districts,
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and 100 total voters, 75 of them pink and 25 green, with 25
voters in each district. We have already seen that you could
draw the lines to give the greens their own district, so they
would have their proportional share of the legislature. But
now suppose that the pinks are in control of the districting
process. They divide voters in the following ways: in District
One, 10 green, 15 pink; in Districts Two, Three, and Four, 5
green, 20 pink; in each. Who wins in District One? Two?
Three? Four? In every district, the pinks are the majority, so
the greens have no representatives in the legislature at all. As
we have already seen, this result could occur by accident in a
majoritarian system, but it is far more likely to happen if a
political party is allowed to draw the lines for their own interest.
And we can do even more amazing things with districting.
Suppose that the country has four districts, 100 voters, 25
voters in each district, but now there are 60 green and 40 pink
voters overall. The pink voters, though a minority, get control
of the districting process. In District One, they put 25 green
voters and no pinks, so the greens win that district. But in
District Two, they put 12 green and 13 pink; in District Three,
12 green and 13 pink; and in District Four, they put 11 green
and 14 pink. Who wins Two? Three? Four? The pink voters
control all three, compared to only one for greens. In other
words, the pinks control 75% of the legislature – even though
they are only 40% of the electorate. Though a minority, they
will run the country, and once in power, they will keep drawing
district lines to keep themselves in power. How did this
happen? The trick is called packing. We pack a lot of green
voters into District One, so they win that one, but there are
few to go around in the other districts. As a result, the other
districts are dominated by pinks. In truth, the greens do not
want 25 voters in District One, because it only takes 13 votes
to win the district. If they have 25, 12 of them are wasted as
a far as the greens are concerned. They would rather take
those votes and distribute them elsewhere, so that they might
control other districts.
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In short, districting is magic. It can take a majority and
make it a minority; it can take a minority and make it zero; or
it can give everyone their proportional share. It turns out that
your share of power depends not only on how many votes
you have but on how those votes are grouped into districts –
in other words, it depends on who is doing the districting. If
you are beginning to think that people can abuse and
manipulate districting for their own selfish ends, you are right.
And that is one of the great problems for majoritarian systems:
someone has to do the districting in a way that is fair. To
district well, we need some standard of fairness for dividing
people into districts. But when their share of political power
is on the line, people are likely to disagree over the proper
standard of fairness.
Let’s ponder what it would take to devise a standard for
fair districting. One possibility is blind districting: we don’t
pay attention to who is going in each district; we blind ourselves
to the identity of the voters; we simply draw arbitrary lines on
the map. The advantage is that because they are blind, people
cannot to manipulate the process. But the disadvantage is
that if you district blind, inj practice, the majority will usually
get more than its fair share of the legislature. Even if you
don’t mean to do so, it just happens. Imagine that your voters
are split 60 pink and 40 green, and they are randomly distributed
across the country. In that situation, even if you draw your
lines at random, you will on average include 60% pinks in every
district–which means that they will win every district. The
greens will still control much less than their proportional share
of the legislature.
So most majoritarian democracies do not district blind.
Instead, they intentionally district so as to divide power in a
fair way. But to know what is fair, we need to decide which
groups have legitimate claims to control some districts, and
how many districts each group has a right to control. But of
course many different groups will apply. In fact, you will find
not only many groups but many different types of groups:
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not only political parties but also racial, religious, language,
and ideological groups all want their slice of the pie. It is not
possible to give them all districts of their own, because there
are simply not enough to go around. So you must decide
which types have legitimate claims, and then you must deny
the others. And this process of exclusion will prove terribly
acrimonious.
For example, suppose that you are districting Shan state
into legislative districts. You decide to have four districts, and
you decide to divide power between the political parties on a
proportional basis. There are three major parties: the pinks
have 50% of the vote, so you give them a majority in two
districts, and the other two parties–the blues and the greens–
each have 25% of the vote, so they get a majority in one district
each. You have worked out a map of district lines that will
divide power in this way, and you are proud about how fair
you have been. But now a group of believing Catholics arrives
on your doorstep. They tell you that they are not part of any
political parties and do not believe in political parties. They
think that religion really matters, and they want to be the
majority in a district so they can choose a good Catholic
representative. You want to give these people a district of
their own, because you think that democracy means that people
get to choose what matters to them, religion or party affiliation.
But here’s the rub: as soon as you start to change your
district lines to create a new Catholic district, you upset your
careful plan for dividing power among the parties. It turns
out that your Catholics live partially in the green district and
partially in the blue district. So you carve out a new district
from those two districts. But now you have five districts – the
Catholic district, the two pink districts, what is left of the blue
district and what is left of the green district – and you only
wanted four. So you combine what is left of the blue and
green districts into one district. In that new blue/green district,
the greens slightly, so they control the district. The blue party
now has no district of its own, so it feels powerless. To make
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matters worse, in the new Catholic district, the voters are about
equally divided between the three political parties, but the pink
candidate usually wins because of better funding. So the
Catholic district elects a good Catholic who is also pink. What’s
the net result? The pinks now have three districts, 75%,
although they are only 50% of the electorate. The greens
have 25% of the districts and of the electorate. And the blues
have 25% of the electorate but zero percent of the legislature.
You have managed to give the Catholics some power, but only
at the cost of under-representing the blues and overrepresenting the pinks.
And it gets worse: if you give the Catholics their district,
then other groups will ask for theirs. Pretty soon you have
religious groups, language groups, occupational groups, and
so on, all clamoring for their fair share of power. Groups like
these put designers of electoral systems into an impossible
position. On the one hand, no electoral system can recognize
all of these groups without unraveling. But on the other hand,
all these groups have a powerful claim. They say that they
have waited a long time for democracy in Burma. They say
that democracy means self-government, so they must be given
a place. They insist that part of governing one’s self is to
decide for one’s self what matters most to one – whether it is
political party, language, religion, or what have you. So when
you tell some of these groups that they will receive no districts
just for them – as you must – you are telling them that they
cannot share control of government in the way that they think
matters.
When you decide which type of group gets how much
power, you have a heavy effect on the future of Burmese
politics. For one thing, you must decide how many districts to
give each group, and obviously this division will determine
just how much political power they have respective to other
groups. But in deciding what types of groups to recognize,
you also have a big effect on the issues that will dominate your
politics. For example, imagine that there are two parties, the
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Free Marketeers and the Communists, with about 50% each,
so you give them each 50% of the districts. Now, if you want
to get a political campaign going in any of these districts, you
need to appeal to what the voters have in common, so as to
get a lot of votes. In each of these districts, there are people
with different religions, languages, ethnicities, and so forth,
but they all share an economic ideology – communism or
capitalism – because we have districted them that way. As a
result, predictably the representatives from the communist
districts will be pushing for a communist economic plan, and
the capitalist representatives for a capitalist plan. But nobody
will be pushing hard for a particular religious agenda, because
all of these representatives have constituents of all different
religions. Politics will be about economic ideology, therefore,
because we have grouped voters into districts according to
their economic ideology.
And we could have grouped them differently, to create a
different sort of politics. Imagine, for example, that the state
is divided 50% Buddhist, 25% Christian, and 25% Muslims.
We intentionally group people so that the Buddhists are
clumped together in two districts, the Christians in one, and
the Muslims in one – perfect proportionality. What will the
politics now be about? Religion, of course. What unites each
of these districts and distinguishes it from the others is religious
identity. To generate a political movement, it will be most
effective to appeal to the voters’ religion. You could try to get
a capitalist crusade going, but it won’t work as well, because
the voters have many different economic ideologies. Again,
we witness the electoral designers quandary: democracy is
supposed to allow the people to choose their own politics, but
in fact, the districter has chosen it for them, by deciding whether
they should be arguing about religion or economic ideology.
And the districter must district on some basis: there really is
not another choice. So the districter ends up deciding, before
democracy even begins, how the democracy should go.
Now let us suppose that we have somehow decided which
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groups should get districts and how many districts each should
have. For example, we will allow only political parties to claim
districts, and we will hand them out in proportion to their
numbers. For a moment, we get the balance just right. But
then we hit another problem: things change. People move
from one district to another; people shift their allegiance from
one party to another. Some groups have higher birth rates
than others. People in some groups (particularly minority
groups) may fail to register to vote in the same proportions as
other groups. Pretty soon, your careful balance has gone
completely out of kilter. If you want to keep the balance, you
must tinker constantly with the boundaries. But if you shift
the districts that often, you create still other problems.
Remember that the great advantage of majoritarian
systems is that they create a stable, close link between the voters
of a particular area and their representative. But if the borders
of a district constantly shift, this relationship breaks down.
This year, you are in District One, but next year, you may be in
District Four. The representative of District One may get to
know her constituents quite well, but then the borders shift
and she must get to know a new group, who may have little in
common with the old ones except their party allegiance.
Because of these problems, most majoritarian systems do not
shift their borders very often. As a result, with district
boundaries stable, the voters and their representatives have a
chance to forge bonds. But the balance of power becomes
ever more skewed, usually in favor of the majority.
In fact, in many countries, including the United States,
the legislature has broad discretion to district in whatever way
it likes. It can give districts to the minority party, or it can
withhold districts. Sometimes, the legislature overtly admits
to gerrymandering: the Indiana legislature, for example, is often
controlled by Republicans, who routinely admit that they draw
district lines to ensure that Republicans remain in power. To
many Americans, this practice is shocking, and they think that
it should be unconstitutional. But if the Court strikes down
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this gerrymandering, it must put something in its place. It
must, in other words, have some standard of fairness for
dividing power among groups. And as we have seen, people
are likely to disagree on of such a standard. So mostly the
courts just stay away and let the parties fight it out.
Majoritarian electoral systems have therefore brought us
to an impasse. Let me rehearse the steps, so you can see that
this impasse is inherent in majoritarianism:
1. In a majoritarian system, the winner takes all; the minority
receives nothing.
2. As a result, majoritarian systems tend to over-represent
the majority: because they are the majority in almost all
districts, they win almost everything, and the minority loses
almost everything.
3. The only way to counter-act this majority premium is
intentionally to draw districts in which the minority
dominates, so they can control their fair share of the
legislature.
4. But if you are going to draw district lines so as to allocate
power fairly, then you need some standard of fairness
according to which you can divide power between groups.
5. But people tend to disagree over how you should fairly
allocate power, so districting battles become heated, with
no obvious right answer.
6. And as a result, some political decision-maker – like the
legislature – will have to decide how much power to give
each social group. But at this point, we must begin to
wonder what has happened to the promise of democracy.
The point in democracy is to allow people to govern
themselves, not to have the government tell them how
much power they are supposed to have. Is there a way
out of this impasse? Not from within pure
majoritarianism. And many people find this problem so
vexing that they adopt a very different electoral system:
197

Designing Federalism in Burma

proportional representation.
(ii).Proportional Systems
The great advantage of proportional systems is that they tend
to give groups a proportional share of power, without a
majority premium. How? In majoritarian systems, the voters
of each district elect only one person, and the winner takes all.
In a PR system, the voters from each district elect a large
number of people, and those people are divided proportionally
between the different parties. If your party polls ten percent
of the voters, then it will elect ten percent of the representatives
from your district. The winner does not take all; the winner
takes only its fair share, and the smaller parties all take their
fair share too.
Let us take the simplest form of PR, generally called closed
list PR. There are five steps in this process.
1. First, we create large districts that elect many people to
the legislature, called multi-member districts. At the most
extreme, we could make the whole country one large
district, so there are no subdivisions. Small countries like
Israel often use this arrangement, and it may be possible
in some of Burma’s states. So in our hypothetical example,
let us imagine that our state is one large district. All by
itself it elects the whole legislature – let us say, one hundred
representatives.
2. Next, the parties nominate lists of candidates to be elected
from the district. Ideally, the parties nominate as many
candidates as there are places to be filled from that district.
In other words, if our district has one hundred
representatives, then each party will run one hundred
candidates, in the hopes of capturing the whole legislature.
These lists will be ranked in order of the party’s preference:
the people that they most want to elect will be near the
top of the list, and the people that they care less about
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will be near the bottom.
3. Each voter in the district then votes for one of the party
lists. Note that they don’t vote for one hundred individuals.
Instead, they vote for one of the party lists as a whole, for
all one hundred people on that list.
4. We then count the vote and determine what fraction of
the votes was won by each party. In our hypothetical,
imagine that the pinks won 37%, the blues won 30%, the
greens won 14%, the purples won 11%, the oranges won
6%, and some very small parties split the remaining 2%
among them.
5. Now, each party receives its proportional share of the
legislature: they get the same percentage of legislative seats
as the percentage of people who voted for them. For
example, if the pinks won 37% of the vote, then they get
37% of the legislature. Since our hypothetical parliament
has one hundred people in it, the pinks get 37 places, and
so the top 37 people on their list become legislators. Most
PR systems have a threshold: to win any places, you must
gain more than a certain percentage of the vote–usually
around five percent. In our example, the smaller parties
split two percent of the vote among them, so none of
them receives any places in the legislature.
Notice the end result: even relatively small parties will
receive some representation in proportion to their actual
numbers in the population. The purples, for example,
command 12% of the votes, and they will receive 12% of the
legislative places. In a majoritarian system, by contrast, the
winner takes all, so that if you won only 12% of the vote in a
district, you would elect no-one. You would just lose. And if
you were only about 12% in every district, you would elect noone at all in the whole country. So people generally think that
PR is much better at giving small groups their fair share of the
parliament.
How do the two systems produce such different results?
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Remember that majoritarian systems use small districts. That
small size, as we have seen, is one of the great advantages of
majoritarianism. But it has a drawback: with small districts,
you can usually only assign one legislator to each district. If
you assigned more, then the legislature would become too huge.
But if each district elects only one representative, then the
majority will win that one place, and everyone else is left with
nothing. You cannot cut the one representative into pieces
and give a proportional share to each party. The result is the
majority premium. By contrast, PR uses large districts with
many members. The large size, as we will see, creates its own
problems, but it allows more accurate representation. If you
elect one hundred people from one district, then small groups
do not have to be shut out: they can receive some small fraction
of the seats, comparable to their fraction of the votes. When
everyone is competing for only one place – the single great
prize – then the largest party will win everything. But if people
are competing for a large number of prizes, then it is possible
to divide them in a more proportional way.
In a new democracy, especially one with a history of
tension, it can be especially important to represent every group
in proportion to its numbers. In a new democracy, people are
often not very committed to the system; they are not sure
whether it will work out. If small groups find that they are
shut out from any voice in the system, they may become
alienated, even insurrectionary. What new, fragile democracies
need above all is broad support, so they can become stable.
That way, people won’t try to overthrow it as soon as times
get hard. Happily, PR can help even small groups to feel that
they have a voice and a place at the table. After being forced
into silence for years, they can suddenly speak. This experience
can be deeply empowering, so they become great supporters
of the new constitution.
But PR has a down-side as well. Its large size allows it to
represent groups accurately, but it also breaks down the
relationship between the people and their representatives.
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Remember that at its most extreme, PR systems designate the
country as one large district. No legislator represents any place
in particular; instead, each legislator represents all the people
of the country. All of the legislators may keep their offices in
the capitol, and they may know little about conditions in rural
districts. Voters may know little about them, and they may
not know where to turn for help. And the parties make up the
party lists: they choose the candidates and place them in a
rank order. People get on the list by being servants of the
party, not by being close to the people of a particular area.
Indeed, in pure PR – what we call closed list PR – the people
do not even vote for candidates as such; instead, they vote for
a party, which chooses who will represent them. As a result,
the central party organization tends to be powerful, and people
sometimes feel that they have no more influence over the party
than over the government itself.
There are ways to limit this downside, but they have their
own problems. First, you could impose residency
requirements: the parties put together the lists, but they are
required by law to include a certain proportion of people from
all different parts of the country. For example, you might
require each party to list at least on candidate resident from
each state of Burma in the top twenty spaces on its list. That
way, it is more likely that someone from, say, Chin State will
go off to the national legislature. In my own view, PR with
residency requirements may be a good electoral system for
the Union of Burma. But residency requirements are not a
perfect fix for PR’s ills. For one thing, although they make it
more likely that there will be legislators from the various states,
they do not guarantee it. For example, suppose that the pink
party wins 10% of the vote for a legislature of 100 people,
but their Chin candidate is number 11 on the list. For another
thing, to get on the list, a candidate from Chin State must
above all earn the favor of the party leadership in Rangoon,
rather than the Chin voters themselves. As a result, the Chin
candidates may not even keep an office in Chin State, and they
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may well be more concerned with developments in the capitol
than in the country.
To make representatives more responsive to people from
the various states, the states might choose to organize their
own state parties and run them in national elections. The
Shan State Party, for example, might field its own list of one
hundred candidates. Now you can be fairly sure that a lot of
people from Shan State will vote for the Shan State Party, so it
will end up with, say, 8% of the national vote. If the legislature
holds one hundred people, the Shan State Party has won 8
seats. And, because these candidates were selected by the Shan
State Party, you can be fairly sure that they will be responsive
to the needs of Shan State and its citizens. But there is a risk
in creating regional, perhaps ethnically identified, parties of
this sort. They can damage the union by creating regional
division, without the broad unifying structure of truly national
parties. And regional parties may not even help the citizens
of the regions themselves: if everyone is organized into a
regional party, then the party from the largest region will
inevitably dominate the legislature. The citizens of the states
might do better to create large, nation-wide parties through
which they can exercise real influence. But, then, of course,
the problem remains: because under PR these large parties
will elect candidates from large districts, there is still no
guarantee that the legislature will contain even a single person
from your state.
Finally, in order to mimic the strong local bond created by
small majoritarian districts, you could create smaller districts
for your PR system. In our example, instead of one district
with one hundred members, we could create twenty districts
with five members each. These districts will be closer to the
people, so they will have some of the advantages of a
majoritarian system. Unfortunately, they will have some of
the disadvantages as well. With fewer members – only five in
each district – it will be hard to divide the legislature
proportionally among the parties. To see this point, let us
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return to our hypothetical example. First, the pinks have 37%
of the electorate: out of the five representatives, they should
get two, which is forty percent, as close as possible to their
37% share. Next, the blues have 30% – but what do we do
with them? We could give them two, which would be forty
percent of the legislature, or one, which would be twenty
percent of the legislature. Neither option accurately mirrors
their electoral strength. And whether we give them two or
three, we create other imbalances. Suppose that we give them
two – forty percent of the legislature, more than their share
of the vote. Notice that the blues suddenly have as many
representatives as the pinks, who actually received many more
votes than they. In effect, the pink victory at the polls has
been stolen by the PR system, which was supposed to be
accurately proportional. And if we give the blues two
representatives, then there is only one left; remember that we
gave two to the pinks, two the blues, and now we have one left
over. That one will have to go to the greens, who got only
14% of the vote but will thus receive 20% of the legislature.
And then all five representatives have been given away – so
there is nothing left for the purples and the oranges, who are
now completely frozen out of the system, just as they would
have been in a majoritarian system.
So let us suppose instead that we give the blues only one
representative. But that’s only twenty percent, much smaller
than their fraction of the vote. And if we give the blues only
one representative, then we still have two more representatives
to allocate; we have given two to the pinks, one to the blues,
and so we have two left over, out of five. What do we do with
these two remaining? Clearly, one must go to the greens, who
received 14% of the vote, and one must go to the purples,
who received 11% of the vote. Notice then this result: we
have three parties, each with one representative – the blues,
greens, and pinks. In the legislature, they have equal power.
But in fact, the blues are far more popular than the other two:
30% as compared to 14% and 11%. Meanwhile, the pinks –
who only received 7% more than the blues – have twice as
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much power as the blues in the legislature. In this situation,
the blues are likely to become angry and frustrated. Pretty
soon, your second most powerful party may be threatening
separation and insurrection, because they don’t think that
Burmese democracy is working out for them.
All PR systems, no matter how big the district, face these
problems. And they all have rules for allocating representatives
in confused cases like these. But those rules cannot eliminate
the inaccuracy that gets worse and worse as the districts become
smaller. People like PR because it represents people more
accurately, but only in large districts. But as soon as you move
to large districts, you create a distance between voters and
legislators. As between pure PR and pure majoritarianism,
there appears to be a real tradeoff. Apparently, you just have
to choose what matters more to you.
(iii). Combined Systems
Is there a way to combine the two systems so that you get the
best of both? People have devised such combined systems.
Though each has its own problems, to many, they seem a
distinct improvement over the pure systems. But it is important
to remember that there is no perfect system. The tradeoff is
real: to the extent that these systems divide power more
proportionally, they tend to move the representatives further
from the people; and to the extent that they move the
representatives closer to the people, they tend to divide power
less proportionally. But it is important to know that these
compromises are possible: instead of choosing either
proportionality or a close bond, you can have some of each.
There are an infinite number of systems to strike the
compromise in different ways. Some offer a lot of
proportionality, but not so much closeness; and others reverse
that priority. It’s good to be aware of all these systems so that
you can choose the one that offers the right compromise for
your particular needs. I will offer just two examples here.
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One possibility is to divide the legislature so that some
legislators are elected from small single member majoritarian
districts, and others are elected nation-wide by proportional
representation. The idea is that the majoritarian representatives
would have close ties with geographical districts, and
constituents would know where to turn for help. As we know,
however, these seats will likely suffer from the majority
premium: members of the majority party will win a
disproportionate number of them. How do we correct this
imbalance? We elect some other representatives by PR, so
that overall, the legislature is fairly split between the parties.
It turns out, though, that making this sort of system work
is more complicated than it might first appear. Let us take a
concrete example. Suppose that we have two parties, the pinks
with 60% of the vote and the greens with 40% of the vote.
Suppose further that our legislature has one hundred seats.
To balance the two systems, we provide that fifty shall be elected
from small majoritarian single member districts, and the other
fifty according to a nationwide PR election. What result?
By hypothesis, the fifty PR seats will be divided 60/40
between the pinks and the greens. The pinks will therefore
receive thirty seats (60% of the 50 PR seats), and the greens
will receive twenty seats (40% of the 50 PR seats). But then
we have the fifty majoritarian seats, which will predictably skew
to the majority. Suppose that the pinks form a majority in
eighty percent of these districts. Even though they are sixty
percent of the voters, they win eighty percent of the races. In
that case, they win forty of the majoritarian seats (that’s 80%
of the fifty seats), and the greens only win ten. What is the
end result? The pinks receive seventy seats (30 from the PR
race and 40 from the majoritarian districts), and the greens
receive thirty (20 from the PR race and 10 from the majoritarian
districts). But that’s not proportional after all: the division
should have been 60/40, not 70/30.
How did this happen? The PR seats were perfectly
proportional, but the majoritarian seats still skew to the
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majority. Half the seats, in other words, are allocated in a
proportional way, but the other half still suffer from the
majority premium. As a result, the legislature as a whole is
still skewed to the majority, because half of its seats are skewed
to the majority. Adding in the PR seats reduces this skew by
half (as half the seats are truly proportional now), but does
not eliminate it. It’s a step in the right direction, but we would
like to do better.
Luckily, there is a way to eliminate the majority premium
in a mixed legislature of this sort. Germany uses a system
like the one that I am about to describe, though I am offering
you a simplified version for the sake of clarity. Let us keep
our example parallel to the one that we have just worked
through. Imagine that the legislature has one hundred seats.
Fifty are elected from single member majoritarian districts, so
that voters feel they have a close connection with someone in
the legislature. But of course these seats will skew to the
majority: although the country is divided 60/40 between the
pinks and the greens, the pinks capture 80% of the single
member districts, and the greens only 20%. How do we rectify
this imbalance?
We hold a second election. This time, people vote not for
a person to represent their local district but for the party that
they would like to govern the country. These are two separate
questions, so it is good to separate them. A voter might, for
example, want the greens to run the country because they have
the best ideas, but for his local district he prefers the pink
candidate because she is more honest. Holding two elections
allows you to vote on these two separate questions separately.
Now suppose that in this second election, the citizenry
divides its votes between the pinks and the greens 60% to
40%. In other words, to reflect the people’s wishes, the
legislature should be divided 60/40 between the pinks and the
greens. To do so, we now allocate the second round seats in
such a way that the legislature overall is proportional. In other
words, at the end the pinks should have 60 seats and the greens
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40. Remember that out of the first fifty seats, the pinks got
40 and the greens 10, because of the majority premium. So,
out of this second group of fifty seats (the PR seats), 20 go to
the pinks, so that they can have 60 total, and 30 go to the
greens, so they can have 40 total. And the legislature is now
proportional to the overall vote. Because the pinks got a superproportionality in the first vote, we now give a superproportionality of the second election seats to the greens, to
balance the scales.
The advantage to this system is that some legislators have
a close tie to a particular place and particular voters, but overall
the legislature is proportional. It seems, at first glance, that
this system therefore combines the best of both worlds. And
it is a very good system – but not perfect. It has at least two
flaws. First, remember that the pinks have captured almost all
of the single member districts because of the majority
premium. Those seats are important, because only those
legislators are likely to have a close relationship to their
constituents. Green voters still suffer from having
disproportionately fewer people to represent their local views
and interests. To have any real power, they must work through
their national party, rather than a local representative – and
that can be hard to do. Second, this system is quite complicated
and difficult to understand – as we have just seen. Complicated
systems can hurt democracy because the people might not
understand how to work them, and so might lose faith in them.
For example, there is evidence that most German voters do
not understand that on the second ballot, they are deciding
the overall balance of power in the legislature; instead, they
think that they are just voting for a second group of legislative
seats.
Some have tried a different approach to combining the
systems: they have developed majoritarian systems that do not
over-represent the majority quite so much. In other words,
though majoritarian, these systems are supposed to be more
proportional – so in that sense, they are like a combination of
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majoritarian and proportional systems. There are many
different varieties of these systems. Most of them are called
cumulative voting systems or alternative voting systems. In
every case, the goal is to allow the minority to have a greater
voice in the legislature, while retaining the advantage of
relatively small districts.
To illustrate the type, let me give you one concrete example.
In this system, each voter is asked to rank the candidates in
the order of his preference. If there are three candidates, the
voter gives three points to his first choice, two points to his
second, and only one point to his third. We then total all of
the votes given by all of the voters, and the candidate with the
highest number of total points wins. To win, therefore, you
want to attract a lot of first place votes, but you would also
like to attract a number of second place votes as well, because
they will help you. What you really don’t want is a lot of third
place votes, because they are worth only one point each. So
you have an incentive to appeal not only to your committed
support but also to people who might give you their second
place votes. In other words, you have an incentive to be
moderate and broad-minded, not narrow and angry.
Let us take a concrete example. Suppose that we live in a
district in Shan State. In our district, there are one hundred
voters divided into three groups: 25 Karens, 35 Shans who are
friendly to the Karens (the Friendly Shans) and 40 Shans who
have decided that they hate the Karens and would like to hurt
them (the Hostile Shans). Each group runs a candidate for
the legislature. In a simple majoritarian system, the Hostile
Shan will win, and the Karens will be in trouble. Again, this
result is typical of majoritarian systems: the majority tends to
dominate, and the minority tends to worry. But now let us
consider how this election would work with our new rankordering scheme. We now count not just the first place votes
but also the second place votes. And now the Hostile Shan
has a big problem. Precisely because he is so hostile, everyone
else puts him last. He gets no second place votes, and so he
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cannot win.
Let us plug in some numbers. The Karen voters all place
their Karen candidate first: 25 votes at three points each totals
75 votes for the Karen. The Karen voters all list the Friendly
Shan second: 25 votes at two points each totals 50 votes for
the Friendly Shan. And the Karen voters all place the Hostile
Shan dead last because they fear him: 25 votes at 1 point each
totals 25 points for the Hostile Shan.
The Friendly Shan voters all place their Friendly Shan
candidate first: 35 votes at three points each totals 105 points
for the Friendly Shan. The Friendly Shan voters then all list
the Karen second because they also fear that the Hostile Shan
will destroy the peace: 35 votes at two points each totals 70
points for the Karen. And then the Friendly Shans all place
the Hostile Shan dead last: 35 votes at one point each totals 35
points for the Hostile Shan.
And the Hostile Shans? Of course they put their Hostile
Shan candidate first: 40 votes at three points each totals 120
votes. They are not happy about their second place choices:
they hate the Karens, but they hate the Friendly Shans about
as much because they view them as traitors and view them as
a more formidable enemy. So we get a split vote. Twenty-five
give their second place votes to the Karen candidate (so that’s
25 votes at 2 points each, for a total of 50 points for the Karen)
and their last place votes to the Friendly Shan (so that’s 25
votes at one point each, for a total of 25 for the Friendly
Shan). And then the other 15 Hostile Shan voters do the
opposite: they give their second place votes to the Friendly
Shan (so that’s 15 votes at 2 points each, for a total of 30
votes for the Friendly Shan) and their last place votes to the
Karen (so that’s 15 votes at one point each for a total of 15
points for the Karen). So in total, the Hostile Shans give the
Karen 65 points and the Friendly Shan 55 points.
And when all is said and done, where does that leave us?
The Hostile Shan gets 120 points from his own people, 35
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from the Friendly Shans, and 25 from the Karens, for a total
of 180 points. The Friendly Shan gets 105 points from his
own people, 55 from the Hostile Shans, and 50 from the
Karens, for a total of 210 points. And the Karen gets 75
points from his own people, 70 points from the Friendly Shans,
and 65 from the Hostile Shans, also for a total of 210 points.
So the Hostile Shan comes in dead last and the Karen and the
Friendly Shan tied for first.
How did this happen? If we look only at the first place
votes, the Hostile Shan would have won, as indeed he would
have in a simple majoritarian system. But because we also
look at second place votes, he lost. Instead, the Karens and
the Friendly Shans swapped second place votes, and that made
all the difference. The Karens and the Friendly Shans, who
would have been voiceless in a regular majoritarian system,
now have some real influence in the legislature. Depending
on the tie-breaking system, one or the other will go off to the
legislature, where they can push for a program of building
friendship rather than hatred. Whoever goes, they all win.
This system thus gives candidates an incentive to do the right
thing: to win, they must get the second place votes of people
outside their own group. The method of counting votes
automatically encourages candidates to reach out.
But again, this system has some serious drawbacks. It
may give the minority some influence, thus reducing the
significance of the majority premium. But when all is said
and done, it is still a winner-take-all system, not PR. In our
example, suppose that the Friendly Shan wins the tie-breaking
procedure because he got more first place votes than the Karen.
He then goes off the legislature, and everyone else just goes
home. The Karen voters may have some influence over the
Friendly Shan, because their second place votes were necessary
to his success. If the Karens had given their second place
votes to the Hostile Shan instead of the Friendly Shan, then
the Hostile Shan would then have thirty points more (because
the Karen would have given him thirty two point votes instead
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of thirty one point votes), and the Friendly Shan would have
thirty points less (because the Karen would have given him
thirty one-point votes instead of thirty two-point votes). The
point totals would then be Friendly Shan 180 points, Hostile
Shan 210 points, Karens 210 points. The Hostile Shan and
the Karen would be fighting it out for first place, and the
Friendly Shan would be out of the running. So the Friendly
Shan must try to keep the Karens happy. But even so, the
Karens have only indirect influence on the Friendly Shan.
When the interests of the Karens and the Friendly Shans, he
will likely choose the Shans. So, with 25% of the vote, the
Karens have only a limited influence on someone else’s
candidate. The Hostile Shans are in an even worse situation.
The Karens and Friendly Shans both voted against the Hostile
Shan candidate because they fear him, so we can imagine that
the new Friendly Shan representative will work hard to defeat
Hostile Shan. With 40% of the vote from this district, the
Hostile Shans end up with essentially zero percent of the
political power. Maybe they deserve to be disempowered, but
still the system is not working in a very representative way.
The proponents of this and similar systems, however,
predict that they will have important long-run consequences
that will reduce this winner-take-all quality. Notice that in our
example, none of the candidates is likely to win without some
support from another party. By giving their second place votes,
the Karens decide the winner as between the two Shan
candidates. So the candidates have a pressing reason to appeal
to the voters of the other parties. They are unlikely to become
rigid and hostile. Parties, voters, and candidates will seek out
areas of common ground and emphasize those. They may
even find that they change their own understanding of their
own interests so as to build bridges. Old angers and prejudices
may melt away in pursuit of shared political advantage. And
because parties shift around in search of a better deal, even
the new alliances will stay fluid. After our hypothetical election,
the Hostile Shans know that if they remain hostile to other
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parties, they will always lose. So they soften their message in
an effort to court the Karen voters. If the Friendly Shans
ever let the Karens down, the Karens may turn to the Hostile
Shans (though we should not probably describe them as the
Other Friendly Shans, since all are now seeking out common
ground) and let them back into power. Pretty soon, everyone
is playing a game of compromise and mutual support, not
angry competition.
In other words, the system of representation is still winnertake-all, but that fact no longer matters so much, because to
win, you must reach out to as many voters as possible. The
legislator does not just go off to parliament and pursue the
interests of his own party members, to the exclusion of all
others. Instead, he will take account of everyone’s interests,
because he cannot afford to overlook the desires of any group
whose second place votes may be critical to his re-election. In
a certain sense, then, this system is proportional in that each
legislator himself will represent the interests of every group
in something like proportion.
But all this works only if the factual prediction is accurate,
that representatives will appeal outside their own party, because
they need the second place votes of others. For that scenario
to hold, at least three things must be true. First, the district
must be divided between a number of different parties, with
none holding a majority. If one party holds a majority, then it
can usually win just with the first place votes of its own
members. As a result, it need not pay any attention to the
interests of voters from the other parties. Second, within the
district, voters from different parties must inj fact share some
common ground. Their interests cannot, in other words, be
implacably opposed. To put it another way, the promise of
this form of alternative voting is that it will give rise to a politics
of the common good. But that will happen only if the voters
share a truly common good. Finally, for this system to work,
the voters must not only have a common good; they must also
be able to see it. And they will see it only if they are not
212

Designing Federalism in Burma

blinded by inherited hatreds. In some places, members of
different religious or ethnic parties will never form alliances
with another. In this case, the candidates have no incentive to
appeal across party lines because they know that they will never
get their votes anyway. In short, the promise of this system is
that even if the election method is winner-take-all, the resulting
politics will not be, because the candidates will look out for
everyone’s good. But that will happen only under particular
circumstances: the district has no clear majority, the voters
possess a common good, and the parties do not feel deep
hostility toward one another.
In other words, no system completely escapes the essential
tension: small districts help create close ties, but large districts
help create proportionality. We can carefully design modified
systems that try to get us small districts and proportionality,
but inevitably we end up compromising one value or the other
or both. No system does both things perfectly, so the task is
to decide where you want to strike your compromise: relatively
greater local ties or relatively greater representative accuracy.
To decide that question, you need to consider what particular
challenges will be facing you in the next several decades. Your
answer must grow out of your own circumstances.
F. Conclusion
It is important for Burma to draft the right constitution,
because it really can help Burma to remain democratic even
through difficult times. In truth, countries that have had civil
war tend to return to civil war, and countries that have lived
under autocracy tend to return to autocracy. But the longer
that a country remains democratic, the more that democracy
becomes entrenched as a way of life. So the first decade of
democracy is critical, and the right constitution can help contain
conflict long enough for democracy to take on some staying
power.
But as important as it is to design the right constitution,
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what matters even more is that the people of Burma seek to
make the constitution work, after it has been drafted.
Constitution-writers hope that if they write the right
constitution, then they will make a better future for their
country. Constitutional scholars hope that it is possible to
know something about the likely effects of particular sorts of
constitutions. But the truth is that in the end, the constitution
is what the people make it. To be sure, constitutional structure
can affect behavior by giving people the right incentives. But
those incentives will work only by touching something already
present in the souls of the people: a desire to make the country
work for the good of all. If you have written a bad constitution
but the people really want to make it work, they will find a
way. If you have written a good constitution but the people
don’t feel connected to it, it will disintegrate. Countries work
because the people want them to work; constitutions just give
them a fighting chance.
We’ve been talking about a constitution as a structure of
rules, a framework for government, to run the country. But
there is an even more fundamental definition of the term: a
constitution is what creates a country, what knits people
together. Constitutions are always therefore based on hope –
the hope that people can assemble in peace to build a common
future. The only way this ever occurs is that people resolve to
work things out together. At the end of the American
Constitutional Convention, a woman asked Benjamin Franklin:
“Doctor Franklin, what kind of government have you given
us?” And he replied: “A republic, if you can keep it.” The
point in this story is that the women wanted to know what the
Framers had given her; but Franklin wanted to remind her
that in the end, it was her responsibility to make this project
work.
So stable countries never just happen; they must be built,
by people. Constitution therefore refers not just to the
document of rules that you are writing. It also refers to the
process in which you are engaged, of trying to come together,
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to forge bonds, to imagine a shared future. As you talk and
learn and write, you are constituting yourself a nation. In
other words, the process through which you are going matters
as much as the end result, the paper that you produce. This is
hard and grueling work, but noble work, almost holy work.
Constitutional states survive because their citizens realize that
they depend on each other to make a good life. Because they
depend on each other, they realize that they need each other.
In the end, they may even love each other, because sharing
hopes for a future is a great gift. Doing this is deeply gratifying;
human beings were created to do this. Yet too seldom do they
have the chance: history imposes on them and drives them
apart. When the opportunity happens to come back together,
it is a miracle. And when you are given a miracle, after all the
words about constitutional design are spoken, you can finally
offer only grateful silence.
Notes:
1. For those who want all the details: In most federal
constitutions, the federal government has the power to make
a treaty on any subject, even on subjects reserved to the states
under the constitution. It would be illegal for the central
government to pass domestic legislation on the subject, but a
treaty is different. Germany may be the single important
exception to this rule. I say that it “may” be the exception
because German constitutional law is not very clear on this
point. Article 32 gives the central government the power over
foreign relations, including a power to make treaties. The
constitution does not, however, explicitly tell us on which
subjects the federal government may make a treaty. Some
experts take the view that the Federation’s treaty power is
plenary; others opine that the central government may make a
treaty on any subject of great political moment; and still others
argue that the federal government may make treaties only on
those subjects that fall within its exclusive or concurrent
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powers. The German High Court has not offered a recent,
clear opinion on the question. (The Concordat case is now
old, written in 1957, and was never very clear. It seems to
hold that if the federal government makes a treaty on a subject
of exclusive Lander power, then the Lander would not be
bound. It does not seem to decide, however, whether the
treaty would be wholly invalid, such that, for example, federal
courts could not apply it in an appropriate case).
One reading of the German constitution, then, would
confine the federal treaty power to those subjects over which
the federal government has been given power. And since the
central government can make treaties only on some subjects,
it seems logical that states have the power to make treaties on
other subjects. In fact, another part of Article 32 gives the
Lander power to make treaties in their own areas of exclusive
and concurrent authority. We could thus interpret the German
constitution to give the federal government power to make
treaties on subjects given to it, and to give the states power to
make treaties on subjects given to them, and to give both of
them power to make treaties on subjects that they share. So
the German constitution seems to give the states some
independent power in foreign affairs.
But things are not so clear. By its terms, Article 32 gives
the states power to make treaties only with the permission of
the federal government. In other words, Article 32 mandates
something like the American system: the states have power to
make agreements only under federal permission, as though
they were federal agents. But there are still two more wrinkles.
First, according to some court cases, when the states make a
treaty within a subject of their exclusive authority, the federal
government must give permission unless it has a compelling
reason to refuse. In addition,
some have argued that even if the federal government
withholds permission, a Lander treaty would still be valid within
an area of its exclusive authority. So perhaps, after all, the
states do have a power to make treaties without federal
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supervision.
If that story has left you confused, you are in good
company, because it has confused German lawyers and
lawmakers themselves. No-one knew what the law actually
required, and everyone desperately needed some clarity. That’s
the reason for the Lindau compact.
2. Even under Missouri v. Holland, the federal treaty power is
not without limits. For one thing, though it can make a treaty
on any subject, the federal government does not necessarily
have the power to enforce any and all treaties, as described in
the text. In addition, although the plenary power allows the
union to make treaties on any subject, it must still respect all
other constitutional limits. For example, although the
government can make an agreement on any subject, it may
not agree to violate its citizens’ individual rights. Imagine that
the federal government makes a promise to exclude people of
a certain religion from the public schools. In our hypothetical,
the constitution gives the subject of education to the states,
but the federal government may still reach it with its plenary
treaty power. The treaty would, however, be unconstitutional
for a different reason: it violates the constitutional rights of
those excluded from school, because it discriminates against
them based on their religion.
3. There is a question whether the states should have the right
to participate in making all federal foreign policy or only on
those subjects that the constitution gives to them in exclusive
or concurrent power. Because the states have power only over
certain subjects, it might make sense to limit their participation
to treaties that address those subjects. For example, if the
states have exclusive jurisdiction only over education, then they
would be able to participate in negotiating education treaties –
but only those. In practice, however, it is difficult to distinguish
education treaties from other sorts of treaties. For one thing,
a treaty might start out about trade but end up about education.
For example, Burma might ask Thailand for importation rights,
but Thailand will agree only if Burma reforms its educational
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system. Suddenly this treaty has become an issue of great
interest to the states, who will have to do the educational
reforming. For another thing, even treaties that may not
directly address education may nonetheless have dramatic
effects on education. For example, suppose that the union
signs a treaty committing Burma to new programs that will
cost a lot of money. Federal taxes will therefore go up, so the
states may feel required to cut their taxes to help their citizens
– but then, with less state money, education will inevitably
suffer. Cases of this sort occur all the time. As a result, it is
probably best to act on the assumption that the states have a
legitimate interest in all foreign policy. They therefore need to
be included in the process across the boards.
**********
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I.

Threshold conditions
A. Religious diversity
B. Economic stability
C. Political legitimacy
D. Religious tolerance

II. Freedom from interference with religious liberty
A. Types of government action that interfere
1. Direct regulation
2. Discrimination on the basis of religion
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C. Protection: a continuum of positions and legal issues
D. When may government override the right?
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Thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. I am
pleased and honored to be here. David has been talking about
the structural issues in constitutional drafting: the division of
powers between state and federal levels, electoral systems, and
so on. I will be speaking about a different aspect of
constitutions: their role in protecting fundamental rights.
Structural issues ask about the basic arrangements of
government power: who has power over what and how they
get it. Fundamental rights ask about the limits placed on the
exercise of government power in the interest of protecting
individuals and groups. In this first session, I will use rights
of religious freedom as an example of fundamental rights and
in the second session I will use rights to gender equality as an
example.
Religious freedom is one of the oldest fundamental rights
to be recognized by the drafters of constitutions. Both the
United States Constitution and the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man include protection for religious freedom. The
right to religious freedom has also been widely acknowledged
in international treaties and conventions and in the
constitutions of most countries. Despite this fact, religious
intolerance and persecution continues to be extremely common
in many places in the world and often leads to more general
human rights abuses, such as torture, and to violent, armed
conflict.
Let me offer a framework for analyzing religious rights
adapted from the work of Prof. W. Cole Durham.1 Prof.
Durham suggests that there are certain threshold conditions
that are necessary to make religious freedom possible. First,
the society must be religiously diverse: if everyone were the
same then there would be no need for religious liberty
guarantees. For better or worse, this condition seems to be
met almost everywhere. Even societies where all members
share a particular religious tradition usually include
disagreement about the meaning and application of that
tradition. Second, the society must have a minimal level of
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economic stability. This is not a very high standard, but
economic instability can make religious liberty harder to
maintain. Under conditions of economic hardship,
governments tend to focus their attention and resources on
economic development without paying too much attention to
the impact on fundamental rights, including religious liberty.
Third, the government of the society must have a minimal
degree of political legitimacy. Governments that are perceived
as illegitimate will generally lack both the desire and the ability
to promote religious liberty. They will lack the desire because
they will be more concerned about repressing challenges to
their power. And they will lack the ability because any efforts
they make to promote religious liberty will be seen with
suspicion and distrust by the population. The final threshold
requirement for religious liberty is that there must be a basic
commitment to religious tolerance in the society. People may
disagree about religious matters, but they must be willing to
live together and respect each other’s right to disagree. This
attitude is less a matter of law and more a matter of culture.
Luckily, most major religious traditions – including Christianity,
Islam, and Buddhism – have some resources for encouraging
tolerance. Thus, protection of religious freedom through law
depends, in part, upon building and maintaining a culture of
tolerance outside of the law as well.
There are two parts to religious freedom and it is useful
to distinguish them and to clarify the relationship between
them. The first part is the right of individuals or groups to
freedom from government interference with their religious
beliefs and practices – let’s call this part freedom from
interference. Sometimes the government interferes by flatly
prohibiting a belief or practice and sometimes it interferes by
discriminating against people of a certain religion in
employment, education, or other government benefits. For
example, some nations require that people holding government
office must belong to a particular religion. In order to assure
this first aspect of religious liberty – the freedom from
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interference – it is not sufficient to prevent direct interference.
Discrimination on the basis of religion must also be banned.
The second aspect of religious freedom is the relationship
between religion and the government – let’s call this religion/
state relations. This part is concerned about government
actions that bring religious beliefs or practices into state
activities – such as prayer or religious education in public
schools. Religion/state relations is about government actions
that intrude into religious institutions, such as government
oversight of church-run schools or hospitals. In these
situations, the government may not be interfering with any
particular person’s religious beliefs or practices, but it is joining
religion to government in ways that may be harmful to religious
liberty. So, we have two aspects of religious liberty: first, the
freedom from interference for groups and individuals and,
second, the relationship between religion and the state.
In the U.S. Constitution, these two aspects of religious
liberty are represented by two different clauses: the free exercise
clause and the establishment clause. The free exercise clause
addresses the freedom from government interference. The
establishment clause addresses the relationship between
religion and the state. There is sometimes tension between
these two clauses: if the government tries to help people to
practice their religion, it may end up establishing religion
(usually the religion of the majority). For example, if a public
school sets aside time during school for voluntary prayer by
students, that might be seen as facilitating the religious practice
of those students and thereby increasing religious liberty. On
the other hand, prayer in the public schools also looks like an
endorsement by government of religion in general, and perhaps
of the practices of certain religious groups in particular, and
might therefore violate the establishment clause.
With respect to each of these two parts – freedom from
interference and religion/state relations – there is a broad range
of issues that might be considered by constitutional drafters.
For example, a basic question regarding freedom from
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interference with religious liberty is which beliefs count as
religious. International law has generally recognized that beliefs
such as agnosticism and atheism should receive the same
protection as conventionally religious beliefs. But what about
political ideologies like communism or philosophies like
existentialism? Is religious liberty simply an extension of
freedom of thought generally, in which case political,
sociological, and philosophical beliefs might get the same
protection as religious beliefs? Or is there something special
about religion that justifies protecting religious belief and
practices to a greater degree than political or philosophical
ones, and, if so, what is it that distinguishes religious beliefs?
One answer sometimes offered by predominantly Christian
societies is that religion is about a belief in a Supreme Being,
but many courts have recognized that this is an unsatisfactory
answer in light of the major world religions, including
Buddhism, that are not best understood in terms of such a
belief. Courts in many countries have struggled with the
definition of religion in cases involving the Church of
Scientology and other newer sects, particularly ones with a
powerful commercial aspect. It is very difficult to design an
adequate definition of religion in terms of the substance of
the beliefs. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a
functional definition. The Court asks whether the belief system
plays the same role in the life of the believer as conventionally
religious beliefs do. Any constitutional system that gives special
protection to religion that is not enjoyed by other sorts of
beliefs and practices must consider the question of the
definition of religion.
With respect to freedom from interference, constitutional
drafters might consider how much protection they wish to
extend to religious belief and practice. Prof. Durham describes
a continuum of protection. At one end, the constitution might
offer only the minimal protection for purely internal religious
beliefs. Such minimal protection would allow citizens to believe
what they want, but only as long as they keep their thoughts
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to themselves. One aspect of this minimal freedom would be
the right to change one’s religious beliefs. There are some
countries, such as the Sudan, in which apostasy is punishable
as a crime and in which even this minimal level of protection
is not met.
The next step along the continuum might protect religious
belief and practice in strictly private settings, such as within
the home and in private meetings only. In some nations,
disfavored religions have been prohibited from constructing
places of public worship: churches, mosques, temples and so
on. In these nations, only private worship is permitted to
those religions.
If a Constitution extends protection to worship in public
as well as private settings, then many new legal issues arise,
including the regulation of religious processions and
pilgrimages, the protection of religious sites, and the ability
of religious organizations and institutions to receive legal
recognition (as corporations or associations) that would allow
them to control property, make contracts, and so on. For
many people, religion is a communal as well as an individual
activity. Constitutional protection for religious liberty must,
therefore, address the rights and powers of religious groups
and institutions as well as of individuals.
The next stage would extend protection to other religious
activities beyond worship, such as teaching and various forms
of religious speech. Several countries, including Great Britain,
have laws prohibiting blasphemy (generally they apply only to
blasphemy against the majority religion). Such laws interfere
with this stage of the continuum. Similarly, a number of
countries restrict proselytizing – religious speech aimed at
converting people. Greece, for example, restricts proselytizing
in its constitution and the European Court of Human Rights
has said that some restrictions on proselytizing are consistent
with the protection of religious liberty in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Russia and certain African nations
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have argued that societies that are struggling to overcome a
history of colonialism or internal religious oppression need
protection against proselytizing. They argue that their
traditional religious cultures are weak because of this history
and must be insulated against attempts by outside groups to
convert their members. Since the proselytizers have both free
speech and freedom of religion claims at stake, this is a difficult
and controversial issue.
The final stage of the continuum would include protection
for religious practices and observances generally, including
many activities beyond the particular practices mentioned in
the previous stages. Many issues arise in such constitutional
systems concerning the practices of religious minorities that
violate the general rules of the society. The question in such
cases is whether people with religious objections to the general
laws ought to be entitled to exemptions from those laws. For
example, where a society conscripts soldiers for its army, should
it make an exception for conscientious objectors (people
religiously committed to pacifism)? Or where a society
prohibits polygamy should it make an exception for those who
engage in this practice as a matter of religious observance? In
the U.S., some religious exemptions were available for many
years but the Supreme Court has recently changed its approach
and denied religiously based exemptions in most cases.
Thus, the continuum of positions on freedom from
interference looks like this:
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At every point along this continuum of protection, another
issue arises: when, if ever, might the government be justified
in restricting religious liberty? Assuming that the constitution
protects a particular belief or practice, is it possible for the
government to justify restricting it nonetheless? For example,
if a religious practice threatens the public health, could the
state prohibit it? Some constitutions, like Canada’s, specify a
standard to be used to determine when the government may
override fundamental freedoms protected by the Constitution.
Canada’s standard allows rights to be overridden where the
limits are reasonable and are demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society. The Supreme Court of Canada has
held that this provision requires that the restriction serve a
very important government goal and that the impact on the
right be proportional to the goal of the restriction.
The European Court of Human Rights also uses a similar
proportionality principle in analyzing restrictions on rights
under European Community law. In the U.S., where the
Constitution is silent on this subject, the Supreme Court has
designed a standard of review which is considerably more
stringent than those in Canada and Europe. The result is that
the U.S. has a more absolutist vision of individual rights and
the government is less able to restrict rights in the service of
other social goals. So, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
has struck down laws prohibiting speech that encourages hatred
on racial or religious grounds. The Court believes that these
“hate speech” laws intrude on the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and cannot meet the very high level of
justification required to override such rights. Courts in Canada
and Europe, on the other hand, have upheld “hate speech”
laws. They find that the government interest in preventing
hatred along racial and religious lines is extremely important
and that these laws restrict freedom of speech no more than
necessary to serve that interest. These different results arise
from different understandings of when the government is
justified in overriding fundamental rights.
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Moving to the second aspect of the problem – the
relationship between religion and state – we find a similar
continuum. At one end of this range, is theocracy: a complete
identification of religion and government. Some current
Islamic states qualify as theocracies. Moving a little from this
end of the continuum, we find states with an endorsed or
established religion but with more separation between that
religion and the workings of the state. England would fall
into this category, as would most of the Scandinavian countries.
Often, such countries have a constitutional commitment not
to discriminate against people who are members of religions
other than the established or endorsed religion. The major
issue in such countries is how to avoid such discrimination in
a system that inherently favors a particular religion.
Moving further along, we find governments that are neutral
as between different religions – they have no favored or
endorsed religion – but they are not neutral as between religion
and non-religion. They see their role as cooperating with
religion and facilitating it. Germany and India would both be
examples of this category. One of the major issues for such
states is whether or not to provide direct financial support for
religious institutions. Another concern is that the government’s
support may have different, and unequal, impact on different
religions.
The next stage on the continuum is separation: the famous
“wall” between religion and the state. The U.S. is the originator
of this approach. Issues in separationist states concern
religious symbols and practices in public life (such as prayers
and references to God in public ceremonies) and indirect aid
to religious institutions. The next stage on the continuum
contains states that say that they are neutral and separate from
religion, but that actually show some hostility to religious
concerns, particularly the concerns of religious minorities.
France may be an example of this point on the continuum.
Finally, at the opposite end of the range from theocracy is
militant secularism and official hostility of government to
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religion, such as in the Soviet Union and Albania.
Thus, the second continuum looks like this:
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The Constitution doesn’t need to resolve all of the legal
issues associated with particular points on both of these
continua, of course. In fact, most of these issues will need to
be left to the legislatures and courts that will interpret the
constitutional provisions in particular circumstances. But
constitutional drafters should be aware of which collection
of questions they are creating for their courts and legislatures
by choosing each position on the continuum.
Countries typically signal their commitment to one or
another of these models of church/state relations with their
constitutional language. Some countries specify the theocratic
basis of their government in their constitutions, such as
Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Some, such as India, France,
Japan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, describe themselves as secular
states. While these different nations mean very different things
by “secular,” it does signal their distance from the theocratic
pole. Many nations have a principle of non-discrimination
on the basis of religion in their constitutions. Some, such as
Brazil, Cuba, Hungary, South Korea, the Phillippines, and
Poland, specify the separation of church and state.
Professor Durham makes an interesting observation about
the relationship between these two continua (freedom from
interference and religion/state relations). It might seem that
as you move away from the theocratic end of the religion/
state continuum and toward the secular end you should also
move toward greater freedom from interference in religious
liberty. But this is not true. In fact, both ends of the religion/
state continuum – theocracy and militant secularism – lead to
less freedom from interference by the state in religious belief
and practice. The greatest liberty on the first continuum seems
to be achieved in the countries that adopt one of the models
in the middle of the second continuum: cooperation or
separation. Thus, one reason to favor the models of
cooperation or separation over the other possibilities is that
they appear to lead to the greatest freedom from interference.
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How else might one choose a position along the religion/
state continuum? Is there any reason to care about the nature
of religion/state relations aside from the impact on freedom
from interference with religious liberty? There are, indeed,
other reasons to care about religion/state relations and the
most important one is that the choice of a position on this
continuum is closely tied to different visions of the nature
and foundation of the state. A theocratic model is based on
the idea that political legitimacy is always dependent upon
religion. A state that wishes to assert an independent basis
for the legitimacy of its political system – such as the consent
of the people – will not adopt theocracy. At the other extreme,
militant and hostile secularism is based on the idea that politics
can control all aspects of life, including those traditionally
understood as religious. This view leaves no room for a private
sphere that is legitimate independent of government. The
range of positions in the middle of the continuum, however,
see both government and religion as independently legitimate,
not dependent on each other but also not overwhelming each
other. These models seek to balance and blend the two spheres
of government and religion. And they must achieve that
balance and blending within the conditions of life of a
particular nation.
This observation brings me to my final point. This
framework for analysis is useful for outlining the range of
issues that constitutional drafters might consider and the range
of positions available to respond to those issues. But which
position a constitution adopts on any of these issues is not
simply, or even primarily, a question of legal theory. It is,
instead, a pragmatic judgment that must be made in the light
of the history and present circumstances of the nation. The
same position – for example, allowing religious education in
public schools – will have dramatically different meanings and
consequences in countries with different histories and different
religious cultures. In Germany, for example, this practice is
seen in light of a history in which the Nazis and other fascist
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regimes tried to make the schools entirely secular. In that
context, religious education in the public schools has the
meaning of maintaining a public sphere hospitable to religion.
In the U.S., on the other hand, religious instruction in the public
schools must be seen in light of a long tradition of separation
of church and state and the current efforts by Christian
fundamentalists to reintroduce religion into many aspects of
public life and politics. In that context, religious education in
public schools would represent a significant retreat from state
neutrality on religion and a victory for a particular religious
view. Thus, in thinking about such choices, constitutional
drafters (and, later, constitutional interpreters such as courts
and legislators) will need to struggle with how best to realize
the ideals of religious liberty within the life of their own
particular nation.
**********
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Gender Equality as a Fundamental Right
I.

Two parts of Gender Equality
A. Government commitment to equality
B. Guarantee of non-discrimination

II. International Law
A. Declarations and Conventions
B. Customary International Law
C. Variation across nations
III. Constitutional Mechanisms for achieving gender equality
IV. When may government override the right?
V. Conflict between gender equality and customary or
religious practices
In this second session, we will continue to look at the ways in
which constitutions protect fundamental rights by using the
example of gender equality. Before we begin, however, I would
like to take a minute to say something about the meaning of
the word “gender.” Obviously, there are physical, biological
differences between men and women. But gender differences
go far beyond biology. In most times and places in human
history, men and women have lived very different lives. They
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have spent the hours of their days engaged in different tasks;
they have fulfilled different roles in their families and
communities; and they have had different ideals and ambitions.
These differences are not required by the biological difference
between men and women. They are largely a result of culture
rather than biology. The word “gender” points to the fact
that the differences are constructed by culture rather than
required by nature.
Moreover, the genders are not just different, they are also
unequal. In most times and places, the roles, tasks, and virtues
assigned to women have had a lower social status than the
roles, tasks, and virtues assigned to men. The word “gender”
reminds us that differences between men and women are
generated by a system, a system composed of thought and
institutions and social norms, a system which creates this great
inequality. So, to adopt gender equality as an ideal is to commit
ourselves to recognizing and eliminating this cultural system
that makes women subordinate to men.
Unlike religious freedom, which has a long history of
recognition as a fundamental right, gender equality is a relatively
new right. In recent decades, it has, however, been codified by
a number of international instruments and has become a wellrecognized obligation of states in the international community.
When drafting a constitution, you may want to bring your
constitutional protection for gender equality in line with
international standards, so I will briefly describe to you the
status of this right under international law.
The principle of gender equality is generally understood
to have two parts. First, the government must be committed
to the ideal of the equality of all people regardless of their sex
or gender. Second, the government must not discriminate on
the basis of gender in the provision of employment, education,
health care, and other goods and services. This two part
principle of gender equality appears in the United Nations
Charter itself. The prohibition of discrimination is repeated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of the
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earliest statements by the United Nations on this topic (1948).
The two major covenants concerning human rights, which a
very large number of nations have signed, are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966).
The second of these covenants again prohibits all signatory
states from discriminating on the basis of sex or gender. Also,
many of the regional conventions on human rights that are
offered for signature by countries within particular areas of
the world prohibit gender discrimination with respect to those
rights and freedoms that they protect. For example, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on
Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights all include commitments to gender equality.
Finally, the most recent and most specific international
agreement on the subject is the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (the Women’s
Convention 1979). Over 100 countries have signed this
Convention. The Convention bars discrimination on the basis
of gender in specific areas of life, including political
participation, employment, health care, education, legal
capacity, and family life. The Convention also calls upon
signatory states to do more than just eliminate discriminatory
laws. States are to promote the full development and
enhancement of women and eliminate discriminatory barriers
to that enhancement in social and cultural life, not just in law.
As Donna Sullivan, one commentator on international law
has observed, the goal of the Women’s Convention is not to
guarantee that women and men are treated exactly the same
way. Instead, the goal is to ensure that gender discrimination
does not interfere with women’s ability to exercise their rights
and to “dismantle the political, economic, and social structures
that perpetuate their subordination.” 2 So, a state should ask:
Do women wield equal political power in our society? Do
they control land and businesses equally? Are they leaders in
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the community equally? Do they do all of the housework and
childcare or is this work shared? The issue is not whether the
law treats men and women exactly the same, but whether it
helps women to improve their status or not.
While conventions such as these are binding only on the
countries that choose to sign them, there are two reasons why
they might be relevant to people engaged in constitutional
drafting. First, a new government may wish to sign such
conventions, either as a way of joining regional organizations
or as a way of seeking recognition from other nations. It
would, then, want its constitution to be consistent with such
commitments. Second, the proliferation of gender equality
rights in international instruments indicates that gender equality
may be attaining the status of customary international law.
While specific conventions are binding only on the nations
that sign them, customary international law is binding on all
nations. Customary international law includes only those
norms that are very widely accepted and understood to be
fundamental. Certain aspects of gender equality – such as the
prohibition on laws that explicitly discriminate on the basis of
gender with respect to fundamental rights – may already be
customary international law, and other aspects of gender
equality may attain this status in the relatively near future.
Now, to say that gender equality is a universal norm of
customary international law is not to say that it means exactly
the same thing everywhere. States have some flexibility in
how they choose to recognize these universal rights and in the
precise form that they take. So, for example, a variety of rules
regarding the inheritance of property might be consistent with
a gender equality norm: no one particular system is required.
But there are two limits here. First, even with respect to areas
where less important rights are at stake, the flexibility is not
endless. Many systems of inheritance rules might be consistent
with a commitment to gender equality, but a system that leaves
women with no meaningful support upon the death of their
husbands and makes them economically dependent upon either
240

Designing Federalism in Burma

his family or their own would not be acceptable. The question
in all such cases is not whether the treatment of men and
women is exactly the same, but whether the treatment of
women maintains their lower status.
Second, some rights are so important that there will be
relatively little flexibility for nations in how they choose to
protect or recognize them. For example, the right to be free
from violence – a part of the fundamental dignity of the
individual person – is so basic and important that a state will
need to protect it carefully and thoroughly. A government,
like the current government of Burma, that refuses to protect
its citizens from violence in general, violates the human rights
of all of its citizens. A government that systematically refuses
to protect its women citizens from violence, violates their
human rights. Effective laws against rape and against violence
within the family, such as wife beating, are required or else the
government will violate the international law commitment to
gender equality.
Last year, I described to you several of the ways in which
the norm of gender equality might be incorporated into a
constitution. These include: (1) a constitutional provision
specifically guaranteeing gender equality and prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex or gender; (2) specific
government agencies designed to consider the effects of
government actions and policies on women and to protect
and promote their welfare, such as a Bureau of Women’s
Affairs; and (3) constitutional requirements that a certain
percentage of government officeholders and elected officials
be women.
The first of these mechanisms – a constitutional guarantee
of gender equality and non-discrimination – is probably the
minimum constitutional protection that a state committed to
gender equality would include and such a provision is common
to many modern constitutions. This is an important statement
of the nation’s commitment and provides a basis for women
to challenge discriminatory practices in the courts. The women
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can argue that such discriminatory practices violate this
provision of the Constitution. The second mechanism – a
Bureau of Women’s Affairs as part of the executive and/or
legislative branch of government – is an excellent way to ensure
that women’s interests and concerns are generally considered
when laws and policies are made. A great deal of gender
discrimination is unintentional: people are simply acting on
the basis of stereotypes or they are unaware of the different
impact of a policy on men and women. This government
agency could bring such concerns to the attention of law and
policy makers and help reduce much of this unintentional
discrimination.
Finally, the third mechanism – a requirement that a certain
percentage of government officeholders be women – is a way
to directly attack the differences in power between men and
women. It gives women the influence over law and policy
that would allow them to make sure that their viewpoints and
concerns are heard and considered. It also contributes to the
dismantling of gender hierarchy elsewhere in society, by
providing examples of women with power that could be
emulated by people in business and other arenas. There are
several ways in which such a requirement could be
implemented. One possibility is that for each seat in the
parliament or legislature, if a woman has not been elected in
the past two election cycles, then only women may run for
that seat in the next election. This guarantees that at least
one-third of the legislature will be women, and that every local
constituency will have a woman representative at least onethird of the time. Such strategies for assuring that women
hold a certain percentage of the offices of power are the newest
and least common form of constitutional response to gender
equality. Perhaps a democratic Burma could lead the way on
this innovative new approach to gender equality.
As with religious freedom, one issue constitutional drafters
should consider is under what circumstances, if any, the right
to gender equality can be overridden by the government.
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International tribunals have adopted a standard for gender
similar to the one they use for assessing government intrusions
on religious rights. The European Court of Human Rights,
for example, has said that a nation’s reasons for overriding
gender equality would need to be “very weighty” and consistent
with the principles which normally prevail in democratic
societies. Morever, the means chosen must fit the asserted
goal: this is a version of the proportionality review I discussed
with respect to religious freedom. 3
There is an argument that the standard used in equality
claims should be even stricter than the one used to assess
government actions that override other fundamental rights.
Where a government restricts rights in general – for example,
the free speech rights of everyone — the democratic process
will generally ensure that the goals of the restriction are
important and that the restriction is proportional to those goals.
The majority will allow restrictions on its rights only where
those restrictions are likely to be justified. But where rights
are restricted only for a particular portion of the population,
identified by gender for example (particularly where that
portion of the population enjoys less political power than its
numbers would suggest), the democratic process will not work
as an effective check on government abuse. The powerful
majority will not necessarily care about protecting the rights
of a less powerful group and may allow intrusions on their
rights that it would not tolerate for itself. 4 Thus, if a
constitution includes a standard for assessing government
claims to override fundamental rights, it might specify a
somewhat stricter version of the standard for claims in which
the rights affected belong to a less powerful and historically
disadvantaged group.
One of the most difficult problems concerning gender
equality arises from the conflict between a commitment to
this equality and the protection of cultural practices that
discriminate on the basis of gender. Many traditional
communities have rules and customs, both religious and
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culturally based, that treat men and women differently. For
example, under Jewish religious law, which is enforced in Israel,
only a man may seek a divorce; the woman is not allowed to
do so. Or, under Shari’a or Moslem law, which has been
codified in a number of countries, including Egypt and
Morocco, female heirs, including wives, inherit a smaller
proportion of the property of their dead husbands or fathers;
a larger share goes to male relatives of the dead man. Or, to
take an extreme example, India has struggled to eliminate the
Hindu custom of sati, in which a widow is burned to death on
her husband’s funeral pyre.
Sometimes these rules and customs are recognized and
enforced by the nation as customary or religious law. In such
cases, there is a serious conflict between the nation’s
commitment to gender equality and its commitment to
maintain the religious and cultural rights of the communities
wishing to enforce customary law. Even where the nation has
no courts or police to enforce customary law, and where the
religious or cultural community must impose its rules through
its own private systems, the conflict may arise. Imagine a case
where parents seek to impose a religious custom on their
daughter, perhaps involving physical mutilation, like foot
binding, or perhaps involving removing her from school before
the age at which the state normally allows. Under other
circumstances, such physical mutilation or denial of education
would be illegal. But if the state seeks to enforce such laws,
the parents will raise a religious freedom claim, arguing that
they are entitled to an exemption from the general laws in
order to practice their religion. If the Constitution protects
both religious liberty and gender equality, then a court will
need to weigh their religious freedom claim against the
government’s interest in promoting gender equality.
There is no simple formula for resolving such conflicts.
Moreover, it is likely that the resolution is best left to the courts
or administrative agencies to struggle with in particular cases,
rather than addressed in the constitution in general. But
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constitutional drafters who include both strong religious and
cultural rights and strong gender equality rights have not
committed their countries to an impossible dilemma: there
are some general principles to guide decision makers in
resolving such conflicts. There are three basic considerations:
first, how important is the denial of gender equality involved;
second, how important is the religious or cultural practice
involved; and third, what is the role of the government in
enforcing the practice.
First, not all denials of equality are equally important.
There is a fairly widely recognized hierarchy of rights, and
denials of gender equality that affect the more fundamental
rights should be regarded as more significant than those that
affect less important rights. Cultural practices that lead to
death or serious physical harm for women or girls must be
regarded as extremely serious violations of equality. Examples
of such practices include sati, genital mutilation, foot binding,
and refusal of medical treatment. Cultural practices that
seriously restrict important civil, political, social and economic
rights are the next category. This would include denying
women the right to education, speech, political participation,
basic economic security, and so on. And cultural practices
that affect only relatively minor rights – such as covering certain
parts of the body in public or performing certain ritual acts
like bathing – would be a less important category of inequalities.
Even with respect to important rights, such as bodily integrity,
there are more major and more minor intrusions on such rights.
A religious practice that leads to death or serious injury is very
different from one that leads only to minor or temporary pain,
such as the piercing of ears or nose. So, both the importance
of the rights at issue and the degree of intrusion on those
rights is relevant.
The same assessment must be made for the religious
freedom claims. Is the practice at issue one that is centrally
important to the religious or cultural group? On this question,
secular authorities like courts will generally have to accept the
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claim of the members of the religion, but there will often be
authorities within that religion to whom they can turn for such
information. A practice that is allowed but not required, like
polygamy in many cultures, might be seen as less important
than one that is mandatory, such as the ban on abortion in
Catholicism. Practices that are closely associated with religious
worship, such as the ban on women priests in certain religions,
might be seen as more central than ones that are more practical
guidelines for life, such as the food preparation requirements
of kashrut in Judaism. And the degree of impact on the
religious or cultural practice is also relevant. Even a mandatory,
important practice may be restricted by a law that simply makes
it a little more burdensome rather than completely prohibiting
it. For example, imagine a religion that prohibits boys and
girls from being educated together. If all public schools are
coeducational, then the religious group might have to fund
religious schools itself in order to educate their boys and girls
separately. The law requiring public schools to educate both
boys and girls would not, for that reason, be an interference
with their religious freedom even though it makes it more
expensive for the religious group to practice its beliefs. A
religious or cultural practice could justify a denial of gender
equality only if it were both an important practice and it would
otherwise be restricted in a substantial way.
Finally, in assessing such conflicts, the role of the state in
enforcing either the religious rules or gender equality is
significant. In the education example above, for instance, the
state is free to promote gender equality in its own schools, but
it would be much more problematic if it sought either to
enforce the religious rule in the public schools or to enforce
the gender equality norm in the religious schools. To force all
children to attend single sex schools in the service of a
particular religious view would probably violate both gender
equality norms and the religious freedom of people of other
faiths. On the other hand, to refuse to allow religious schools
to operate as single sex schools would probably be an intrusion
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on religious rights that is arguably unjustified by the promotion
of gender equality. If the state is merely allowing private
persons to run their own institutions in gender unequal ways,
like a single-sex religious school, that is very different from
running state institutions in that fashion. There are many
instances in which religious freedom rights would justify a rule
allowing private parties to discriminate based on gender but
would not justify a rule allowing the state to do so. And,
conversely, gender equality might often justify the state in
refusing to support a religious practice even if it would not
justify the state in completely prohibiting that practice.
As the potential conflict between religious or cultural rights
and gender equality rights indicates, constitutional drafters must
consider not only the boundaries of each individual right but
also the interaction between rights. Conflicts between rights
pose difficult challenges, but they are not impossible to resolve.
They require attention to the specific situation and a careful
balancing of the concerns on both sides. But such potential
conflicts do not justify ignoring the claims of either of the
rights involved.
As both religious freedom and gender equality rights
demonstrate, fundamental rights issues can be very complex
with no clear right answers. This can be frustrating both for
the drafters of constitutions and for those, like the courts and
legislatures, that interpret constitutions. But one of the most
important tasks of a constitution is to provide for fundamental
rights. Even if you have a perfect balance of power between
state and federal governments; even if you have an accurate
and delicate voting rights system, you cannot have a just society
without protection for individual and group rights. Because
democracy is not enough to generate freedom and justice: even
democratic societies can violate the rights of their citizens.
But how can a constitution, a piece of paper, prevent this?
Imagine a country where the government not only controls
military and economic power, but also enjoys great legitimacy
because it is a real democracy, representing the will of the
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majority of its people. If that government decides to violate
some fundamental right, how can the Constitution stop it?
The first answer is that constitutions do not always succeed
in stopping such violations. Particularly in times of national
crisis, such as wars, courts and legislatures may ignore the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. But the amazing thing is not
that constitutions sometimes fail, but rather that they
sometimes succeed. Sometimes, this flimsy piece of paper
stands between the might of the state and a vulnerable
individual and it protects that person.
How is that possible? It is possible because, and only if,
the Constitution captures the deepest hopes of a nation for
freedom and justice. Then, when the people look at their
Constitution, they will see not only the practical minimum
necessary for them to live together in peace, but also the ideals
toward which they strive. If they see their Constitution this
way, as a statement of their ideals, then it may be able to restrain
them when the passions of the moment would lead them to
violate fundamental rights.
So, constitutional drafters have a large and difficult task.
In drafting provisions to protect fundamental rights, they must
try to find the words that will touch the hearts of their people.
They must speak for the ideals that those people care about
deeply enough to stop them on those occasions when they
really want to ignore their ideals. The Constitution draws on
existing commitment to those ideals, but the Constitution itself
also contributes to the creation of that commitment. Writing
your ideals into a Constitution, builds those ideals into a shield
that can stand against the desires of the people, even a majority
of the people. The process of drafting itself, the conversation
about your ideals, can help to strengthen them and make them
effective in a crisis. Thank you for inviting me to be a part of
this conversation.
**********
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Notes:
1

See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework 1 in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal
Perspectives (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds.) (1996).

2

See Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward
a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24 J.Int’l Law & Pol. 795, 800
(1992).

3

See Belgian Linguistics Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.A) at 34 (1968).

4

The most famous version of this argument was offered by John Hart
Ely in his book, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
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